KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
President Jimmy Carter’s passing has prompted many reflections on his life and legacy. Few of Carter’s achievements have had as lasting an impact as the 1978 Camp David Accords. Between 1948 and 1978, Egypt and Israel had known nothing but waves of violence and stalemate. After Camp David, the Israeli-Egyptian relationship that was once a key threat to Middle East security became a resilient cornerstone of regional stability.
Camp David is a story of both realpolitik, and the power of leadership and personal relationships in diplomacy. Carter and his team recognized an alignment of interests — the parties’ shared acknowledgment of the mutual strategic interest and benefit to be gained. But in the words of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin immediately after a deal had been reached: “the Camp David conference should be renamed — it was the Jimmy Carter conference.” Carter’s ability to connect with others — to build trust, lean on and cajole as needed — was central to the initiative’s success. As the world considers paths out of the current Gaza War, it is a lesson worth reflecting on.
At the time of Camp David, Egypt and Israel had fought four major wars plus a war of attrition. But through the mid-1970s, something was changing. While the perceived power asymmetries that had long fueled Israel’s existential fears were recalibrated after Israel’s overwhelming military victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, any sense of complacency Israel gained was overcome by Egypt’s strong performance in the 1973 war. By the time of Camp David, it became clear in the context of international, regional and domestic events what could be gained by a deal and lost by its absence. Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Begin all understood the stakes and benefits.
Jimmy Carter’s emergence as a statesman came as a surprise. Before becoming president, he had not been highly involved in national politics — much less foreign policy — serving a single four-year term as governor of Georgia, after years as a small businessman and state senator. In the summer of 1973, the governor and Mrs. Rosalyn Carter made their first visit to the Holy Land. Deeply religious, he characterized the 10-day trip as both a personal pilgrimage and political education. It was an experience he credited with shaping his worldview and desire to reach a just solution to the region’s conflicts.
Begin rose to Israel’s prime ministership in June 1977, marking a rightward turn in Israeli politics as the first non-Labor Party premier. He was known for his time with the Irgun (a Mandate-era paramilitary group fighting the British); for rejecting territorial compromise with Jordan; and for supporting the expansion of settlements. Begin was a hardliner on issues related to the Palestinian question but saw opportunity in some parts of the Geneva process of Arab-Israeli diplomacy that he inherited. His foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, said at the time “the future is with Egypt. ... If Egypt is out of the conflict, there will be no more war.”
The third player at Camp David was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. After coming to power in October 1970, Sadat made regaining the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt lost to Israel in the 1967 war, and re-burnishing Egypt’s international reputation his highest priority. In the years before and after the 1973 war, Sadat also took a calculated political risk, pivoting Egypt’s strategic relationship from the Soviet Union toward the United States.
He made no secret that he was relying on the U.S. to make peace, stating in March 1977 that the U.S. holds 99% of the cards in the region. Months later, in a speech to the Egyptian parliament and in the presence of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat, Sadat expressed his readiness to go to Jerusalem to achieve peace. Ten days later, to the delight of the Israeli public and dismay of many in his cabinet (including his foreign minister, who resigned in protest), Sadat landed in Israel to speak in the Knesset. Talks between the parties began but faced huge difficulties. It was in this context that Carter invited Sadat and Begin to Camp David.
In the first three days of the Summit, any attempt to bring the parties together resulted in Sadat or Begin banging on the table and storming out of the room. As a result, thereafter the Israeli and Egyptian leaders did not engage directly — Carter shuttled revised drafts between the delegations until an agreement was reached.
In his book, “Thirteen Days in September,” Lawrence Wright outlines dramatic Camp David scenes of shouting matches and chess matches, of tense walks around the grounds, of packed bags and pleas to stay, and of the second Egyptian foreign minister’s resignation in protest. In perhaps the most dramatic moment of the summit, Wright describes a scene on the 13th day of the summit, when it seemed the negotiations had failed and the delegations were packing to return home. Offering Begin a stack of photos of the summit, inscribed to each of the prime minister’s grandchildren, Carter said, “I wanted to be able to say, ‘this is when your grandfather and I brought peace to the Middle East.” A weeping Begin agreed to persist.
While the outcome was far from certain, the parties understood that the stars may be aligning. Sadat, laser-focused on getting back the whole of the Sinai, was willing to be flexible on security and other arrangements to do so. Begin saw an opportunity to reach peace with Israel’s largest adversary. Still, both had intense domestic politics to consider.
Among the widest gaps between the parties was Sadat’s insistence that the negotiations also include a just resolution for the Palestinian question. Sadat insisted on the development of two framework documents, the first providing a formula for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza, the second, laying the principles for a bilateral peace agreement. That first framework was an important step, but without the Palestinians represented at the summit, was challenging to actualize.
While the Israel-Egypt peace has been a lynchpin for stability on this front, the lack of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued to be a source of violence and instability.
Ultimately, the summit yielded what was both achievable and necessary for both sides. Egypt regained the Sinai, the domestic dignity and political benefits that came with it, and a powerful role on the world stage. Concurrently, Sadat received much-needed U.S. support for the Egyptian military and economy, and a central place in U.S. regional strategy. Israel made peace with its strongest adversary and strengthened its alliance with the United States, which became its greatest guarantor of security. The United States facilitated what at the time seemed like a major step toward a comprehensive Middle East peace and secured an important advantage over the Soviet Union.
The formula has worked for both parties as envisioned: since 1978, Israel’s and Egypt’s shared a strategic interest in the sustainability of their peace treaty, buttressed by the United States role as a partner to both parties. But while the Israel-Egypt peace has been a lynchpin for stability on this front, the lack of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has continued to be a source of violence and instability, and one that has sorely tested the relationship since October 7, 2023.
Perceptions of the accords differed widely between Israel and Egypt. When the agreements were signed, emotions were high in the Arab world. In Egypt, public opinion was divided. Supporters were simply tired of a continuous war with Israel, with its heavy human, military, political and economic costs. Critics felt that Egypt should not negotiate except in the context of a comprehensive peace that addressed the Palestinian issue. In protest of Sadat’s decision, most Arab countries severed ties with Egypt and the headquarters of the Arab League was moved from Cairo to Tunisia. In October 1981, Sadat was assassinated by members of a terrorist organization that rejected Camp David.
Over time, Egyptians increasingly appreciated Sadat’s vision. A few months after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, a poll showed that 67% of respondents believed it was important to uphold the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and only 11% wanted the peace deal scrapped. However, the public has remained uncomfortable with the idea of warming relations as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolved. As the October 7 war in Gaza has persisted, that support has further eroded, presenting a challenge for the Egyptian government, even as the peace treaty has maintained its resilience.
In Israel, Camp David was a watershed moment. It was Israel’s first peace agreement with an Arab neighbor, consummated with the most powerful Arab state. However, the real psychological dam was broken not at Camp David, but a year earlier when Sadat spoke at the Knesset. Many still reference the “Sadat to Jerusalem moment” as shorthand for a historic gesture toward peace.
Overall, the legacy of Camp David has proven mixed in the eyes of Israelis. It paved the way for peace with Egypt, which enabled peace with Jordan in 1994, and normalization agreements with other Arab neighbors years later. It also established the framework for the Oslo Accords, which formed the backbone of what became a two-state solution-driven approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Support for this latter paradigm has been eroding consistently in Israeli society over the past quarter century. In the wake of October 7, it has been broadly dismissed across Israeli society as a reward for Hamas’ actions, and untenable security risk. The current Israeli parliament has formally rejected this paradigm as a political horizon.
Even before the current Israel-Hamas War, support for two states was at an all-time low among Israelis and Palestinians. As the war continues, it is reasonable to ask if Carter’s robustly pursued vision for Middle East peace will forever remain half-realized.
If securing a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was a groundbreaking achievement for President Carter, the “unfinished business” loomed large for him. In a speech two months into his presidency, he offered that peace in the Middle East would only be achieved when three conditions were met: when Israel received recognition of its right to exist by its neighbors; when Israel establishes permanent borders; and when Palestinian refugees have a “homeland.”
For Carter, Camp David was an opportunity to kick start a comprehensive end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Driven primarily by Sadat, an initial strategy of “linkage”— tying an Israeli–Egyptian agreement to benchmarks on the broader Palestinian issue — was attempted. However, by the end of the summit, Carter deemed this approach unworkable and, in a pragmatic pivot, successfully pushed to define specific Israeli-Egyptian peace and security arrangements, with the hope that the momentum might spur a broader agreement.
No one could deny the dedication and tenacity Carter brought to the task — both Sadat and Begin commented on Carter’s indispensability to the successful negotiations.
Over 45 years later, that comprehensive peace remains elusive. Arguably, Carter’s legacy lives on in the Abraham Accords. Through the latter, a set of “new normalizers” in the Arab world have forged agreements with Israel, securing bilateral interests despite the unresolved Palestinian question, but with the articulated hope that the developments could facilitate such resolution. As the October 7 war grinds on, the two-state paradigm that had its seeds sown in the Camp David framework has returned to the forefront of the diplomatic discourse, as some countries — particularly Saudi Arabia — weigh conditioning their constructive engagement on Gaza on an irreversible pathway to an end-of-conflict two-state agreement and full regional normalization, which would expand the 2020 Abraham Accords
Camp David’s impact still looms large in the Middle East. Those 13 days in September 1978 yielded a lasting peace between two once-warring states and offered a pathway and vision for Israeli–Palestinian, and broader Arab-Israeli, peace. No one could deny the dedication and tenacity Carter brought to the task — both Sadat and Begin commented on Carter’s indispensability to the successful negotiations. Carter may not have succeeded in brokering that comprehensive peace he believed was necessary to U.S. interests, and to the interests of all stakeholders, but what he did accomplish held lasting impact and set a precedent and expectations that guide the parties’ approach to Israeli–Palestinian and Arab–Israeli peacemaking to this day.