Event Summary

Introduction

Over the course of 2008, a diverse group of distinguished Iraqi professionals and academics came together with the assistance of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and produced a report on the implications of US and international policy in Iraq and recommendations for the future. On 3 March 2009, USIP hosted Jan Egeland, Director of the, NUPI and Reidar Visser, Research Fellow at NUPI, to present the findings of this report, "More than "Shiites" and "Sunnis": How a Post-Sectarian Strategy Can Change the Logic and Facilitate Sustainable Political Reform in Iraq." Sam Parker, Iraq Program Officer at USIP, offered a response on the paper. The following is a summary of their remarks and responses to question from participants.

The NUPI Report

Iraqi society has a rich history of coexistence between Sunnis and Shi'a. "If you look at the big picture, sectarianism in Iraq in the shape of large-scale violence has been quite marginal," stated Visser. "Most of the people in this group tell us, 'we are Iraqis first and foremost, not Sunni and Shia.'" However, the report claims, US policy in post-2003 Iraq created, or otherwise deepened, division among Iraq's various communities -- first by invading Iraq with a misguided vision of Iraqi society, framing the evolving conflict through an ethno-sectarian paradigm, and finally pursuing a reconciliation strategy based on the fulfillment of communitarian quotas. This process yielded political gains to opportunistic leaderships by bolstering the appeal of communitarian interests and polarizing an otherwise coexistent population. The Iranian government, whose interest lies in preventing a nonsectarian Iraq, has ultimately benefited from American missteps. The US government and international community must now work to reverse this trend, in order to facilitate a timely and unproblematic withdrawal of US forces.

The paper focuses heavily on the threat of Iranian influence and warns equally against both a premature US withdrawal and the inverse situation in which US forces would overstay the end of 2011 deadline in the Status of Forces Agreement. Both of these situations would result in undue growth of Iranian influence in Iraq. To prevent this from occurring, the US and international community should pursue policies that work toward a stable, centralized, non-sectarian Iraq. These policies should focus primarily on securing free and fair parliamentary elections in 2009; stimulating nonsectarian political participation; reforming regional diplomacy; and clarifying the status and territory of Kurdistan.

Foremost among the paper's eighteen recommendations is that the US government should publicly acknowledge the negative consequences of its policies to date and clarify its future aims in Iraq. Other specific recommendations include: tying further international development assistance and withdrawal of US troops to the completion of a revised or new constitution; offering campaign assistance to political parties running on non-sectarian platforms; opening bilateral US-Iran negotiations with intentional disregard to Iran's role in Iraq, so as to downplay this issue; guaranteeing the KRG internationally recognized autonomy; and discouraging foreign investment in the oil sector in Kurdistan until its status is agreed upon.

Sovereign, stable and self-reliant: Parker's critique

Parker's critique of the paper focused on three primary facts: 1) sectarian divisions predate the US-led invasion; 2) sectarianism has declined in Iraq over the past two years; and 3) constitutional reform is not an antidote to sectarian political mobilization. While Parker conceded that US policy had some role exacerbating ethno-sectarian division in Iraq, he refuted the paper's conclusion that the US should then pursue proactively anti-communitarian policies in order to reverse this trend. The spirit of the recommendations, Parker argued, is "like taking the side of the anti-communitarians, almost as if [the US] had a stake in the Iraqi political debate" beyond a stable, self-sustaining outcome that is mutually acceptable to the major Iraqi players. The Obama administration's goals in Iraq, as outlined in the President's address on February 27, are aimed at achieving a sovereign, stable and self-reliant country, with a just, representative and accountable government. Ambitions beyond these basic goals are likely counterproductive and assume a level of US involvement in Iraqi politics that is not sustainable or compatible with the US's broader interests worldwide. Parker asserted, "The US interest is not to pick a side. The US interest is in a system in which competing trends can co-exist."

Speakers

• Jan Egeland
  Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
  Former UN Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
• Reidar Visser
  Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
• Sam Parker, Discussant
  Iraq Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace
• Daniel Serwer, Moderator
  Vice President, Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace