KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
On Tuesday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu becomes the first foreign leader to meet with President Donald Trump since his return to the White House. The visit comes as a fragile but holding cease-fire in Gaza approaches the midway point of its initial six-week phase, and as phase two of the agreement’s prescribed negotiations begin, with critical questions surrounding Gaza’s transitional security and governance to be decided. It also comes against a backdrop of a recently extended cease-fire deal between Israel and Hezbollah, expressed interest by both Trump and Netanyahu in advancing Israeli-Saudi normalization, and international concern over Iran’s nuclear threshold, despite the setbacks dealt to the “Axis of Resistance.”
USIP’s Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen unpacks the respective goals, interest and considerations at play during the Netanyahu visit, and for the Trump administration as it confronts a changing Middle East.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: Netanyahu comes to Washington buoyed by the relief and support of Israelis for the cease-fire agreement that, in the last two weeks, has seen the release of 13 of their citizens and five Thai nationals taken hostage by Hamas and its Gaza-based allies on October 7, 2023.
Netanyahu is also aware that the clock is ticking toward the second phase of the agreement, in which all remaining Israeli hostages would be released in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza en route to a permanent end to the war. As it stands, however, ending the war is not an easy sell for Netanyahu, as he faces internal government opposition to doing so before Hamas’s military and governing control over Gaza is destroyed.
So while President Trump has said he has “no assurances [the cease-fire] will hold,” he has also been clear that he wants to move on from war to making peace. In the waning days of the Biden administration, Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff was instrumental in pushing the January 15 agreement over the finish line, with his stark message that the incoming president expected a deal to be done before he entered office. In his inauguration speech, Trump said that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker” who will “stop all wars” and “measure success not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars that we end.”
While the Trump administration may have lifted a pause placed by its predecessor on bombs supplied to Israel, and agreed to support Israel should it return to hostilities, Trump has signaled his expectation for de-escalation and the openings that can bring for broader dealmaking in the region.
American hostages also remain in Hamas’ captivity, further providing incentive for the U.S. to prevent a breakdown of the agreement. But keeping momentum toward and through phase two will be no easy lift. Hamas is weakened. However, albeit saturated with a heavy dose of cruel and performative theater, their show of force during the recent hostage releases underscores that they remain the most powerful Palestinian actor in Gaza.
Shifting this equation will minimally require Israel to grapple with an alternative post-war governance and security vision for the territory, to include consideration of the roles of regional actors and their consensus vision for the eventual ascendancy of a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA). To date, Netanyahu has rejected having this conversation. But as the U.S. administration seeks to leverage cease-fire momentum to achieve broader goals, the conversation will be difficult to avoid.
This is particularly true in relation to both U.S. and Israeli interest in a renewed push for Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization: a shared goal that will not only rely on a sustained cease-fire, but on tough decisions by Israel in relation to Gaza’s and the broader Palestinian future.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: It is a priority for both Netanyahu and Trump, who brokered the groundbreaking 2020 normalization agreements that included Saudi’s neighbors, the UAE and Bahrain. The “holy grail” of normalization agreements, and by all accounts a near-achievement of the prior U.S. administration until it was derailed by Hamas’ October 7 attack, Saudi Arabia remains open to the prospect.
However, in the wake of 15 months of brutal devastation in Gaza, the Saudi leadership has been clear about its need for a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state. “[Normalization] is off the table until we have a resolution to Palestinian statehood,” Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, said in October 2024.
The Kingdom has likewise voiced support for the PA as the ultimate body in control of a unified West Bank and Gaza. In recent days, in a joint letter to the Trump administration with Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar and a senior PA official, the Saudis made clear their opposition to a Trump-floated proposal for Gazans to be relocated to other countries — primarily Egypt and Jordan. On this latter point, the signatories underscored the destabilizing and radicalizing potential of such a plan, which would surely forestall the ability to leverage today’s “historic opportunity” for forging regional peace.
President Trump will undoubtedly receive this same message next week when he receives King Abdullah of Jordan at the White House. Trump could well be convinced that Saudi and broader Arab ally positions, interests and assessments of the road to peace align with the U.S. interest in achieving the same goal, with a Saudi-Israel normalization deal as a linchpin. Long adamant that a Palestinian state and PA governance over Gaza are non-starters, in particular in the wake of October 7, and with a cabinet member in vocal support of the proposal for Gazan relocation, Netanyahu may have found himself faced with one or more stark differences to overcome in his meetings with the president.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: This will certainly top the two leaders’ agenda. Departing for Washington, Netanyahu previewed his own goals for the visit, saying that he and the president would talk about “victory over Hamas, achieving the release of all our hostages and dealing with the Iranian terror axis in all its components.” And while Iran’s axis of partners and proxies have been dealt a monumental, if not fatal, blow in recent months — from the degradation of Hezbollah to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria — and its missile and air defense capabilities have been severely damaged, the country stands on the threshold of being a nuclear power.
Netanyahu and Trump are aligned in their countries’ respective interests in preventing this outcome. The prime minister has been seized with this goal, in lockstep with a broadly held Israeli assessment of Iran as the country’s most significant and existential threat. Trump, meanwhile, has long focused on the danger of Iran’s “wide range of malign activities,” in addition to its nuclear program. The question over the next couple of days in Washington, and the months beyond, will not be whether the two leaders see eye-to-eye on the Iranian threat, but one of how each seeks to address it. Netanyahu has long espoused the achievement and projection of “peace through strength,” a phrase he invoked as he left for the U.S.
He is not alone among Israeli security and political officials who have argued for military strikes on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. However, it has long been understood in the security establishment that a maximally successful attack would require American support and reinforcement. While Trump has not ruled out such a prospect, he has recently expressed the hope that the matter of Iran’s nuclear posture could be resolved non-militarily, and made clear he would consider making a diplomatic deal with Tehran.
Arguably, the president begins his second term in office with more capital and favorable circumstances to do so. With Iran reeling from the aforementioned blows to its military assets and materiel, and susceptible domestically to further economic (and military) pressure, the U.S. has meaningful cards to play. As of this writing, reports indicate that Trump plans to revive, as early as today, the “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran that he instituted during his first term.
It is also noteworthy that Iran as security threat is an issue on which Israel and other U.S.-allied regional actors agree. However, and as reinforced by the 2023 Iran-Saudi reconciliation agreement, such actors are hedging against rising instability amid a fear of U.S. withdrawal from the region. Eager to see the Iranian threat neutralized, but wary of regional escalation with an epicenter at its borders, actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to favor diplomatic rather than military avenues.
Netanyahu stated that he comes to the U.S. seeking to “strengthen security, and broaden the circle of peace.” Key regional actors have shown willingness to play along if sustained Israeli-Palestinian de-escalation and a political horizon are in the cards. With spoilers numerous but weakened, the moment is fragile but also ripe with opportunity. Masterful U.S. diplomacy could orient the region in a more positive direction.