John Park, a senior program officer who directs USIP’s Korea Working Group, examines North Korea’s preparations for a “satellite launch,” which has cast a long shadow over the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.

After the February 29 “Leap Day Agreement,” it appeared that Washington and Pyongyang had both initiated an important early step toward resuming denuclearization talks. Also, Seoul had completed final preparations for the Nuclear Security Summit and was about to roll out the red carpet for over 50 heads of state. How did an announcement of a “satellite launch” overshadow months of intense diplomatic negotiations and preparations?

North Korea’s plan to conduct a “satellite launch” in mid-April has dominated media coverage of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. For world leaders whose country is a member of the Six-Party Talks, the focus is on the missile test and implications for efforts to return to denuclearlization talks. The viability of the February 29 “Leap Day Agreement” is now in question whereby North Korea would have received 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance as part of a deal to cease nuclear activities and missile tests. Consequently, important public attention has been diverted away from what specific steps key countries have taken to further the goal of the Nuclear Security Summit, which is securing nuclear stockpiles of material to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism.

What is the current state of North Korean preparations for its long-range missile test? Why is there so much concern about this test?

North Korea is already moving the rocket to a launch pad in preparation for its announced mid-April long-range missile test. No country – including China and Russia – believes that it’s a benign satellite launch. The major involved countries object to this long-range missile test because of the heightened regional tensions that would result from it. While the missile is unlikely to reach any part of the United States, the immediate concern for countries in the rocket’s flight path is that debris could fall on civilian populations as it proceeds southward this time. When North Korea last conducted a long-range missile test in April 2009, the rocket’s trajectory was eastward into the northern part of the Pacific Ocean.

What is the significance of the missile test to North Korea?

There are four key reasons why the test is deemed to be important to the North. First, each time North Korea conducts a long-range missile test, it yields valuable technical data for improving the development of its missiles. That brings North Korea a step closer to nuclear weaponization – i.e., mating a miniaturized nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system. Second, the consensus among North Korea watchers is that this “satellite launch” will be the symbolic centerpiece in the celebrations marking the 100th anniversary of the birth of the country's founder and Eternal President, Kim Il-sung. Third, it will provide massive propaganda value to show the early achievement of the new leadership group under the young Kim Jong-eun – a critical boost as this new group consolidates its power and seeks to strengthen its legitimacy.

Fourth, such acts of North Korean brinkmanship tend to drive a wedge between Washington and Beijing. President Obama’s stern warnings to Pyongyang not to proceed with this missile test overshadowed the opening of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. He called on China to exert its influence to rein in North Korea instead of “rewarding bad behavior… and turning a blind eye” to its nuclear defiance. He also repeated warnings of tighter sanctions if North Korea proceeds with its long-range missile test. Wary of a weak North Korean regime collapsing under the weight of additional sanctions, China tends to buttress it with an eye to bolstering regime stability. This policy behavior, in turn, creates friction between the U.S. and China over Beijing’s anemic track record in implementing the United Nations Security Council’s North Korea-centered sanctions measures.

How is USIP contributing to efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism in the international community, as well as conflict on the Korean Peninsula?

On March 12, USIP’s Center for Conflict Management and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs co-convened a closed briefing on the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit for senior diplomats of countries whose head of state will be participating in the summit. Ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and heads of political section from more than 30 embassies participated in the briefing. This closed briefing was the final activity of the USIP-initiated Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Study Group (SNS3G). Launched in fall 2010, SNS3G builds on the key findings of the USIP-facilitated Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which was directed by USIP Chief of Staff Col. Paul Hughes. USIP placed early emphasis on the need for comprehensive preparations for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit at the Institute’s 4th U.S.-South Korea-Japan Trilateral Dialogue in Northeast Asia Track 1.5 conference, which was convened in Seoul in January 2011. SNS3G’s key objective has been to work with U.S. and South Korean officials and technical experts to help ensure that the March 26-27 summit in Seoul leads to concrete progress in improving nuclear security.

The Korea Working Group is the primary means through which USIP facilitates ongoing efforts to prevent conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Although security, political, economic, and environmental challenges are growing more complex in the region, the U.S. and its Northeast Asian counterparts increasingly lack the capacity for sustained analysis, development, and implementation of policy approaches to prevent conflicts.

Cognizant of this trend, USIP launched and convenes recurring Track 1.5 policy dialogues – like the Korea Working Group – with current and former policymakers and advisers. They facilitate three goals: a deeper understanding of complex policy issues, early direct crisis communication, and the development of prevention initiatives and strategies. By generating feedback on early-stage policy proposals developed and discussed in USIP’s Track 1.5 meetings, we have been able to increase the likelihood of traction of these proposals at the Track 1 level.