China’s ongoing push to change the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. The GSI promotes a set of distinct security concepts and principles — many of which reflect Beijing’s longstanding international normative preferences, such an emphasis on territorial sovereignty and noninterference. USIP is tracking how the GSI is being operationalized by China, with an initial focus on Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

A Chinese coast guard vessel confronting a Philippine Coast Guard vessel in the South China Sea on Nov. 10, 2023. China’s ongoing push to change the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative in April 2022. (Jes Aznar/The New York Times)
A Chinese vessel confronting a Philippine vessel in the South China Sea on Nov. 10, 2023. China’s ongoing push to change the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the GSI in April 2022. (Jes Aznar/The New York Times)

On the global stage, China seeks to position the GSI as a framework for world peace in contrast with the current U.S.-led security order. In addition to boosting the GSI and other initiatives through the United Nations and branding China’s role in international diplomacy as GSI activities, China has begun associating bilateral and regional security activities like counterterrorism partnerships, policing assistance, and cybersecurity cooperation with the GSI as well. While these efforts offer some insights into this still nascent initiative, many aspects of the GSI remain unclear. What are China’s areas and issues of focus? What is new and what is a repackaging of existing projects and relationships? Several USIP essays series will examine these questions and more.

Africa

Chinese peacekeepers serving with the United Nations in Juba, South Sudan, Oct. 2, 2017. (Eric Kanalstein / U.N. Mission in South Sudan)

China’s Bid for a Bigger Security Role in Africa

USIP’s Carla Freeman and the National Bureau of Asian Research’s Bates Gill discuss how, under the banner of the GSI, China is increasingly emphasizing security cooperation and linking it to development in its relations with African countries.

Central Asia

Southeast Asia

Security guards walking past Chinese flags decorating a street in Beijing. October 1, 2019. (Gilles Sabrie/The New York Times)

China's Vision for Global Security: Implications for Southeast Asia

Researcher Thy Try explains that as China tries to establish itself a counterbalance to the U.S.-led security order, Southeast Asian nations should remain skeptical of China’s expanding political influence due to unresolved territorial disputes and questions over cybersecurity.

Featured Publications

Chinese leader Xi Jinping speaks on October 24, 2024, at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, where China is promoting the GSI. (Photo by Maxim Shemetov/Pool via AP)

China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia

Drawing on field research and discussions with regional policymakers and experts, this report looks at Beijing’s progress in implementing and operationalizing the GSI in the priority regions of mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia, and it examines key policy implications, explaining why the initiative warrants greater attention on the part of the US policy community.

20240612_central-asia-gill_thumbnail_blog.jpg

China's Growing Role in Central Asia’s Security

Bates Gill, senior fellow in Asian security at the National Bureau of Asian Research, discusses his recent trip to Central Asia with USIP colleagues and what they learned about why China has taken a larger role in Central Asia, how Central Asian countries view China’s increased security engagement and why there’s still interest in greater U.S. engagement with the region.

Visitors at Ala Too Square in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Sept. 26, 2022. With Russia distracted in Ukraine, Central Asian leaders are looking for a reliable partner to help ensure domestic stability. (Sergey Ponomarev/The New York Times

China Looks to Fill a Void in Central Asia

USIP’s Carla Freeman, Alley McFarland and Gavin Helf look at what’s driving China’s growing engagement in Central Asia, what these countries are looking to get out of their relationships with Beijing and how the United States can compete with China in the region.

President Xi Jinping of China participates in a bilateral dinner meeting with President Donald Trump during the G-20 Summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Dec. 1, 2018. (Tom Brenner/The New York Times)

Xi Ramps Up Campaign for a Post-Pax Americana Security Order

While the GSI has gained traction with some states, the recent trips to Washington by the South Korean and Philippine presidents show that even in China’s neighborhood, many countries still see Washington as the world’s leading strategic security partner. As Beijing continues its GSI campaign, Washington should consider the implications for U.S. policy and how it can respond effectively.

