Establishing an autonomy arrangement is proving to be a popular scheme to resolve ethno-nationalist and secessionist conflicts, but the experiment has not proved to be successful everywhere. In his project report, Institute Senior Fellow Benedicto Bacani focused on the Philippines, where autonomy as a political arrangement has been so discredited that, in the ongoing negotiations between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the revolutionary group served advance notice that it would not accept a similar political arrangement. Still, Bacani believes that autonomy is the only viable compromise that will bridge the minority's demand for independence on one hand, and the assertion of the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, on the other. According to Bacani, it is imperative for all parties to come up with a creative solution combining many forms of government.

Moro Autonomy: An Overview

Moros, the indigenous and mostly-Muslim population of the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, are in the majority in five provinces of Mindanao and in the Islamic city of Marawi. From the perspective of the Moros, the Philippine national government in Manila is continuing the colonial policy of complete subjugation of Moroland. Autonomy for Muslim Mindanao has its roots in the Tripoli Agreement entered into by the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on December 23, 1976, but the negotiations between the government and the MNLF collapsed in 1977. Periods of tense negotiation were interspersed with the ongoing conflict until 1989, when President Corazon Aquino signed an act creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Unfortunately, this did not serve to stop the conflict, because the MNLF boycotted the plebiscite establishing the ARMM, and only four provinces voted to join. In 1992, President Fidel Ramos reopened negotiations with the MNLF, which culminated in the agreement to establish the Southern Philippines Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), composed of 14 provinces (including a newly established province) and nine cities under the Tripoli Agreement. The 1996 Jakarta Peace Accord provided for two developmental stages of the SZOPAD.

But, as Bacani asserted, the enormous task of rebuilding conflict-affected communities and coordinating development efforts in the SZOPAD was too much for the MNLF members, who found themselves in the totally unfamiliar terrain of public administration. In addition, the national government failed to enact a new Organic Law within the three-year transition period; nor did it provide material resources for SZOPAD development. Manila blamed the ARMM for mismanagement of government funds and for its failure to bring in development despite the large sums of money supposedly provided by international aid organizations. In March 2001, the Organic Law implementing the Jakarta Peace Accord was finally approved. The province of Basilan and the city of Marawi voted to join the four provinces of the ARMM, and elections were held in November 2001.

Flaws in the Autonomy Arrangement

There is near unanimity in the Philippines and elsewhere that autonomy has not brought durable peace and prosperity in southern Philippines. Bacani explained that skepticism about the ARMM is not without basis. Despite the grant of autonomy, the region continues to have the worst human development indicators (including poverty and mortality rates) in the country. Bacani contends that since 1989, the autonomous region have failed to reduce the level of violence and armed conflict within the area of autonomy. Calls for secession, clan wars, political violence and terrorism remain serious concerns. With the failure of the 1996 Peace Agreement and autonomy to bring lasting peace and development, a breakaway faction of the MNLF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), began waging another armed struggle that is more radical, religious, and Islamic than the MNLF. The MILF, which has been linked to terrorist groups, demand an independent Islamic state for Mindanao. Two major wars in 2000 and 2003 claimed the lives of thousands of combatants and civilians and displaced around 100,000 residents.

Bacani highlighted the basic flaws in the foundation and implementation of the arrangement that doomed Mindanao autonomy from the beginning. Most importantly, the central government and the autonomous region have failed to engage in a constructive and critical partnership to make this new relationship work. A major problem in the Philippines is that the negotiators let the euphoria of signing the peace deal obscure the ongoing conflict, so that they regarded the arrangement as an end in itself, rather than as a tool to address the grievances that led to the rebellion in the first place. The 1996 Peace Agreement provided for the implementation of the Tripoli pact in phases, but in the actual implementation, the phased approach was largely set aside and Manila acted as if the agreement was the final text.

