KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Editor's Note: The following article is part of a USIP project examining the costs to China of a Taiwan contingency.
The strategic costs to China incurred by a comprehensive military campaign to compel unification with Taiwan likely are myriad and exorbitant. However, Taiwan’s prominent position in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) core-interest hierarchy complicates assessments of the extent to which any costs drive the party’s decisions regarding use of force for unification. Beijing’s calculation of costs of action versus perceived cost of restraint is a foremost consideration in any Chinese use-of-force equation, and therefore critical in weighing U.S. options for deterring Chinese military action against Taiwan.
Given the extent to which Chinese leader Xi Jinping has consolidated his control and the centralization of CCP decision making, viewing the likely cost-benefit analysis of a key decision regarding Taiwan should weigh as much as possible those costs and benefits through the lens of Xi’s priorities and legacy. Xi’s signature initiatives in economic, diplomatic and military domains are designed to pave the road to the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation by the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic (2049), and as such will be central to any decision regarding conflict over Taiwan.
This article explores several specific aspects of strategic cost or risk behind CCP decision making regarding use of force against Taiwan, the likelihood of a protracted conflict in the Strait and what U.S. and allied policymakers can do to strengthen deterrence.
In Xi’s first five-year “term” as head of China’s tripartite party-military-state apparatus, he established his dominance over decision making regarding national development and security strategy. Through anti-corruption efforts, military restructuring and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Xi laid the foundation for a “new era” in Chinese policy. In his second term, he successfully re-engineered the Chinese constitution to ensure his rule over the Chinese system beyond the bounds of that second five-year tenure. In this context, Xi delineated his Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and “world-class military” plan to provide the means to the end of national rejuvenation. The CCP seeks to promote its core mid-century objectives through these initiatives, backed up by growing military prowess and, despite a downturn in growth, still formidable economic standing.
Taken as a whole, these initiatives seek to place China at the center of future global governance and development activities. Associated diplomatic and economic efforts give China leverage with the Global South and potentially resonate more broadly as the global security structure evolves. CCP leaders posit that the United States will respond with increasing hostility to China’s rising power in order to sustain U.S. “hegemony.” Xi alleges that a global rebalancing is inevitable but cautions that the transition is not complete. Moreover, party leaders believe U.S.-China tensions will continue to worsen as the U.S. and China approach the shift in power; with multipolar trends favoring China in the long term but heightening short-term risks of conflict with the U.S.
A key question for China is whether to conduct a Taiwan invasion in this transitional period understanding the likelihood of crippling costs to Xi’s development goals — and by extension, to his legacy. China is deploying capabilities to compete with the U.S. in shaping the decisions and activities of other powers to buttress the CCP’s vision of a new global security system. But this does not yet translate to influence that could help Beijing weather the broad array of costs that major conflict would engender. China increasingly turns to strategic partnerships for economic and diplomatic advantage. But Beijing generally avoids alliances, particularly of the sort that would constrain Chinese choices in security decisions. In an actual great power conflict, this is likely an area where China is at disadvantage and faces elevated risk associated with conflict.
China is prepared to risk trade losses to gain Taiwan, but a concerted U.S. and allied sanctions effort could badly batter the Chinese economy.
In a major conflict, global influence and leadership would be of particular importance in the trade arena. China is prepared to risk trade losses to gain Taiwan, but a concerted U.S. and allied sanctions effort could badly batter the Chinese economy at a time when Xi’s developmental goals include managing already slowing growth. Over half of China’s exports are to countries in the U.S.-allied sphere of influence. In the event of a conflict involving the United States and its allies, a blockade (or counter-blockade depending on China’s actions against Taiwan) of critical imports into China is also possible — a coordinated threat that portends prohibitive cost.
Global responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine are likely instructive for CCP elites regarding economic and reputational costs. Unlike Russia, moreover, China is heavily integrated into the U.S. and European Union economies and would suffer substantial losses if those economic ties were cut. China also seeks to expand political influence in these and other countries and has resisted overt military support for Russia. Beijing instead portrays itself as a potential peacemaker, despite its materiel and rhetorical support for the Russian war effort. The use of force against Taiwan would certainly impact this desired political influence negatively.
Some Chinese researchers also posit that the United States has taken advantage of the Russia-Ukraine war to consolidate its alliance structure and drag an opposing power into a protracted war with a Western proxy . The United States did so by rallying its allies to provide materiel support to Ukraine and by mobilizing its own advanced technology, such as cyber and space technologies, to optimize Ukrainian defenses and capabilities. Being dragged into a war with the U.S. likely is viewed by China’s elites as a trap to be avoided — as indicated by Xi Jinping’s reported statements to European leaders that he would not fall into such a trap.
