Iraq Beyond 2011: Remarks by Deputy Minister Rafe Al-Eissawi
Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Rafe Al-Eissawi, on June 10 spoke at a public event at the Institute to deliver his primary message: the U.S. and Iraq need “to move from [a military-based] relationship towards the strategic framework relationship.”
Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Rafe Al-Eissawi, on June 10 spoke at a public event at the Institute to deliver his primary message: the U.S. and Iraq need “to move from [a military-based] relationship towards the strategic framework relationship.”
“As is very well-known, Iraq signed the SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement] and the SFA [Strategic Framework Agreement] with the United States of America,” said Eissawi.
“But for the last few years the focus was only on the security relationship and the security agreement. Now I think we are in a new environment. This is the main mission of my delegation to the States: to trigger the process of focusing on the activation of the Strategic Framework Agreement.”
The Strategic Framework Agreement, which was signed in tandem with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), lays the groundwork for intergovernmental cooperation across various sectors.
Eissawi argues that the withdrawal of U.S troops, as dictated by the SOFA, should be offset by bolstering U.S. civilian engagement. This includes building capacity in “universities, hospitals [and government] ministries; providing opportunities for Fulbright and other fellowships; [and encouraging] economic and business relationships between American and Iraqi businessmen and companies.” Eissawi came to Washington, D.C. with the purpose of meeting with U.S. government officials, including at the departments of State, Commerce and Transportation, to discuss these needs.
In addition to building the civilian sector, Eissawi acknowledged the need for a parallel effort to ramp up the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
“We think that it will be possible for the ISF to control the situation internally. Still [they] need more and more capacity building, training and equipment,” said Eissawi. “There is a schedule… in the hands of the two ministries [Iraqi ministries of Defense and Interior] to cover the training and equipment program, which is definitely [farther] than 2011, despite the fact that Iraq and the U.S. are committed to implement the SOFA and complete withdrawal at 2011.” Eissawi suggested that the ISF would not be fully prepared to handle external threats until 2018.
“I think this should be the decision of the next Iraqi government to reevaluate the status of the security forces,” Eissawi continued. “I think it is possible for Iraq or the U.S. to restudy their situation again, to decide at that time whether to [participate] in another phase of agreement or not.” However, Eissawi assured, “for the time being in Baghdad,” the assumption is that the SOFA will be carried out and withdrawal will be complete at the end of 2011.
Eissawi discussed the problems of reintegrating the Sons of Iraq (SOI), a movement of about 100,000 mostly Sunni fighters, into the ISF and Iraqi government civil sector. Due to budgetary constraints and bias against the SOI, only five percent of the SOI had been successfully hired, compared to the 80 percent that had been planned.
He also touched on Iraq’s disputed territories, saying that this and other issues point to “the necessity of reforming the constitution,” which should be done by the next Iraqi government “within the first four months” of its formation.
On the topic of refugee return, Eissawi lamented that the Ministry of Migration had not done more to support the return of Iraq’s refugee and internally displaced population (IDP), due to its limited capacity. He reached out to international organizations continue their work in this area. “The most important issue now… is their participation in the next election... I think it is part of their rights to participate [in the election] and to include that in the national election law.”