Secondly, the asymmetric relationship between Manila and the MNLF in a post-agreement autonomy arrangement exacerbates this negative state of affairs. Manila has undermined autonomy in Mindanao by interfering in the political processes there. In short, the central government's policy on Mindanao autonomy is short-sighted, and lacks coherence and consistency necessary to allow the maturation of the region's political institutions. Making matters worse, the MNLF is contributing to the weakening of Mindanao's autonomy by its failure to assert its powers, allowing Manila to dictate the terms and implementation of the arrangement. Why would the MNLF do this? First and foremost, the MNLF does not have a clear political platform. The regional government became the MNLF's "milking cow" and employment agency, where personal ambitions and self-interest ruled. It was not clear whether the MNLF really had a blueprint on how to govern a regime of self-rule for the Moros.

Thirdly, Bacani emphasized that the MNLF's insistence on the Tripoli Agreement as the framework of a negotiated settlement in 1996 doomed Mindanao autonomy. Much has changed since 1976. The establishment of the Special Zone for Peace and Development, to be led by the MNLF, was a failure from inception because there was no sufficient incentive for the non-Moro areas to buy into the idea of the SZOPAD and eventually of the autonomous region. Perhaps it is a more optimistic sign that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is now willing to settle for a negotiated settlement that will cover only Moro-dominated areas.

Possibilities for a Lasting Peace

Taking these issues into consideration, Bacani asked whether autonomy can work in territories which are not contiguously located and are inhabited by thirteen different ethno-linguistic groups bound together by only the same religion. Further complicating the issue, the MNLF itself has broken into five factions. These various forms of fragmentation, compounded by unreliable communications and transportation infrastructures, all work against strengthening regional autonomy. The boundaries of power between the Philippine national and regional governments are vague and subject to multiple interpretations. There are also concerns about the objectivity of the Philippine courts, and problems such as corruption, politics, and inefficiency.

Bacani noted that there is a correlation between failed or failing autonomies and failed or weak states. This is understandable, since weak political and socio-economic systems, poverty, unstable rule of law, and violations of human rights all contribute to the marginalization and oppression of minority groups. The irony is that the success or failure of autonomy also depends largely on the capacity of the same weak political and economic systems to make autonomy work as an effective vehicle in addressing the grievances of the minority. But, Bacani remains optimistic that autonomy and a weak/failing state are not totally incompatible, and it is possible for a political arrangement to have a life and dynamism of its own—even within the context of weak political and socio-economic institutions. Under the current arrangement, though, the instability of the Philippines' political institutions renders both the national and regional governments incapable of staying the course in making autonomy work. While the constitution and statutes clearly intend a modicum of self-rule for the Moros, the infrastructures for carrying out this national policy have failed miserably in addressing the social and historical ills that led to the initial Moro uprising.

In Bacani's assessment, the three major players in the Mindanao project seem to have varying opinions on whether autonomy is still a viable option for peace. For Manila, autonomy is the only option, although it is open to adjustments. The MNLF will certainly resist any change that will imperil its leadership of the region. And the MILF is said to be looking at other options including a federal system, a commonwealth, an association of free states or outright independence for the Moros. The MILF has to contend with questions of legitimacy, as its extremist views and alleged ties to international terrorist groups threaten its ability to speak for all Moros. The only way out for the parties is to avoid putting labels during negotiations on their preferred political structure, because it is possible to combine different features of political systems. It is imperative that the parties consider autonomy as a broad concept, exploring its dynamic nature, in order to arrive at a formula with enhanced chances of success. After all, most of the problems raised in Mindanao deal more with implementation than the structure itself, so counting autonomy out as an option may be premature.

Final Thoughts

Bacani maintains that in order for autonomy to mature, the region and the central governments must engage in continuous negotiations to resolve disputes on the allocation of powers and resources, the heart of this autonomy arrangement. But such a relationship requires that the parties treat each other as partners, something not evident in either Manila's treatment of the regional government or in the regional government's subservient stance towards the center. Autonomy will only be successful if leadership and public offices are equitably distributed among the various ethnic groups.

Benedicto Bacani has spent much of his professional career promoting peace and development in the southern Philippines. He is the dean of the College of Law at Notre Dame University in Cotabato City, Mindanao, where he is also an associate professor in political and administrative law and human rights and international law.