Related Research & Analysis

China’s Rhetoric on Myanmar Doesn’t Match Reality

China’s Rhetoric on Myanmar Doesn’t Match Reality

Thursday, January 30, 2025

As Myanmar’s civil war grinds on and increasingly threatens China’s interests, Beijing has stepped up its engagement with all sides, especially Myanmar’s junta. The announcement that China and the junta plan to “establish a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar” has raised concerns and speculation that this initiative could worsen the conflict and endanger the Myanmar people and Chinese nationals working in Myanmar.

Type: Analysis

China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia

China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia

Thursday, November 21, 2024

Since Chinese leader Xi Jinping launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022, it has been used in China’s efforts to expand its international security role and reshape global order. Drawing on field research and discussions with regional policymakers and experts, this report looks at Beijing’s progress in implementing and operationalizing the GSI in the priority regions of mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia, and it examines key policy implications, explaining why the initiative warrants greater attention on the part of the US policy community.

Type: Special Report

How China Is Leveraging Security Cooperation in Central Asia

How China Is Leveraging Security Cooperation in Central Asia

Monday, September 9, 2024

The July 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in in Astana, Kazakhstan provided China with another platform to highlight its vision for global governance and security. While the SCO has expanded to include states beyond Central Asia, the organization’s focus on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism — the so-called “three evils” — is particularly relevant for China in Central Asia, where Beijing looks to test and advance its security cooperation strategies. The SCO, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) are key components of China’s ambition to offer an alternative to what it calls “Western hegemony” and to resist external interference in the domestic affairs of SCO states.

Type: Analysis

View All

Latest Research & Analysis

Philippines: Former Combatants Help Keep the Peace During Recent Polls

Philippines: Former Combatants Help Keep the Peace During Recent Polls

Wednesday, June 25, 2025

By: Haroro Ingram, Country Director, Philippines, USIP

For decades, the struggle for peace in the Philippines’ southernmost island of Mindanao has been characterized by armed conflict between the Philippines government and Moro separatist groups, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and cycles of failed peace processes. The historic 2014 peace agreement between the Philippines government and MILF led to the granting of greater self-governance with the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) five years later. What has followed since is an unprecedented, yet very fragile, period of peace and stability.

Type: Analysis

With Cease-fire Holding, Can Israel and Iran Move Toward De-escalation?

With Cease-fire Holding, Can Israel and Iran Move Toward De-escalation?

Wednesday, June 25, 2025

Israel’s stunning and sophisticated June 13 attack on Iran set off a worrying 12-day escalatory spiral. Iran responded in short order with ballistic missile and drone strikes, which led to a series of tit-for-tat exchanges between the two sides. A cease-fire is now in place -- but will it hold?

Type: Analysis

What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

Monday, June 23, 2025

By: Nilanthi Samaranayake, Adjunct Fellow, East-West Center

When viewing U.S. partnerships in the maritime domain, relations with India, in particular, have thrived — especially over the past decade. Moreover, the partnership enjoys bipartisan support in the United States. Indications after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025 are that U.S.-India security relations will continue to be strong in the second Trump administration.

Type: Analysis

What’s at Stake for China in the Iran War?

What’s at Stake for China in the Iran War?

Monday, June 23, 2025

China has major energy and economic interests that are threatened by an escalating conflict. But Beijing may also see some strategic opportunities with the U.S. focused on the war. Ultimately, China is likely unwilling, and unable, to make a serious effort to broker peace.

Type: Analysis

The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry

The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

The 2024 revelations over China’s effort to implant malware in critical U.S. infrastructure by the Volt Typhoon hacking group — as well as the Salt Typhoon group’s successful breaching of at least nine major U.S. telecoms — have renewed concern over Beijing’s constant, ongoing efforts to hack Western companies, governments and non-governmental organizations. Unlike past incidents, like those involving Chinese military unit 61398, which were largely about cyber espionage, the Volt Typhoon group was actively implanting malware designed to disrupt critical infrastructure such as water and power systems.

Type: Analysis

View All Research & Analysis