KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint.
  • Rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. 
  • The U.S. and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal.

Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpt from a report originally published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Read the full report here.

The status quo trajectory of U.S. policy toward North Korea is unsustainable. Rigid adherence to a narrow strategy of denuclearization and enhanced deterrence has led to a state of dangerous coexistence. The results are unbridled growth in North Korea’s nuclear force capabilities, its adoption of a nuclear doctrine that features preemptive use of nuclear weapons, and compounded risks of crisis escalation. The current state is also plagued by complete estrangement between Washington and Pyongyang that forecloses crisis management and tension reduction, increased demand for nuclear weapons in South Korea, and a strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia that is destabilizing multiple regions.

South Korean soldiers stand guard facing North Korea at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea, June 25, 2014. (Woohae Cho/The New York Times)
South Korean soldiers stand guard facing North Korea at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea, June 25, 2014. (Woohae Cho/The New York Times)

Yet the United States continues its approach of denuclearization through pressure despite consensus among U.S. intelligence that North Korea will not disarm and despite empirical evidence that suggests U.S. diplomatic engagement can mitigate North Korea’s provocative behavior. It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. This clash between analysis and goals has promoted policy incoherence.

The United States and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal. This approach would emphasize risk reduction and improved relations with North Korea while maintaining deterrence. It would also entail, at least for the near term, tolerating North Korea’s continued possession of nuclear arms and recognizing that the status quo of attempting to manage threats exclusively through deterrence measures ultimately presents unacceptable risks to U.S. and allied interests.Stable coexistence is consistent with U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated intention to “have relations with North Korea” and “get along with” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The current U.S. administration therefore seemingly has the political will to start pursuing stable coexistence and be the first to take proactive steps to reduce tensions and risks. These steps could include formally announcing the United States’ intention to improve relations with North Korea, which Trump has already begun to signal, and initiating confidence-building measures that are taken independently but designed to invite reciprocity from Pyongyang.

The U.S. should instill the urgency of pursuing stable coexistence in its ally South Korea, explaining the goal as crucial for reducing the risk of conflict.

At the same time, the United States should instill the urgency of pursuing stable coexistence in its ally South Korea, explaining the goal as crucial for reducing the risk of conflict and nuclear war with North Korea. Regardless of which administration is in power in Seoul, Washington must stay the course on stable coexistence, stressing the reality of a nuclear North Korea, the paramount importance of risk reduction, and the relationship between engagement with North Korea and lower levels of provocative behaviors that could result in unwanted conflict.

This policy framework would also suit broader U.S. geopolitical objectives. Improved relations with Pyongyang could mitigate the worst possible consequences of ongoing Russia-North Korea cooperation. Similarly, given U.S. prioritization of strategic competition and deterrence vis-à-vis China, a more stable relationship with North Korea will help render deterrence and defense requirements for the Korean Peninsula more modest, allowing for a short-term adjustment to the U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Trump administration has an opportunity to fundamentally redesign North Korea policy, moving away from the unattainable goal of denuclearization toward a broader, stable coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The administration should seize this opportunity to make the United States safer, stronger and more prosperous and advance peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.


PHOTO: South Korean soldiers stand guard facing North Korea at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea, June 25, 2014. (Woohae Cho/The New York Times)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis