USIP’s Haitian Citizen Engagement project ensures that marginalized communities — particularly in rural southern Haiti — have a voice in the country’s political transition. Communities Organizing for Haitian Engagement and Development (COFHED), USIP’s key partner in Haiti, has deep-rooted relationships within these communities that allow them to facilitate dialogues that reflect the needs and aspirations of rural Haitians, ensuring their voices are included in national discussions. The project empowers local citizens to generate their own solutions and advocate for their representation in dialogues with national leaders.

In partnership with the Inter-American Dialogue, this working group includes civil society stakeholders based in Haiti as well as former U.S. and international government officials and experts from think tanks, academia and humanitarian organizations. This platform is one of the prime forums currently discussing Haitian political, security and humanitarian dynamics, advancing cutting-edge proposals on national dialogue, transitional justice, economic recovery and stabilization.

The project provides U.S. and Haitian decision-makers with valuable information on the customs of Haitian dialogue in order to better inform future national dialogue and reconciliation initiatives. The Institute maps and characterizes the extent of engagement between local authorities and citizens, as well as current and historic initiatives of dialogue, to identify gaps in service delivery and institutional capacity.

Haiti’s exclusionary and adversarial political system has led to extremely fragile democratic institutions that have proven incapable of providing basic public services to the population. A concerted effort to reach a stable governing arrangement in the short term is key to ensuring a free and fair election in the future. In the medium- and long-term, legitimately elected authorities should engage in inclusive and comprehensive national dialogue and constitutional reform processes that simplify governance, clarify the balance of power, cleanse Haitian institutions from corruption and political violence, and strengthen its civil service system. 

Challenges

Short-term:

• A political crisis that has led to a significantly unstable governing arrangement, and a progressive collapse of the Haitian state into the hands of gangs.

Medium-term:

• A country that has not had elections for almost 8 years, limiting the legitimacy and representativity of any political actor, and further eroding trust between the people and their institutions. 
• A series of high-level criminal, human rights and corruption cases — including the killing of President Jovenel Moise in 2021, the PetroCaribe corruption scandal of 2019, and the gang-related massacres since then — that have undermined the basic legitimacy of Haiti’s public institutions and political leaders. 
• Years of emigration and humanitarian crisis have left the country without an educated middle class sizable enough to staff government institutions at the operational ranks and pressure political elites to reach consensus. 

Long-term:

• A political class not accustomed to power-sharing, which has turned politics into a zero-sum game where state institutions are wielded as a weapon against political opponents and for personal profit.
• An exclusionary political culture, heavily focused on the capital city of Port-au-Prince, to the detriment of the rest of the departments, cities and villages of the country. 

Policy Options

Short-term:

• A strong and concerted effort by the international community, through CARICOM and the U.N., to bring political actors to the negotiation table to promptly implement the agreements of interim governance:
  • The selection and installation of the Government Action Monitoring Body, a body of the transitional government that would function as a temporary legislature.
  • The preparation and holding of free and fair elections.
  • The organization of a limited constitutional reform process that is inclusive and representative.
• Expanding the representativity of the interim government by creating a National Advisory Council composed of representatives from civil society (health care, education, youth, IDPs, labor, women, human rights, business, LGBTQ+, and the diaspora) and from each of the departments to grant the government further legitimacy and efficacy.
  • The National Advisory Council can provide the government with a list of actionable items to restore basic public services to vulnerable communities and other issues of high importance to the population to ensure early victories. 
  • The council can also serve as the bridge between local populations and the national government, considering that the usual channels (such as representatives in parliament) are not available yet. 
  • Research has shown that the inclusion of civil society in such processes has historically contributed to more sustainable peace — and conversely, its exclusion has often resulted in societies returning to conflict after a short period of time. 

Short- and Medium-term:

• Restoring Haiti’s institutions through the election of new national authorities and a parliament in a free and fair process that is supported and observed by the international community.
  • The newly elected institutions can restart the process of electing the members of the high courts, and push for the prompt administration of justice in high-profile cases.
• Providing security to interim and elected government authorities to protect from spoilers, including but not limited to gangs, paramilitary groups and nondemocratic actors. 

Medium- and Long-term:

• Convening a national dialogue with representation from the full sociopolitical spectrum and all the regions of the country, facilitated and mediated by the international community, with the purpose of developing a nationally agreed upon agenda for economic reconstruction and sustainable development, as well as the necessary reforms to the 1987 Haitian Constitution.
  • The agenda for reconstruction and development can provide future administrations with a safe roadmap to implement government policies and ensure national unity notwithstanding political orientation. It can also provide a middle ground for moderation and compromise at times of crisis and/or gridlock.
  • The reforms of the 1987 Haiti Constitution can provide a fairer playing field for all stakeholders by clarifying the division of power between the prime minister and the president, as well as rendering more efficient the division of labor between national and local authorities, among other reforms to be decided by the Haitian people themselves.
• Creating transitional justice mechanisms to address the human rights violations and trauma from the last four years of crisis. 
  • Truth commissions and special tribunals can be set up to provide victims with the truth and recognition they need and deserve. These processes can also help heal the divisions left by conflict by providing justice from a restorative standpoint. Such mechanisms can define the terms for any amnesties for low-ranking members of the gangs (who are sometimes victims themselves), shed light on the links between gangs and socioeconomic elites during the crisis, and develop the restorative actions culprits undertake to repair the damage. 
• Establishing strong anti-corruption mechanisms to cut the links between public institutions and criminal actors. 
  • Regional experiences with hybrid international missions such as the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala provide an innovative model to transfer capacities and knowledge to local institutions, encourage self-reliance, and protect reform efforts of justice and security systems.

Haiti faces severe humanitarian challenges, with 5.5 million people in need of aid, widespread food insecurity, a collapsing public health system, and escalating violence impeding relief efforts. Gang activity restricts access to vulnerable populations and poses significant risks to humanitarian workers and resources. International partners can support the efforts of the Haitian government by increasing financial commitments to the U.N. humanitarian response plan, restoring minimum security to allow aid delivery and supporting local organizations through capacity-building to enhance sustainable impact.

Challenges

Short-term:

• Roughly 5.5 million Haitians requiring some level of humanitarian assistance.
  • Approximately 4 million Haitians are experiencing grave levels of food insecurity.
  • At least 362,000 Haitians are internally displaced, with hundreds of thousands more migrating irregularly to the U.S. through Latin America.
• The collapse of the Haitian state has also led to a deterioration in the sanitary conditions of the country, providing a breeding ground for diseases such as cholera. 
• Access to vulnerable populations has been restricted by gangs, who threaten (and use violence against) local and international humanitarian workers as well as loot and destroy facilities with food and supplies destined for relief efforts.
• Despite repeated calls by the United Nations and local and international NGOs, raising the entirety of the funding required to satisfy the humanitarian needs of the country has rarely been achieved.

Policy Options

Short-term:

• Increase the level of pledges and disbursements to the humanitarian response plan in order to equip the international humanitarian system with the financial resources to service the most vulnerable population. 
• Provide access to communities in need by restoring minimum levels of security in the country.
  • Security interventions must consider the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to avoid putting organizations in the crosshairs of armed actors and/or have their legitimacy damaged vis-à-vis communities in need. 

Medium- and Long-term:

• Prioritize working with local organizations and focus on the transfer of knowledge and capabilities in the implementation of projects. 

Haiti's fragile security situation is exacerbated by powerful, organized gangs that challenge government authority and a state that is unable to maintain control over its territory. Proposed policy actions include deploying a robust multinational peacekeeping mission to disarm gangs and establishing a strategic security framework to enable the Haitian National Police (HNP) to safeguard critical infrastructure and expand control over gang-dominated areas. Long-term initiatives involve building a national guard-like force to provide security in rural areas, addressing arms trafficking, and severing gang ties with economic sponsors through international sanctions and accountability mechanisms.

Challenges

Short-term:

• Hundreds of well-armed gangs, organized under two umbrella coalitions, have challenged the interim government and contributed to the collapse of remaining Haitian institutions.
  • The equipment, organization and posture of these gangs resemble more of an organized insurgency.

Medium- and Long-term:

• The use of criminal and paramilitary violence by some political and economic actors to control territories and communities and advance personal/group agendas has become a normalized practice.
• The Haitian state is unable to ensure the monopoly of violence in the entirety of its territory, opening vacuums of power filled by nefarious actors and exposing itself to be challenged with relative ease by private interests. 

Policy Options

Short-term:

• Deploying a strong, multinational security mission capable of arriving in force, intimidating smaller gangs into disarming, deterring attacks from more organized groupings and disrupting stronger criminal coalitions.
  • Considering the challenges of the current multinational security mission, a better tool could be a U.N.-led multinational peacekeeping mission financed by contributing member states that eventually hands over stabilizing efforts to a U.N. or multinational police mission once a significant proportion of the gangs have been neutralized, demobilized, disarmed and/or disrupted.
• Developing a comprehensive national security strategy and anti-gang strategy that clearly define the division of labor between the National Police, the Haitian army and international forces and provide a vision for stabilization efforts beyond temporary kinetic interventions by the security forces.

Short- and Medium-term:

• Consolidating a capable Haitian National Police (HNP) that is able to defend itself. The HNP should progressively expand to protect key infrastructure, humanitarian efforts and IDP camps and eventually project and consolidate power in neighborhoods controlled by gangs. The international community can support this goal by:
  • Providing necessary equipment to the HNP to match and surpass the current capabilities of criminal actors. 
  • Providing training to vetted units in order to provide a quality edge vis-à-vis gangs.
  • Providing financial, logistical and technical support to maintain current capabilities and progressively revamp the current institution and render it more transparent and efficient in its administrative processes. 
• Strengthening current international efforts to stem weapons trafficking into Haiti coming from the United States, the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean Island nations. 
• Severing connections between gangs and national and international economic sponsors by strengthening and expanding the current U.N. sanctions regime and coordinating efforts between countries to sanction Haitian individuals with reported links to gang violence, corruption, human rights violations and transnational crime. 

Medium- and Long-term:

• Ensuring accountability among the HNP and potential future international forces by setting up a survivor-centered mechanism for the reception, review and investigation of human rights complaints, as well as transparent and fair processes to ensure justice, reparation and non-repetition. 
• Creating a heavy security force — albeit most likely separate from the army — with law enforcement duties in the form of a national guard/gendarmerie that provides security in rural areas, regions that are difficult to access, and along the borders. This force can also provide backup support for the HNP when needed in urban operations. The international community can support this effort by:
  • Supporting current efforts by Haitian authorities to fill this vital gap in capacity by encouraging better strategic planning that aligns the various security forces with the threat. Also, they could support military academic exchanges that would build a network of Haitian military officials trained under the highest standards of quality and commitment to democratic values. 
  • Providing the necessary financial resources, equipment and technical support to set up the appropriate administrative and institutional architecture needed to efficiently and transparently support the force.
  • Support vetting and training efforts by Haitian institutions in the recruitment process of the new force.

Haiti’s prolonged crisis has critically damaged infrastructure, displaced populations, disrupted education, and collapsed economic stability, with key sectors hampered by violence, corruption and natural vulnerabilities. Policy recommendations focus on restoring security and education services, reintegrating displaced populations and former gang members into the formal economy, and strengthening diplomatic and economic ties, particularly with the Dominican Republic. Longer-term strategies emphasize sustainable development by rebuilding infrastructure to climate-adaptive standards, supporting local capacity-building, and fostering regional economic integration to ensure resilience and autonomy in the face of recurring instability and environmental challenges.

Challenges

Short-term:

• After years of crisis, the critical infrastructure of the country is in shambles:
  • The main roads and highways of the country are damaged by years of mismanagement, roadblocks and deliberate dismantling by criminal actors.
  • Schools and other education facilities have been turned into de-facto refugee camps by families fleeing violence.
  • Police stations and local courthouses have been attacked with gunfire and sometimes even set on fire amid clashes between the HNP and gangs. The main penitentiaries of the country have been rendered unusable after the March 2024 prison riots. 
  • The country’s airspace has been closed after consistent attacks on the capital’s international airport by the gangs. 
  • In the case of seaports, insecurity and alleged collusion between port authorities and criminal actors have disincentivized trade and investment. 
• Violence and political instability have gravely impacted Haiti’s economy, which has contracted for 5 consecutive years. 
  • Inflation and depreciation of the local currency has further deteriorated the country’s macroeconomic stability. 
  • The economic crisis has pushed Haitians into unemployment, migration or the informal economy. 

Medium- and Long-term:

• A generation of Haitians has experienced years of malnourishment and missed several schooling years. According to the World Bank, a child born today in Haiti will grow up to be only 45 percent as productive as they could be if they had enjoyed full access to education and health care. 
• Haiti is highly sensitive and vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters. Earthquakes have a history of impairing the country’s economic development, and hurricanes in the Caribbean/Atlantic are expected to become more frequent and severe as global temperatures increase. 
• Haiti’s informal economy is estimated to represent 55 percent of the total economy, significantly impacting the government's capacity to raise taxes, protect worker’s rights, enforce quality standards, and promote a fair, competitive environment for businesses.
  • Informal and subsistence economies have also had a significant impact on the environment, considerably affecting the country’s forests and clean water sources. Such predatory economic models have rendered the country ever more vulnerable to natural disasters via mudslides, droughts and overall land degradation.    

Policy Options

Short-term:

• Restore security conditions for the free movement of people and goods (as noted in the security section).
• Prioritize the rehabilitation of the education system, including school meal programs, to resume administering key services to children and youth. 
• Plan and implement labor-intensive projects for the reintegration of former gang members as a way to include vulnerable populations in the formal economy and provide additional incentives against recidivism.
  • Projects can include street cleaning campaigns and critical infrastructure rehabilitation (such as police stations, local courthouses and schools). 
• U.S.-specific: Pursue policies that contribute to the sustainability and potential growth of Haiti’s apparel sector.
• Restore amicable diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic that allow for the normalization of trade along the border. 
  • International mediation efforts by regional organizations such as CARICOM and OAS can help resolve the impasse caused by the construction of the canal in the Massacre River. 

Medium-term:

• Design policies and projects that encourage the return of migrants through tax incentives, communication campaigns, reintegration campaigns and other tactics. This will equip Haitian society with the necessary skills and workforce to rebuild state institutions and administer foreign resources in both development aid and humanitarian efforts.
• Ensure aid and humanitarian projects financed by international donors prioritize the transfer of knowledge and capacities to Haitian local organizations in order to reduce dependence on international staff and contribute to the consolidation of a national cadre of high-quality Haitian technical professionals based in the country.
• Update urban planning and building codes to incentivize the construction of more resilient and climate-adaptive infrastructure.
• Foment a stable business environment by reducing corruption in the customs and tax systems through the prompt resolution of high-profile cases and the identification of corruption and criminal networks embedded within government institutions.
• Incentivize sustainable tourism as a source of revenue, international currency and a catalyst for social transformation through the preservation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage. 

Long-term:

• Ensure and plan for a long-term commitment to the reconstruction and development of Haiti through Haitian-led priorities and plans, such as national development plans and/or reconstruction roadmaps.
• Insert Haiti into regional economies, staring with further integration with the CARICOM common market and economy and potentially expanding into South and Central American value chains. 
  • The potential opportunities on the border with the Dominican Republic for shared ventures and border economic integration zones should be studied.  

Leader: Jimmy “Barbeque” Cherizier (also leader of G9)

With his core bases in the Delmas neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, Jimmy Cherizier is one of Haiti’s most powerful gang leaders. Barbeque took the lead in the gang uprising that destabilized and ultimately toppled Prime Minister Ariel Henry in March 2024.

A former police official, Cherizier has an extensive record of extrajudicial killings and significant human rights abuses, including the La Saline, Grand Ravine, and Bel Air massacres. Perhaps more so than other gang leaders in Haiti, Barbeque has entered political discourse, regularly engaging with Haitian and international media and cultivating a very purposeful public persona.

Barbeque has repeatedly claimed gang violence is driven by corrupt political oligarchs and is a necessary response to cleanse the system. He has portrayed himself as the Haitian equivalent of Latin American socialist revolutionary Che Guevara. On December 15, the HNP reported it killed Kendy, AKA Jeff Mafia, who it described as Barbeque’s second in command, in a shootout with the Viv Ansanm coalition in the Ft. Nactional area of Port au Prince.

Leader: Contested (previously Iskar Andrice “Iska”)

A former mathematics teacher — and previously a talented student — Iskar Andrice came to consider violence as the only reliable means of achieving social advancement in Haiti. Commanding his own gang in the Belekou neighborhood of Cité Soleil, Iska is accused of engaging in robbery, murder, extortion, rape, and hijacking goods and trucks.

Within the G9, he was meant to be the true strategist and thinker, while Barbeque took on the political, visible role. Andrice was killed in November 2023 during a wave of intra- and inter-gang assassinations after the breakdown of the first iteration of Viv Ansanm.

Leader: Christ Roy Chery “Krisla”

Christ-Roy Chery (alias “Chrisla” or “Krisla”) is one of the longest-running gang leaders in Haiti. He leads the Nan Ti Bwa gang, which is sometimes referred to as the Ti Bois gang. Controlling neighborhoods for over 15 years, Krisla is deeply integrated into the communities of Ti Bois, Fontamara, and part of Carrefour (a suburb southwest of the capital).

In the spring of 2024 — as other gangs sought to emphasize their aspirations to a Robin Hood-like mantle — Krisla resorted to significant violence in neighborhoods bordering his headquarters, with his fighters launching assaults on police stations, looting supplies and releasing prisoners.

