KEY TAKEAWAYS:
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
When it comes to Venezuela, all eyes of late have been focused on the Trump administration’s deliberations over sustaining or selectively lifting sanctions. The decision will have a major impact on Venezuela’s ability to produce and sell oil. Beyond that, the administration’s moves on sanctions will serve as a key signal of its Venezuela policy and whether Washington will return to a policy of maximum pressure or take a more accommodating approach.
While that policy is outside of Venezuelans’ control, they will have their own important decision in 2025 that will have a major impact on the country’s institutions and residual democratic space: whether or not to participate in this year’s elections. In the 2025 electoral marathon, more than 3,300 positions will be elected, including 277 deputies to the National Assembly, 23 governors, 270 regional legislators, 335 mayors and 2,471 municipal councilors. The U.S. should pay close attention to Venezuelans’ decision to vote or abstain and decide how best to deploy its leverage.
The contested result of the July 28 presidential election, announced by the National Electoral Council (CNE) and ratified by the Supreme Court (TSJ), has revived abstentionist slogans such as “in Venezuela, you vote, but you cannot choose,” “a dictatorship doesn’t fall with votes,” and “participating in the next elections means validating the regime’s electoral farce.” Advocates of abstention argue that they cannot participate when their parties are barred from participation and their candidates are disqualified, imprisoned or in exile. They are also concerned with the legitimacy voting bestows on the Maduro government.
On the other hand, those who call for participation argue that the 2025 elections present an opportunity to restore some institutional checks and balances and curb the government’s authoritarianism. They argue that given the regime’s firm political, economic, social, military and territorial control, there is no quick path to restoring Venezuelan democracy. Rather, a sustained process of accumulating political power is required for the recovery of spaces for democracy and institutional balance. They assert that restoring democracy will be possible when a politically organized and dissatisfied people accumulate enough power to strengthen independent democratic institutions and create the conditions to facilitate negotiations that would lead to positive change.
Given the widespread rejection of ruling party candidates, the opposition could achieve a landslide victory and demonstrate once again that national sovereignty truly lies with the Venezuelan people.
Advocates for participation in this election cycle argue that without institutional checks and balances to limit the government’s control over other branches of power, what’s left of the country’s democracy will continue to deteriorate if not disappear. Elections are one place where this slide can be arrested. Like its predecessor, the Maduro regime has gradually subjugated democratic institutions, which they use to intervene in political parties and select their leaders, disqualify opposition candidates, use public resources for their campaigns, and deploy the state’s repressive apparatus to intimidate, persecute and neutralize opponents.
Participation advocates emphasize that the lack of institutional checks and balances was one of the reasons why the Venezuelan people could not claim its victory in the July 28 presidential elections. The opposition not only competed against the ruling party with its unfair advantages but also against a biased CNE and TSJ aligned with the government. This, they argue, was a direct consequence of previous electoral boycotts, which handed control of the National Assembly to the ruling party. They reason that the legislature appoints the members of the CNE and the justices of the TSJ, whose autonomy and impartiality are crucial for ensuring fair and transparent elections.
These advocates also stress the need for consistency in electoral strategy. They argue that participating in the presidential elections only to then call for abstention in the parliamentary, regional and municipal elections weakens the opposition’s electoral machinery and demobilizes voters. Then, when the opposition decides to return to the electoral path, it lacks the organizational capacity to compete effectively under unfavorable conditions. They insist that electoral ground lost due to abstention cannot be regained in the next election cycle. Instead, accumulating power in a sustainable way requires participation in all elections.
Finally, local opposition officials have limited power, especially as resources are allocated first to cities and states that voted for the ruling coalition, but their presence and what influence they can muster is a reminder of the widespread desire of the Venezuelan people for change. And in the National Assembly there is even more capacity to affect change, and to influence some of the issues that go to the heart of preserving democratic space and the re-institutionalization that many in civil society believe is the key to the country’s ultimate recovery and social healing.
Abstentionists argue that electing National Assembly deputies, governors and mayors does not address the root problem — the central government’s illegitimacy. They claim that until the electoral victory of the July 28 presidential elections is reconciled, participating in any other election is meaningless, as it normalizes an irregular situation. From their perspective, Venezuela’s political conflict can only be resolved by taking control of the executive branch, making all other elections secondary.
Electoral conditions are increasingly disadvantageous for the opposition. However, they do not nullify its unique advantage — widespread public rejection of ruling party candidates.
To assess the feasibility and rationale for participating in the 2025 elections, abstentionists pose the following questions:
This list of questions could be the basis for negotiations between the opposition and the regime leading to an agreement on the parameters for these elections.
On balance, electoral conditions are increasingly disadvantageous for the opposition. However, they do not nullify its unique advantage — widespread public rejection of ruling party candidates. This is why the government benefits from maintaining an electoral council that discourages voter turnout, which may lead to renunciation of voting altogether. Capitalizing on this public discontent, the opposition could participate with unified and single candidacies and in the process once again validate the desire of the Venezuelan people for change, while keeping alive the residual democratic institutions that will be essential to the country’s recovery.
As the United States focuses on the immediate issue of sanctions, it would do well to consider how it might be helpful should Venezuelans determine that their best collective interest is served by voting in the 2025 elections. If both the opposition and the U.S. agree on a path forward, Washington’s considerable leverage could be useful in creating the conditions that would make these elections worthwhile for Venezuelans and the U.S. This could directly advance U.S. interests by putting Venezuela on a stable path, lessening migration, and opening the door to improved relations that would make Venezuela less available to China and Russia.
Victor Alvarez is an economist and writer living in Caracas. He was the winner of the National Science Award and director of the Project on Elections Education.