KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries reacted quickly to the collapse of the Assad regime with public statements supporting the aspirations of the Syrian people, calling for respect of Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and warning against a descent into chaos. During Syria’s Arab Spring uprising, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed competing factions of the Syrian armed opposition. But following years of bloodshed, frustration with a divided opposition and what seemed like a deadlocked conflict, they decided to deal with facts on the ground by reopening diplomatic channels to try to pull Assad away from Iran’s orbit and address other priorities, including curtailing the Captagon trade and facilitating the return of Syrian refugees.
Now the same pragmatism that drove normalization efforts with Assad is informing the Saudi and Emirati response to his ouster. While Saudi Arabia and particularly the UAE are skeptical of the rebels’ intentions and concerned about the chaos regime change can bring, they appear to be quickly pivoting to dealing with Syria’s new realities.
On December 14, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar met in Jordan with Arab counterparts and issued a joint communique supporting a peaceful, inclusive transition in Syria through a comprehensive national dialogue, promising aid and support to its people, while also condemning Israeli airstrikes and incursions into Syrian territory.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE no doubt see benefit in yet another blow to Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” in the region. Yet their overarching immediate concern in Syria — a concern shared by Qatar and other GCC states — will be stability. No GCC country wants to a see Syria descend into chaotic infighting that fragments the country and spills over its borders, or the consolidation of a radical Islamist regime seeking ideological and territorial expansion. GCC countries are wary of ripple effects that could further de-stabilize Syria and its neighbors.
The UAE is particularly sensitive to the prospects of a radical Islamist regime with regional ambitions taking root. They have been the most skeptical in public statements, with presidential advisor Anwar Gargash saying “the nature of the new forces, the affiliation with the [Muslim] brotherhood, the affiliation with al-Qaeda” are worrisome.
The risks are high, yet so are potential gains. In a best-case scenario, rebels could share power and oversee a relatively smooth transition, ushering in a Sunni ally for Gulf monarchies in a strategic area once dominated by Iran. Until now, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (now going by his given name Ahmed al-Sharaa), have been saying the right things about inclusion and preserving state institutions. Only time will tell if this rhetoric is matched by action.
Doha’s unique connections and deep pockets yet again put the country in a good position to serve as a regional mediator.
Qatar occupies a unique position. Unlike Saudia Arabia and the UAE, Doha never normalized relations with the Assad regime and instead chose to continue to back Syrian rebels, including HTS. It was the only Gulf country to host a Syrian opposition embassy. Working in coordination with Turkey, Qatar has close ties with HTS and other rebel groups and has already publicly offered to mediate if rebel forces turn on each other. Doha’s unique connections and deep pockets yet again put the country in a good position to serve as a regional mediator. There are risks given the competing priorities and perspectives of Qatar’s neighbors and allies on issues such as openness to HTS and the status of Syria’s Kurds. Qatar will likely proceed with caution, wanting to avoid the return of tensions with GCC neighbors.
In Yemen, the internationally recognized government welcomed the fall of the Assad regime, congratulating the Syrian people for returning to the Arab fold and for rejecting “foreign, Iranian guardianship.” The chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Allimi, announced that now is the time for Iran to “lift its hand from Yemen.”
On the other hand, Ansar Allah (popularly known as the Houthis), have long supported the Assad regime, and predictably have a different view. In an impassioned speech on December 12, their leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, tried to refocus attention on Gaza, affirming the Houthis unwavering defense of Palestine, while framing developments in Syria and elsewhere as a U.S.-Israeli conspiracy to weaken the region.
It is unclear what if any direct impact the fall of the Assad regime will have on Yemen.
It is unclear what if any direct impact the fall of the Assad regime will have on Yemen. At a big picture level, the blow to Iran is creating the perception that Ansar Allah is vulnerable. As a result, supporters of Yemen’s internationally recognized government are using the opportunity to argue that now is the time to strike while the iron is hot against what increasingly looks like the outlier node in the Axis of Resistance before it becomes even more of a threat. It is unclear, however, if their calls will be met with action. The government is divided and would need military support to restart fighting that has been mostly paused since a 2022 U.N.-brokered truce.
Neither Saudi Arabia nor the United Arab Emirates wants a return to war, and the policy position of the new U.S. administration is uncertain. There is also a chance that Israel could turn its attention toward Yemen, particularly given continued Houthi attacks on Israeli territory.
Ansar Allah’s perception of their own vulnerabilities is also unclear. Until now, they have been doubling down on attacks on Israel — which win them popularity at home but inflict limited damage on Tel Aviv — and ships in the Red Sea, while escalating rhetoric against the United States. Some in the group may see regional developments as a chance and even an obligation to try to assert a leadership role in the Axis of Resistance and more importantly the cause of opposing Israel and Western influence in the region, although these ambitions will be shaped by Iran’s willingness to continue to assist. Others may see reason to try to pocket gains made as soon as possible and refocus attention on a Yemeni peace deal.