• Baz Nan Chabon Gang
  • Leader: Contested (previously Serge Alectis “Ti Junior”)
• Carrefour Drouillard Gang
  • Leader: Contested (previously “Tyson”)
• Terre Noire Gang
  • Leader: Terre Noire Jonel Catel
• Baz Krache Dife Gang
  • Leader: James Alexander “Sonson”
• Baz Pilate Gang
  • Leader: Ezeckiel Alexandre “Ze”
• Simon Pelé Gang
  • Leader: Albert Stevenson “Djouma”
• Wharf Jérémie Gang
  • Leader: Micanor Altes “King Mikano”
• Nan Boston Gang
  • Leader: Mathias Sainthil
     

Leader: Gabriel Jean Pierre (alias: Ti Gabriel; also leader of G-Pèp)

Operating from the shadows, Gabriel Jean-Pierre (alias: Ti Gabriel) has enjoyed a long criminal career spanning over 20 years and back to the second administration of former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2001 – 2004).

Raised in and operating from Cité Soleil (a suburb north of Port-au-Prince), Ti Gabriel also has important strongholds in the Brooklyn and Ti Zil neighborhoods — some of the poorest areas in the entire world.

Ti Gabriel has keenly focused on cultivating political capital with local communities as well. He helped pioneer the use of NGOs as a front to distribute political “donations” and criminal proceeds to communities under his control, opening the Gabriel Foundation in 2012. He has enjoyed a folk status in Cité Soleil. In his self-presentation, Ti Gabriel has long defined himself as a protector of his neighborhood. The U.N. panel of experts has recorded Jean-Pierre’s involvement in extorsion, property destruction, the hijacking goods, and violence against civilian populations.

Leader: Vitelhomme Innocent

Vitelhomme Innocent is one of the relative newcomers to Haiti’s gang scene and has reframed gang operations in a number of ways. His management style has been characterized by a ready willingness to set off wars with other gangs, aggressive territorial expansion, and proclivity toward unrestricted violence.

Innocent has not shied away from venturing into areas traditionally considered safe by wealthier Haitians, including Tabare, Montagne Noire and a significant flank around the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince. These actions — along with his extensive involvement in kidnapping, extortion and murder, including of police officers — have landed Vitelhomme on the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted list. With their access limited to mostly secondary roads, his Kraze Barye gang has resorted mostly to predation in the form of looting, extortion and kidnapping — explaining in part the high levels of violence and brutality displayed by his gang.

Leaders: Johnson André “Izo” and Emmanuel Solomon “Manno”

Johnson André, known as Izo, heads the 5 Segond gang, along with Emmanuel Solomon, known as Manno, who serves as his principal operational and military commander.

5 Segong has made vicious violence their modus operandi, subjecting communities under their control to extensive brutality and rampaging plunder with no effort to cultivate political capital with local populations. In other words, his rule centers on being feared.

The U.S. Treasury has accused Andre and Solomon of more than 1,000 cases of sexual violence in 2022 alone. André brazenly displays his violence, vices and criminal proceeds on social media, where he has also tried to establish a career as a Haitian rapper. Beyond looting, extortion and kidnapping, the 5 Segond gang is extensively involved in drug trafficking in Haiti, controlling a large part of the coastline in Port-au-Prince and conquering territories in the Artibonite department and along Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic.

Leader: Renel Destina “Ti Lapli”

Ti Lapli is reputed to store weapons and hostages for the 5 Segond Gang in the Grand Ravine area. His gang strategies are highly similar to those of the aforementioned André, strongly prioritizing the criminal aspects of his operations and devoting little effort to cultivating political capital. Some of Destina’s cadres come from the same sources as 5 Segond’s, including former vigilance brigades. Ti Lapli has also integrated Dominican nationals into his gang.

Leader: Jeff Larose “Jeff”

Jeff Larose, known popularly as Jeff, is the leader of the Canaan gang, which is an important ally of the 5 Segond gang. While Larose employs unrestrained violence similar to his allies — such as murders, kidnappings, house burning and other forms of plunder — he has invested more effort in coupling his reputation for unrestricted violence with Robin Hood-type actions, frequently distributing handouts to local people and excelling in propaganda. The Canaan gang consists of many factions, with commanders known by nicknames such as BIG, Jordany, John and Valès, and “Black Satan.”

Leaders: Joseph Wilson “Lanmo Sanjou” and Germanie Joly “Yonyon”

Internationally notorious for the kidnapping of 17 Christian missionaries from the Ohio-based Christian Aid Ministries in Haiti in October 2021, 400 Mawozo is yet another very brutal Haitian gang. 400 Mawozo often treats its kidnapping victims very poorly, with their victims having a higher likelihood of dying in captivity than victims held by other Haitian gangs.

Despite its self-mocking name, which stands for “400 simpletons,” the gang is heavily armed and militarily well-organized. With substantial income from weapons and drug trafficking as well as kidnapping, the gang has been emboldened to ramp up their attacks, including shooting at U.S. embassy vehicles.

Leader: Kempes Sanon