KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Six months after Bangladesh’s repressive Awami League (AL) government was overthrown in a student-led uprising, Bangladesh’s democratic reformation is entering a critical phase. The reform commissions setup by Muhammad Yunus’s interim government (IG), which took power on August 8, are set to release their recommendations for dramatic changes to the country’s democratic institutions. Under Yunus’s stewardship, political parties and student leaders will now sit to forge a consensus on what reforms to pursue and when to hold elections. A breakdown of these negotiations would blunt momentum toward much-needed reforms and could tilt the country into political chaos.
During its tenure, Bangladesh’s IG has elicited sharply divergent international impressions. Many Western governments and observers continue to extol the protest movement that unseated Hasina and support the new government’s efforts at democratic reform. This perspective is encapsulated by The Economist, which named Bangladesh its “country of the year” for “toppling a despot and taking strides toward a more liberal government.”
In contrast, the IG’s detractors see a dangerously deteriorating situation. The Indian government has persistently criticized the IG and Indian media have described Bangladesh as a “vortex of instability” on the verge of becoming a failed state, Islamic republic or India’s “new Pakistan.” In the United Kingdom and the United States, some elected officials have expressed concern about violence against Hindus since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Recent scenes of student-led mobs destroying the homes of AL officials and historical sites unimpeded by security forces lend credence to these concerns.
Bangladesh currently faces numerous challenges and governing deficiencies. Politics are divisive. Law and order is weak. Militant Islamism is more overt. The economy is shaky. Relations with India are on edge.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the seeds of Bangladesh’s democratic reformation are taking root. Despite disagreements, the main political actors have all publicly and credibly committed to democratic reforms. After the AL’s fall, the IG has not been able to fully contain political, social and economic instability — or the deeply embedded political norms of violence and retribution — but it has made progress on these challenges and retained public support. At this crucial juncture point, the United States has a strong interest in standing with the IG and other political actors as they work to build a more democratic Bangladesh.
Bangladesh’s politics are tumultuous. Key leaders and factions from the student movement that led the 2024 July uprising have pushed controversial positions, including rewriting the constitution and banning the AL from politics. Unshackled by restrictions, the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) is gaining strength. Among the public, protests on a range of topics have proliferated, snarling traffic, undermining public services and creating a perception of general discontent. The IG has waffled on an election timeline while the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) — the primary opposition to the AL that is now well positioned to take power — has launched rallies to push for quick elections. A continued delay in announcing an election date risks provoking violent street confrontations. The reform commissions’ forthcoming recommendations are likely to spark divisive debate.
Underneath Bangladesh’s roiling political cacophony is agreement on the need for reform and elections.
Yet underneath Bangladesh’s roiling political cacophony is agreement on the need for reform and elections. After the AL’s collapse, the remaining major political parties support significant institutional reforms. The BNP’s strident calls for new polls in 2025 are coupled with a reform proposal that is less wide-ranging than others’ but would still significantly improve democratic processes. Political pushback has moderated some of the students’ unilateral positions. The IG’s ambiguity about elections appears driven by a desire to implement reforms rather than hold onto power. For its part, the military continues to back the IG but also opposes an extended interim period.
The law and order situation is precarious. After the fall of the AL government, the police, which were implicated in years of partisan and violent policing that culminated in at least 1,400 deaths during the July uprising, largely fled their posts. In September, the army was given law enforcement powers to fill the gap while police stations reopened, but today citizens still commonly complain of lawlessness. Local media outlets report a rise in violent crime. Since the AL’s expulsion, local media and rights groups documented an increase in attacks on religious minorities, particularly Hindus. Although misinformation and faulty documentation likely inflated data on attacks, violence against Hindus and other religious groups persists and many Hindus feel insecure.
Nevertheless, there are signs of stabilization as the IG establishes greater control. In response to recent mob violence, the government toughened its stand on law and order. Anti-minority violence has reportedly declined since August and IG officials, the BNP and JeI have continuously asserted their commitment to the protection of minorities. Under successive governments, Hindus have been vulnerable to extortion, discrimination and violence because of politics, economic exploitation and religious hostility. This issue requires a serious response from the IG, but hyperbolic charges of “genocide” both overstate and obscure the complex, long-standing problem of anti-minority violence in Bangladesh.
The space for militant Islamism is growing. As the influence of hardline Islamist groups — like JeI and Hefazat-e-Islam — have grown under the IG, more radical organizations and perspectives are emerging in public. ISIS and Taliban flags have reportedly turned up at rallies and extremist groups’ online recruitment has increased. Women complain of more Islamist activities on university campuses and street harassment for “indecent” behavior. Citing due process, the judiciary released from prison several top extremist leaders, including the al-Qaida-linked Jasimuddin Rahmani. IG officials insist the government is attentive to the threat even while emphasizing rule of law in counterterrorism (CT) operations. Yet some police officials privately argue that CT units are disempowered and in disarray, raising the threat level.
