KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
From an Israeli strategic calculus, the unexpected and precipitous fall of Assad at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a simultaneous cause for cautious optimism and concern. Assad’s fall removes the final keystone of Iran’s arc of proxy and allied resistance through which it was able to engage Israel across its borders. With Hezbollah decapitated and depleted in Lebanon, and Iran’s resupply land route through Syria gone, Israel has removed a significant threat to its security.
However, what comes next from Syria is unknown. In keeping with the pragmatism that has characterized his messaging to the outside world, Syria’s de facto new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (more popularly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) reportedly told Palestinian factions in Syria that they must disarm, and has stated that they are not seeking conflict “whether with Israel or anyone else and … will not let Syria be used as a launchpad for attacks.”
These words and Jolani’s vow to uphold the 1974 disengagement agreement that saw a buffer zone established between Israel and Syria may be cautiously welcomed by Israel. But its experience of being blindsided by Hamas on October 7 will keep it skeptical of the largely untested al-Qaida offshoot. These calculations prompted Israel to take rapid military action — within days destroying Syria’s military capabilities, seeking to neutralize the capacity for HTS or other groups to pose a military threat. Al-Jolani has accused Israel of using “false pretexts” to justify their actions, given the exit of Iran and Hezbollah from the scene.
Early on in the crisis, Netanyahu declared the “collapse” of the 1974 agreement and ordered the Israeli military to take control of the demilitarized area, a move he has said is temporary but also “for the foreseeable future,” until “another arrangement can be found that will guarantee Israel’s security.” From here, Israel has taken up position on Mt. Hermon, the highest vantage point in Syria from which Israel has clear lines of sight across that country as well as Lebanon.
The Israeli government has also decided to “encourage demographic growth in the Golan” — the area Israel captured from Syria in 1967, retained after a 1974 disengagement, and annexed in 1981. (After a 2019 U.S. decision, the U.S. is the only country that recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan.) Netanyahu stated last week that that Golan Heights will “forever be an inseparable part of the State of Israel,” just 13 years after the territory had been in serious play as a land for peace bargaining chip between Israel and Syria.
Beyond the calculus and implications for Israel of the road ahead vis-à-vis Syria, its own and others’ posture in weeks and months ahead stands to have implications for a broader set of Israel-regional relations and dynamics.
Israel shares its longest border with Jordan. Since the two countries’ 1994 peace agreement, security cooperation has remained strong and a mutually acknowledged interest, even as the relationship has been heavily strained primarily over the Israeli government’s posture toward the Palestinians. Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza has only exacerbated this dynamic. However, a significant impetus for the sustained strength of the Israeli-Jordanian security relationship has been the shared threat perception of Iran.
With Iranian influence in Syria largely neutralized, Jordan’s stability remains heavily reliant on the prevention of chaos filling that vacuum. In turn, destabilization in Jordan is a deep concern for Israel. It is in that context that Israel and Jordan reportedly engaged in talks last week to discuss the unfolding events in Syria, and that Jordan is playing a go-between role between Israel and HTS. As Israel and Jordan continue to navigate their deep divisions, the precariousness of the situation in Syria ensures that the delicate balancing act of maintaining strategic and mutually beneficial security cooperation will continue. However Jordan’s strong condemnation of Israel’s incursion into the buffer zone with Syria is a reminder that a new set of challenges risks adding more tension to an already delicate relationship.
As a long-time supporter of HTS, without whom the latter could not have executed its takeover of Syria, Turkey is positioned to be the most influential outside actor in the country. With a recent history of deeply strained relations with Israel, in particular over the country’s strong stand against Israel and support for Hamas in the ongoing Gaza war, the stage is potentially set in Syria for a new front over which to clash.
In recent days, Turkey has strongly condemned Israel’s move into the buffer zone, with Erdogan accusing Israel of “displaying its occupier mentality.” Israel countered with its own accusations against Turkey, describing it as “the last country that can speak about occupation in Syria…” Now, with Israeli and Turkish forces operating in different parts of Syria, the possibility for unintended conflict increases. On the other hand, this realization and the deepening stakes could incentivize approaches toward deconfliction, particularly with both countries sharing a strong interest in Syrian stability.
The trajectory of events both in Gaza and now Syria will be key to watch in relation to the future contours of Israel-Turkey relations.
In addition, with cautious optimism being telegraphed by several parties that a cease-fire in Gaza may finally happen, a fulfillment of this hope could provide some space for lowering the temperature between the two countries. In pursuit of this agreement, the U.S. has expressed its appreciation for the role Turkey can play to secure Hamas’ agreement to a cease-fire. Additionally, Turkey has an interest in playing a role in the years-long reconstruction process that will be required in Gaza — a role to which Israel will ultimately need to acquiesce — and in maintaining good relations with the United States. Bottom line: the trajectory of events both in Gaza and now Syria will be key to watch in relation to the future contours of Israel-Turkey relations.
Israel’s expanded relations in recent years via the Abraham Accords derived in no small part from shared regional security concerns. The primary Gulf driver of the Abraham Accords, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, undoubtedly now share Israel’s strategic concern that the rebel forces replacing Assad could drag Syria in an undesirable direction. For now, they have joined with fellow Arab states in both voicing support for a peaceful Syrian transition and the provision of humanitarian aid to the Syrian people, and calling out Israel for its incursion into the buffer zone, “rejecting it as a brutal occupation and violation of international law… .”
While pragmatism and hedging may rule the day for some actors … the backing of different groups in the struggle for Syrian control could easily replace one form of instability with another.
The UAE has also issued a statement condemning the Israeli government’s decision to expand its population in the Golan Heights. This reminder of how rapidly regional dynamics and calculations have shifted in a relatively short time underscores the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. The strength of the Abraham Accords has been sorely tested over the past 14 months in relation to Gaza. They have survived, albeit not unscathed, but now face further pressures in relation to respective postures and actions in Syria. As with Jordan and Turkey, the perils for Israel’s existing and potential relations with Gulf states are clear.
The risks for all posed by relational deterioration and regional escalation are high. The mosaic of regional actors has interests that are at odds with each other in Syria, and while pragmatism and hedging may rule the day for some actors in the near term, the backing of different groups in the struggle ahead for Syrian control could easily replace one form of instability with another. However, there are scenarios in which the balance of overlapping strategic interests, combined with creative diplomacy and responsible statecraft, could open pathways to de-escalation, win-win understandings and longer-term stability. Just as the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire arguably set the stage for events in Syria, a potential Gaza cease-fire could serve to not only end the ongoing immense suffering but also provide openings for Israel and its neighbors to more effectively navigate the dynamics ushered in by Assad’s fall. The ease and likelihood of such a path should not be overstated. Missteps, miscalculations and overreach by any number of actors can easily foreclose constructive possibilities.