What can the history of relations between Iraqi Shia and Sunni Muslims reveal about the prospects for future peaceful power-sharing in a new democratic Iraq? On March 30, 2004 the Institute hosted a presentation by senior fellow Amatzia Baram to explore this and other questions on state-mosque relations in Iraq. A noted expert on Iraqi politics, Baram's presentation explored the tensions between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq and traced their origins in the history of Saddam Hussein's alternating policies of accommodation, co-optation, and repression toward these communities. From this historical overview of Ba'ath Party policies, he drew lessons for the management of Shia-Sunni relations by coalition forces and the new Iraqi regime scheduled to take office in July. Baram also evaluated how the provisional constitution has addressed state-mosque relations, and the ongoing dilemmas this issue will pose for the final constitution.

A professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Haifa in Israel, Baram is a prolific author and editor of several books and dozens of scholarly articles on Saddam Hussein and Iraqi politics and history. His insights have been frequently featured in print, radio, and television interviews.

Report Summary

Mokhtars from Abu Ghrayek of the Babel Governate in Iraq participate in a USAID program to reform local governance throughout Iraq
USAID Photo

Baram began by noting that "this is a moment of great danger, perhaps the most dangerous days of the coalition presence in Iraq." As an historian, he believes that there are valuable lessons from the history of state-mosque relations which may prove useful for all of those working to build a stable foundation for a democratic Iraq.

The Politics of Co-option: Sunni-Shia Relations Under Hussein

Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party resorted to a number of techniques to split Iraq's majority Shia community and render their opposition ineffective, according to Baram. The party tried, and, in many cases succeeded, to co-opt Shi'i clergy. Thus, following massive anti-regime demonstrations in February 1977, the regime issued a new "Law of the Service of Men of Religion" which turned them into government officials, with a salary increase of between 50 and 100 percent and extensive social benefits. Many ulama were either lured or coerced into expressing support for the regime. Those whom the regime could not buy off or coerce, they deported, imprisoned, executed, or assassinated.

In addition, the regime adopted a variety of methods to neutralize anti-Ba'th sentiments at the grassroots of Shi'i society. To demonstrate that Shi'i values were dear to their hearts, Ba'th politicians claimed over the years that the state spent large sums of money on the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. Providing other religious services like building mosques and improving services for pilgrims was given high media exposure. A closer scrutiny reveals, however, that investment in Shi'i mosques and smaller places of religious assembly was far lower than that in Sunni ones.

The regime also tried to win the Shia over by the adoption, or "nationalization," of Shi'i commemoration days and festivals. Their attempt to co-opt the mass processions of the 'Asura provides the best example. The 'Asura commemorates the 10th day of the month of Muharram, when in 680 A.D. Imam Husayn ibn 'Ali, the Third Imam of the Shi'a, was killed at the hands of Umayyad ("Sunni") troops in Karbala. From 1973, the state organized public rallies that equated the martyrdom of al-Husayn with the struggle of the Ba'th Revolution against the enemies of the Arabs. In addition, Hussein's family began in 1971 to promote the notion that the family and tribe were offspring of the Prophet, of his cousin and son-in-law Ali, the First Imam, and of al-Husayn. This became a part of Hussein's official biography from his takeover of the presidency in 1979, and his "special relation" to Najaf and Karbala, the resting places of his "ancestors," was mentioned on almost every Shi'i occasion.

By allowing Shi'i party members to rise to the highest echelons of party leadership and state bureaucracy, the regime sought to win some legitimacy in Shi'i eyes. Thus, for the first time since 1966, the Eighth Regional Congress of January 1974 elected Shi'i members to the Regional Leadership (RL), the top party body. In the elections of January 1977 the number of Shi'i Arabs in the RL rose sharply, from three to as many as ten out of twenty-three members. At the very least, their percentage share doubled, rising to anywhere between 26 and 43 percent. It should be noted, however, that except in rare cases, Shi'is had not become ministers of defense and the interior, the two most important government positions.

Shia and Sunni Politics after Hussein

Moving to current events Baram pointed out that, Shi'i groups are gearing up for the coming elections, and competition is already fierce. At least for now the Hawza has managed both to rein Sadr in, and yet to remain above the fray, but when the elections come they will very likely advise their followers to vote for the political parties of the senior clergy's choice. While the Hawza is a difficult and sometimes hypocritical partner for the U.S. led-coalition, Baram noted, it is a recognized and legitimate leading body, with whom the coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council can have a direct or indirect dialogue. Baram also pointed out that in contrast to how Grand Ayat Allah Sistani has been portrayed in the Western press, a closer look at his record and statements shows that he is much more accurately described as moderate politically. However, "don't ever forget, " Baram cautioned, "a moderate ayatollah is still an ayatollah."

The primary dilemma faced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regarding the Sunni Arabs of the triangle, Baram stressed, is that they do not have such leadership. Instead they are furious, frightened, and alienated— a combination that provides a fertile soil for extremism. Unlike the situation with the Kurds and the Shi'a, there is no authority acceptable to most of them. Saddam Hussein is in prison, as are most of his lieutenants. This is one of the primary reasons, according to Baram, that the CPA's concentrated efforts to establish a dialogue with their leaders has so far faltered. This situation has been further complicated as those who speak to the CPA often receive death threats and several Iraqis working in positions for the CPA have been assassinated.

Final Thoughts

In closing, Baram examined the Iraqi groups fighting American forces. Citing several examples of recent violence in Iraq, Baram observed that the insurgents consist mainly of two camps: the ex-Ba'thists, or "Saddamists," and Islamists of various hues and shades, including Salafis and Wahhabis. While the Saddamists are running out of both money and leaders, the Islamists, on the other hand, have proven themselves to be a serious challenge to security in Iraq over the past month. These are the same young men who were attracted to the mosque when Hussein launched his Faith Campaign in 1993. According to Baram, much of the recent violence has been conducted by Salafis and Wahhabis who are ultra radical and have a large core of foreign supporters from which to draw. With local clergymen leading them, and reported financial support from Sunni Arab donors in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, Islamists have successfully recruited volunteers from across the border in Syria and Jordan to conduct suicide bombings and other acts of violence.

Baram stressed that finding ways to address the continuing threat of political violence from Islamist groups in Iraq will be a critical factor in building a stable foundation for state-mosque relations in a new Iraq. "When you have homicidal organizations recruiting suicidal people, you have a serious problem," Baram warned in closing.