There are similar costs for Xi’s military goals. Xi has repeatedly underscored the importance of integrating and synchronizing military capabilities with economic development to enhance national security. Great powers have strong military forces both to defend the country and to enable and protect economic and diplomatic interests. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi announced his plan to accelerate modernization to make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a “world-class” military by midcentury, representing the military dimension of Chinese rejuvenation. In the 20th Party Congress report from 2022, Xi discussed military modernization goals related to the building of a “world class military” through training on joint operations, strategic deterrence and national defense education; with Xi’s military thought as the cornerstone of PLA reform and restructuring.
Central to becoming a world-class military is the PLA’s ability to lead global technological and doctrinal innovation. This, however, is an area where the PLA continues to play “catch-up” rather than to innovate. The PLA learns from recent conflicts but does not pioneer cutting-edge strategies, technologies and doctrine. To remedy this, the PLA aims to develop a world-class, self-reliant defense industrial base integrated with an innovative civilian industrial sector. Reducing China’s dependence on other countries for core technologies is central to Xi’s plans. U.S. advances in military space capabilities, and the integration of civilian systems such as Starlink satellites, are examples of the technologically advanced systems-of-systems the Chinese recognize as essential for modern combat operations but have not yet mastered.
A technologically skilled personnel base and officer leadership development programs are also critical components of a world-class military. Soldier and officer training and education programs, however, highlight contradictions within the PLA’s personnel system and point to weaknesses inherent in China’s top-down leadership and decision-making culture. Xi and party elites stress political education and training to cement political loyalty across the force, while at the same time recognizing a need on the modern battlefield for decentralized decision making and independence of action. While political indoctrination doesn’t necessarily connote less effective operational training, senior CCP assessments of PLA leadership skills indicate shortcomings in building a force that is both loyal and operationally effective. Ongoing challenges in efforts to recruit and retain personnel also are indicative of shortfalls in the development of expertise and combat readiness.
Xi’s actions and statements evince a lack of trust in the PLA that likely would figure prominently in decisions regarding when and how to employ forces in a Taiwan contingency.
Xi has been concerned about combat readiness and political reliability of PLA officers, as evidenced by the continuing saga of corruption charges against high-ranking PLA leaders and the no-confidence votes that directly and indirectly figure into Xi’s excoriation of officers incapable of fundamental leadership skills required for modern combat. Xi’s actions and statements evince a lack of trust in the PLA that likely would figure prominently in decisions regarding when and how to employ forces in a Taiwan contingency.
Analysis of PLA military sources also raises questions about the maturity of PLA doctrine, both joint and service-specific, in terms of enabling the PLA to fight the type of conflict envisioned in Xi’s military thought and theory. There is evidence that the operational regulations to implement Xi’s vision for the kind of “multi-domain precision strike warfare” that would be needed for a successful Taiwan invasion are not fully formed or integrated into planning and training regimens. PLA strategists note that “new type operational forces” are necessary for joint campaigns fought under the new concepts of operation the PLA is devising. Turning Xi’s military thought into operational reality is a work in progress; and CCP decisions about employing force in major joint combat operations must consider disconnects between aspiration and readiness.
Along these lines, analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine note that Russia failed to employ many of the capabilities that China’s leadership views as essential for war in a so-called “informatized” environment, where networked command and control systems enable rapid, integrated joint operations. Russia failed to seize informational advantage either offensively or defensively and Russian forces were unable to achieve the synergies afforded by well-coordinated joint campaign operations. These are areas, however, that the PLA is likewise insufficiently ready to execute despite leadership focus on them — yet another indicator that the PLA needs more time to meet Xi’s exacting standards before undertaking a major power conflict.
A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely undermine Xi’s signature global diplomatic and security initiatives and throw his plans for a world-class military into disarray. The risk is compounded by the fact that the PLA has yet to prove to its own leadership that it is ready for a fight on the magnitude of a complex joint campaign against Taiwan that might involve U.S. intervention. However, an extreme provocation such as Taiwan's government officially declaring independence, or perhaps the perception that increasing U.S.-Taiwan security ties imply a treaty-like commitment to secure Taiwan’s autonomy in perpetuity, could escalate tensions into a full-blown conflict. Lesser provocations such as even more stringent U.S. technology export controls on China or expanded U.S. security assistance to Taiwan also could elevate tensions enough to create a more escalatory environment during an incident or crisis.
CCP perceptions that a conflict with the U.S. is becoming increasingly likely, juxtaposed with the exorbitant cost of conflict due to the economic and military pain that the U.S. and its allies could bring to bear, pose a decision-making conundrum for the CCP as it considers Taiwan policy. Should China perceive an extreme provocation or geostrategic development that precludes peaceful unification, party leaders might yet choose to conduct a cross-Strait invasion, anticipating that economic, military and reputational costs might be the lesser of bad outcomes. This would not, of course, support Xi’s goal of building a world-class military if the PLA were largely decimated in the conflict.
