Taliban fighters have re-emerged in full force in Afghanistan and insurgency-related violence has increased to record levels, resulting in 2,732 fatalities between September 1, 2006, and February 25, 2007. According to the United Nations, the 35,460-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), along with the 8,000 troops deployed under the United States-led coalition command, has begun its own offensive against the insurgency in the south, targeting opium growing regions and Taliban safe zones. From safe havens in the Pakistan border areas, the Taliban are now pursuing a long-term strategy of exploiting their control of remote villages to gain control of districts and then regions. Thus, a conflict that had been pushed down on the U.S. and international agendas is now reemerging. As the Taliban regroups and continues its insurgency, the international community is faced with the need to re-evaluate and strengthen its own plan of action.

United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Afghanistan Tom Koenigs offered a new evaluation of the conflict in Afghanistan on March 21 at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Ambassador Koenigs was introduced by USIP President Richard Solomon. The discussion was moderated by J. Alexander Thier, senior rule of law advisor at USIP.

The Insurgency Is Alive and Well

The Taliban's comeback is the result of the "power vacuum in the south," according to Ambassador Koenigs. When the international community chose not to pursue the "remnants" of the Taliban into neighboring Pakistan at the outset of the conflict, it gave them the opportunity to use the safe haven along the Afghan/Pakistani border to regroup and consolidate their strength. The problems in the south were seen as essentially military problems, said Koenigs, and there were few significant and lasting attempts at reconstruction or state-building operations. Today the rural and lawless south has become the perfect hideaway for the insurgency and a breeding ground for future Taliban recruits. "The alienated tribes in the southern region have been subjected to bad governance, which has increased the difference between the tribes," said Koenigs. "This has created a huge discontent in the region." Disappointed with the Karzai government and the international community, the peasants in the south have begun to look to the Taliban for strong, trustworthy leadership. Koenigs stressed that this is an insurgency "with support from the people in the region." The consequences of ignoring it would be dire.

Feeding the Insurgency

At least eight Afghans were killed and over 30 injured on March 4, 2007, as U.S. marines opened fire on an open highway as a self-defense response to an attack by a suicide bomber, according to Koenigs. Twenty-four hours later, nine people spanning four generations of the same family were killed when American warplanes mistakenly dropped a bomb on a house near Kabul. A huge wave of anti-U.S. protests soon rose across the country, revealing the dissatisfaction of many Afghans toward what they see as the occupation of their country by foreign invaders responsible for the deaths of their own people. Such incidents, Koenigs suggested, are fueling the Taliban's cause. Each time a civilian is killed by foreign troops, he said, the Taliban find renewed justification for their own actions against these "murderous" troops, despite the fact that the Taliban themselves are no strangers to collateral damage. "The Taliban insurgency is completely insensitive to losses, either in civilian population or in their military," Koenigs noted, a fact that explains the 1,000 civilian casualties caused by the insurgency in 2006, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports.

A second factor enhancing the Taliban's appeal is the prolonged foreign occupation itself, Koenigs noted. As the international presence lingers and conditions fail to notably improve, the Taliban gain more legitimacy as they offer a more familiar alternative to the "disappointing" international intruders.

It is, in fact, this feeling of occupation that has most likely triggered the sudden appearance and rise of suicide bombings in the country, said Koenigs, since "suicide bombing does not exist in countries where there is no feeling of occupation." As the feeling of occupation and disappointment toward the international community grows among the Afghan people, so too do the numbers of suicide bombings, up from 17 to 139 incidents from 2005 to 2006. And this year's figures are on track to triple the number of incidents from 2006.

Must Focus on Governance

Koenigs stressed that in order to resolve the issue, the international community must focus on the root causes of the resurgence of the Taliban in the south. The absence of the state presence in the provinces and the districts of the south is perhaps the most crucial obstacle blocking the possibility of bringing order to the region, he said. A March 2007 United Nations General Assembly Security Council (UNSC) report stated that "popular alienation remains a key factor behind the revitalized insurgency, and stems from inappropriate government appointments, tribal nepotism and monopolization of power, and the marginalization of those outside the dominant social and political groups." Focusing on building stable governance, a strong judiciary sector, and security forces, in that order, should therefore be the top priorities in the south. Currently, peasants and villagers in the south are turning to the Taliban for their rule of law, justice, police and anti-corruption needs. The Karzai government, with the support of the international community, needs to concentrate on offering them a stronger, more stable, and more trustworthy leadership than the Taliban are able to give.

While proper governance needs to be implemented in the south, governance in the north must also remain a priority. State institutions and local governments should be supported so they do not deteriorate or become corrupt. Two years ago, there were 23 drug-free provinces--mostly in the northern region--and today, because the issue of governance has been pushed down on the agenda in the north, "we are happy that we have eight," Koenigs noted.

Collateral Damage

The second most important item on the international community's agenda is to protect the civilian population at all costs, Koenigs said. According to the UNSC report, the ISAF said that "civilian casualties were its single biggest failure in 2006, and measures would be taken to reduce them." Koenigs stressed the importance of reducing this number, not only for obvious human rights reasons, but also as a means for the international community and the Karzai government to keep the trust of the Afghan population.

The Taliban Gloat: "The Americans Have Watches, We Have Time"

Finally, Koenigs emphasized that the international community must now concentrate on getting the Afghans to take over their own fight for democracy as soon as possible. The insurgency will not and cannot be defeated anytime soon, he said, and in this situation, time is on the insurgency's side. Perhaps more importantly, the insurgency cannot be defeated by anyone other than the Afghans themselves, as they are the only ones with access to intelligence and the ability to infiltrate the Taliban. They are, consequently, the only ones with the power to dismantle cells and prevent attacks. The international community now has only a limited window of opportunity to train the Afghans to take over the immediate fight and it "must do it forcefully" before conditions deteriorate even further. Nonetheless, Koenigs stressed the importance of the international community staying in the country as long as needed to help support the reconstruction mission in non-combat terms.

The Pakistan Problem

The March 2007 UNSC report states that security incidents in January 2007 in provinces bordering Pakistan were double the number recorded the previous year. This fact indicates the significance of Pakistan and its policies toward the Afghan conflict. As long as the border areas between the two countries remain a breeding ground for the Taliban, special attention needs to be given to Pakistan. As in Afghanistan, a lack of strong governance and structure in the rural border regions of Pakistan is creating perfect conditions for the insurgency to thrive, said Koenigs. Therefore, international support for the border area in the form of development aid to Pakistan is a vital component to resolving the Afghan issue.

In addition to international aid, however, Pakistan needs to take some steps on its own in order to contribute to the stability of the region. Koenigs specifically noted that Pakistan and Afghanistan need to develop direct military cooperation, without an intermediary, in order for healthy, constructive dialogue between the two countries to commence. The two countries have no option but to work together to win peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region as a whole, he said.

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Beth Cole and Catherine Morris, senior program officer and program assistant, respectively, in the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at USIP. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.