USIP Senior Fellow
Amatzia Baram on C-SPAN
November 20, 1997

Highlights from the November 20, 1997 Forum:

Introduction (Ambassador Max Kampelman, Vice Chairman, USIP Board of Directors)

The U.S. Institute of Peace is an independent, non-partisan organization mandated by Congress to strengthen the nation's capabilities to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

To this end we are fortunate to have with us some of the best national and international talent from research organizations, academia and government working as Fellows here to provide policy makers and the American people with independent and creative assessments of how to deal with international conflict situations by political means.

The U.S. Institute of Peace does not advocate specific public policies. Our objectives are -- as in today's session -- to raise public understanding of situations, such as the current confrontation over Iraq's programs to build weapons of mass destruction, and to develop action alternatives for policy makers to commander. We are grateful for Professor Baram's time and expertise as he shares with us his assessment of Hussein's motives and United Nations and U.S. options for dealing with Iraq.

Saddam the Man
Saddam Hussein is not the only dictator in the world, but he may be the most dangerous one. Hussein came from a peasant background. He grew up poor. His father died before he was born, and his family did not own any land. He began his political career as a muscle-man for the Ba'ath party. After he had a foothold in the party, he eliminated the people who welcomed him and brought him in. Hussein has no problem striking a deal and breaking it. He has no inhibitions about breaking promises. Saddam Hussein seems to feel that he is entitled to his own moral standard: Humanity as a whole needs to keep certain standards; he is entitled to his own. He can break agreements at will. He feels that any means can be justified.

Creating Conflict with the UN Weapons Inspection Teams
The immediate reasons that prompted Iraq to initiate the present crisis can be guessed as Hussein's pressing need to distract the Iraqi citizens' attention from the fact that their food rations were recently cut by 30-35%; his perception of division within the Allied forces; and his fears that UN arms supervision teams were close to discovering a few hundred kilograms of anthrax cultures.

The medium and long-term incentives to shatter the status-quo are more important and more certain. First, Saddam is being pressured by his own power bases -- namely the Republican and Special Republican Guard and other security bodies -- to stop the present humiliating form of arms inspections and UN supervision that violates the most basic Iraqi code of behavior: Honor. This elite military corps would like to preserve Iraq's non-conventional weapons potential, but also see an early end to the embargo. If he fails to satisfy at least part of their expectations he will lose power, and with it, very likely, his life.

Saddam's Powerbase
Hussein wants to become the hegemon of the Gulf and leader of the Arab world. He sees himself as a military strategist of historic proportions, and will use the army to attain that position. He has surrounded himself with people from his own tribe, to whom he must now prove that he is still the powerful, fearless leader they used to know.

The fact that UNSCOM's supervisors are trying to investigate the government's secret caches vies against the Iraqi government secular religion: secrecy and security. In addition, the inspection denies the security establishment weapons which they believe Iraq needs for its security and self-defense. Another sore point is the fear that once Resolution 986 has been accepted by Iraq, allowing it to sell oil for food and medicines, the humanitarian problem disappears and the world forgets Iraq. Then the Iraqi regime can no longer use its own population as hostages by which to draw Western humanitarian sympathy and support, allowing no foreseeable end in sight to the oil embargo.

In other words, the Iraqi ruling elite is deeply worried that their acceptance of Resolution 986 will condemn them to eternal sanctions. For this reason President Saddam Hussein is insisting persistently on a time-table for the termination of the oil embargo on Iraq. At the same time, however, for the same reasons specified above, he will make every effort to retain his non-conventional chemical and biological weapons. There is little doubt that, as a matter of self-preservation, he will have to continue to do his best to obstruct the activities of UN inspection teams. In summary, his interests are to retain his non-conventional arsenal while removing the oil embargo.

The Crack in the Coalition
To achieve these two inter-connected goals he must construct, with Russian advice, a sophisticated inspection agreement that Russia, France and China will readily accept, but that the US and Britain cannot, or will do so only reluctantly. This way he effectively drives a sharp wedge between the two parts of the Security Council permanent members.

The main difference between the military engagements in January-February 1991 and September 1997, is that the presence of a CNN crew in Baghdad has heightened in importance. By positioning Iraqi women and children in his palaces and vowing to put them in strategic installations as well, Saddam has made them hostages, thus using Western humanitarian concerns to complicate the West's response to his latest defiance. If the UN or US opt for a military action this time they will have to take into account this factor, and avoid civilian casualties almost at all costs.

The irony is that the party most actively trying to save Saddam and bring the oil embargo to a halt, Russia, is also the party that will economically lose the most when the embargo is lifted. Russia will not be able to sell Saddam large quantities of weapons, because the weapons embargo will be sustained for a long time anyway. With its newly generated petro-dollars Iraq will not be tempted to purchase low-grade Russian consumer goods but, rather, go to the West, most likely to French products. If they do need to buy low-grade products, they will probably turn to China where the prices will be far lower than similar low-quality Russian consumer goods. Finally, Russia is selling large quantities of oil on the world market. Once Iraq is permitted to sell oil again it is certain that it will sell as much as it can produce, paying no attention to OPEC quotas. At the moment Iraq's production capability is around 2.5 million barrels/day and soon it can expand this capacity. Chances are that when Iraq gets back into the oil market in full-swing, oil prices will drop, and Russia will suffer economically.

Who Won?
Who won the most recent conflict? Winning is in the eye of the beholder. Hussein did prove to his elite that he's not afraid of war. He will go to the brink, but is wise enough to pull back at the last minute if he perceives achievements have been made.

What are his successes? Hussein became a legitimate partner for negotiations in the eyes of the international community. He forced the U.S. Secretary of State to change her plans and rush to meet with Russian and other foreign ministers to negotiate the Iraqi issue. He greatly improved his position in the Arab world. His Deputy Prime Minister visited Damascus for the first time in 18 years, and was received with great fanfare in Cairo and Amman. Even Kuwait and Saudi Arabia refused to publicly support UN military action against Iraq. Hussein showed his elite that he could break the ice around the embargo. He demonstrated fissures among the international community. He forced the acknowledgment that the use force by the U.S. and the UN is becoming less and less feasible. And most importantly -- Saddam Hussein remains defiant. He is a fighter, and he is still fighting.

This is how we know he will do something again. For its part, the U.S. forced him to reverse his decision to exclude Americans from inspection operations, but at a high diplomatic cost.

The confrontaion with Iraq is not yet over.

The views expressed here are those of Dr. Baram, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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