More likely, China might refrain from invasion and resort instead to punitive missile strikes or a blockade. This might offer Xi options to reduce military and economic risk while displaying CCP determination to reverse what the party views as unacceptable trends in the cross-Strait dynamic. However, if unsuccessful in the short-term at forcing Taiwan’s leadership to capitulate to Beijing’s political demands, such upticks in combat operations below the level of an invasion could nonetheless usher in hostilities along a wider and longer escalatory path.
Beijing may look to the war against Ukraine for lessons for a Taiwan conflict, where it could reach its unification objectives through a use of force at high but acceptable cost.
PLA assessments conclude that the U.S. will maintain military advantage in the coming years, but that China can nonetheless exploit new areas of military competition, including innovations in cyberspace, outer space and the deep sea. This, however, will not happen overnight. PLA scholars admit that China currently does not have the capability to match or surpass U.S. military innovations and technologies. In the longer term, Beijing may look to the war against Ukraine for lessons for a Taiwan conflict, where it could reach its unification objectives through a use of force at high but acceptable cost.
Much ink has been spilled regarding China’s military advances and the possibility that the PLA could undertake a campaign to overwhelm and subdue Taiwan rapidly rather than getting sucked into a long war. The assumptions underlying any assessment of Chinese success in such a scenario are many and do not appear to be those held currently by China’s elite leaders. If Xi and his inner circle believe that the U.S. seeks ultimately to block China’s core strategic interests, they may instead seek to deter large-scale conflict in the short- to mid-term through lower risk operations and activities while preparing China’s economy, global diplomatic posture and military forces for a longer, broader conflict.
Some Chinese sources indicate a belief that China is in a better position for a protracted war than Russia was when it invaded Ukraine. Over time, Russian adaptations to technological inferiority and willingness to accept casualties potentially mitigate Western advantages and stress U.S. and allied defense industrial capabilities. In this view, strengthening China’s national defense mobilization system and connecting it more deeply with the PLA’s theater commands could provide the foundation for victory in a protracted conflict.
With an eye on U.S.-led actions in support of Ukraine, CCP leaders have considered and taken several actions to alleviate potential wartime shocks in key energy and food sectors and to evaluate financial institutions to determine the likely impact of sanctions. The party has gone so far as to bar ministry-level officials and their families from holding overseas real estate and other foreign holdings in light of the sanctions imposed against Russian oligarchs.
Some analysis in this area focuses on the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to sustain a long war, assessing that the United States investment in the Russia-Ukraine war depletes U.S. strategic resources that would impact U.S. ability to fight China. This assessment aligns with China’s focus on ensuring sufficiency of its own resources as part of the larger defense mobilization system.
In a protracted conflict with high PLA attrition, China could perhaps snatch victory from the jaws of technological defeat if its defense industrial capacity and national mobilization meet CCP expectations. Russia has thus far continued to fight in Ukraine despite U.S.-led sanctions, largely due to its ability to sustain large losses and still fight on. Perhaps in recognition of this, China has had a major reform and restructuring effort underway in its National Defense Mobilization Offices since late 2022, strengthening the integration of wartime mobilization work across government agencies at national, provincial and municipal levels.
Chinese strategists appear clear-eyed about the high costs associated with military options to compel Taiwan unification but are likewise focused on delineating the civil-military strategy, posture and capabilities to conduct what they increasingly perceive as an inevitable clash with the U.S. Concerns about the likely damage to Xi’s economic, foreign policy and military goals, along with a persistent mistrust of PLA readiness, indicate that a complex, comprehensive joint campaign to invade Taiwan is not top of the current list of military options to respond to perceived Taiwan provocation. Even lesser options such as a blockade of Taiwan carry risks of economic backlash and military escalation that appear exceedingly high absent severe provocation that tips the cost-benefit scale toward military action.
This does not mean that China would forego military options under any but the direst circumstances, and it calls for U.S. and allied policymakers to signal an understanding of the costs to China and a willingness to make those costs felt to strengthen deterrence. Equally important is the possibility that Beijing might conduct actions just below the level of major conflict in concert with (and perhaps to buy time for) preparations for a protracted conflict in the future. As such, U.S. and allied policymakers can also strengthen deterrence by preparing and signaling the preparation of responses to the broad range of military and non-military options available to the CCP to coerce and compel Taiwan — to include signaling through defense industrial preparations and joint exercises that a long war against the U.S. would be a losing proposition for China.
Cortez Cooper is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation. He provides analyses of international security and defense issues to a broad range of U.S. government and allied entities.