Despite concerning trends, a recalibration of Bangladesh’s CT approach is needed. Under the AL, human rights activists and organizations, the U.S. government, the United Nations and others accused the government’s CT operations of excessive force and unjustified arrests. Even while suppressing extremism, the AL made numerous concessions to Islamist groups to maintain power that weakened pillars of secularism. The IG’s desire to depoliticize and demilitarize the country’s CT strategy can produce a more just and effective policy if coupled with closely monitoring and punishing extremist speech and behavior.
Bangladesh’s economy faces strong headwinds. Prior to the IG’s installation in August, important economic indicators were moving in the wrong direction despite years of high GDP growth. Inflation was rising, the budget deficit was ballooning and foreign exchange reserves were declining. The AL government’s collapse prompted a transparent analysis of the state of the economy that exposed previously hidden structural problems.
Under the IG, inflation has continued, workers are agitating and electricity cuts are expanding. In surveys, Bangladeshis identify inflation and the economy as their primary concerns, on which they rate the IG’s performance poorly. Economic dissatisfaction, which was a key factor in the uprising against Hasina, remains.
Although out of the political spotlight, the IG has taken several important steps to stabilize the economy. A recent International Crisis Group report outlines several IG actions, including securing financial support from multilateral lenders; reforming exchange rates to boost foreign reserves; opening negotiations with external creditors to ease repayment terms; and reconstituting the boards of directors of underperforming banks. Although the IG’s economic performance has faced critique, its commitment to difficult fiscal choices and economic transparency and accountability is a positive sign. The IMF’s 2026 projection for Bangladesh shows hopeful trends for both GDP growth and inflation.
Bangladesh’s relationship with India, its most important neighbor, is deeply strained. India was closely aligned with the AL government, which accommodated India’s concerns and received unwavering diplomatic support in return. Since Hasina’s resignation, Dhaka and Delhi have had diplomatic spats over anti-Hindu violence, border fencing, Hasina’s extradition and other issues. India believes the IG is ignoring its concerns while warming to Pakistan, while Bangladesh sees nefarious motives in India’s critiques. The Indian government and media were comparatively muted during the Durga Puja riots in 2021 and persistent social media-driven attacks on Hindus throughout the AL’s tenure. After India spent years calling the AL’s poor record on democracy and rights a “domestic matter,” the IG views Delhi’s public criticisms as an effort to undermine it.
Yet key leaders in India and Bangladesh still recognize an interest in cooperation. Yunus, Bangladesh’s army chief, and the BNP have called for strengthened ties. India’s foreign secretary and army head have emphasized the need for collaboration to achieve its many interests in Bangladesh. Recent high-level diplomatic engagement has bolstered lines of communication. While Sheikh Hasina’s stay in India will continue to be an irritant, focusing on areas of mutual benefit like trade and infrastructure connectivity can begin to repair relations.
According to major democracy indices, Bangladesh was in gradual and steady decline amid state co-optation and suppression of opposition under the AL. This degradation will take years to fully reverse, but incremental progress is within reach. The major political actors appear in principle to agree on key reforms to address policing, judicial independence, election management, constitutional checks and balances, and other issues. These reforms would lay the foundation for more democratic institutions and processes if codified and reaffirmed by government officers and elected officials and supported by the military over time.
While Bangladesh appears on the precipice of positive procedural and legal changes, its illiberal and violent political culture is untamed.
While Bangladesh appears on the precipice of positive procedural and legal changes, its illiberal and violent political culture is untamed, which will undermine reforms if not also addressed. Zero-sum, retributive politics has persisted against the former ruling party in the form of spurious legal cases, a bureaucratic purge, targeted violence against party members and allies, blackmail and media retribution. It is also widely alleged that the BNP and some local student leaders have moved into extortion rackets previously occupied by AL members. The IG and political parties — including an unrepentant AL — need to embody a new norm of political reconciliation and nonpartisan governance alongside pursuing institutional rule changes to make Bangladesh’s democratic reformation sustainable.
The United States and other international actors can help in this effort by working to affirm positive trends and counter negative currents. The IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank recently announced new financial support, but more economic aid will be needed to stabilize the economy. International assistance can help Bangladesh recover laundered money, design and implement reforms, and conduct investigations into past crimes that ensure due process. In advance of new elections, democracy-assistance groups can scale up programs aiding civic and voter education, women’s and youth political empowerment, and domestic election observation. Diplomatically, the U.S. and others should affirm the IG’s international standing while also pressing the need to find an inclusive political settlement, prevent political violence and enact proactive policies to counter religious violence and extremism.
For the United States, a successful interim government that oversees key reforms and moves without unnecessary delay toward credible elections is clearly in its interest. A stable, democratic Bangladesh will be a better ally and trading partner, a better setting for U.S. business investment, a better balancer of China, a better defender of religious minorities and better able to accommodate moderate Islamist politics while draining the pool of support for extremism. The IG’s failure would produce a destabilizing democratic regression or possibly military intervention. Building democracy is a generational and iterative endeavor, but the IG will have succeeded if it can bend the curve of governance toward greater participation, pluralism and accountability. The United States and other governments should support this goal.