U.S. Institute of Peace experts discuss the latest foreign policy issues from around the world in On Peace, a brief weekly collaboration with SiriusXM's POTUS Channel 124.

Transcript

Laura Coates: Let's turn our attention to what's happening the Middle East. Dr. April Longley Alley, a senior expert for the Gulf and Yemen at the USIP, joins us now. Good morning, April. How are you?

April Longley Alley: Good morning. I'm well, thank you.

Laura Coates: Let's talk about what's going on. I know you have been focusing on the Israel-Houthi tensions that are seeming to be heating up. What's happening? Give us the lay of the land and bring us up to speed.

April Longley Alley: Sure. So I guess I'll start with you know what's happened, basically over the last year and a half. So what we've seen is that the Houthis, who control northern Yemen, also called Ansar Allah, have been firing at ships in the Red Sea and also at Israel, really, ever since the Gaza War began, and those attacks have just expanded over time. They started pretty narrow, in terms of in the Red Sea. You had attacks on ships that they said, were associated with Israel directly, but pretty soon it was, you know, any loose affiliation, and then no affiliation at all. And then over time, it drew in the U.S. and the Europeans and the U.K. and defensive operations in the Red Sea. And then by January of 2024, you had the U.S. the U.K., engaged in military operations in Yemen to try to deter the Houthis, you know, as they had severely disrupted shipping through the Red Sea corridor and the Bab-el-Mandeb, forcing most shippers to divert around the Cape of Good Hope. Similarly, with attacks on Israel, almost immediately since, since October, the Houthis begin to fire directly at Israel, but originally, their drones and missiles were not penetrating Israeli airspace. But then we saw at the end of 2024, in December, and then early January of this year, a significant uptick in their attacks on Israel, almost on a daily basis. Not causing significant damage, but still a significant uptick in attacks. And from the beginning of their attacks on these areas so their military operations, they've said in their words that they would stop when there was a halt to the quote, “aggression in Gaza and then a lifting of the of the blockade.” So, this has been their framing.

So what we have seen since the cease-fire in Gaza has begun to be implemented, that we have seen a pause. So, what we do is we have a situation where there is an effective pause, there have been no strikes, so none in Israel since the cease-fire has begun, or in the Red Sea. Actually, the Red Sea attacks had been on the decline since December of last year for a kind of a probably a number of reasons, less targeting, maybe less weapons on their side, but I think it's really important to emphasize that they've also been very clear that this is a very tenuous pause. So essentially, they've they made an announcement. They have an internal humanitarian organization. They made an announcement that their own sanctions are lifted on all ships, with the exception of Israeli ships. So, they still keep this in their pocket, even as the cease-fire is ongoing, they say that that will only be lifted when all phases of the cease-fire are implemented, but and they also say that they are going to monitor the cease-fire as it unfolds, and if there are violations, that they will return to military action. So, this does not give enough confidence right for shippers to restart those voyages through the Red Sea, as they were, and then also at the big picture level, I would just point out that their leader has been very clear that, in their view, this is just one of many battles. So even if we have a successful cease-fire in Gaza at the moment, I mean, they view this as part of a larger struggle for Palestine, and they've been very clear that they will continue to rearm and regroup for the next battle. So it's quite a, it's a tenuous pulse right now, and it's also one that is probably not enduring. This is going to be a medium- and long-term threat.

Laura Coates: There is obviously a new president here in the United States as of just last week, and there was the executive order that had been set in motion, a process to designate the Houthis as an F.T.O. What is the impact of this?

April Longley Alley: Yeah, that's right. So this executive order does set in a process. It's a 30-day process to evaluate, but it does seem like the F.T.O. will be coming based on Ansar Allah or the Houthis behavior, and also kind of the perspective here in Washington. I would just note that it's not a surprise that we have the F.T.O. So in the end of the last Trump administration, the Houthis were designated as an F.T.O., and then it was the Biden administration that came in that reversed that decision for primarily two reasons. The first was humanitarian, because the F.T.O. can be a very blunt instrument, and Yemen is a very poor country, so it had a humanitarian effect. And the second was to give a U.N. backed peace process a chance, to try to contain the Houthis within a peace process. And that process, to try to get a peace agreement, was making progress in 2022 and 2023 was something called a “roadmap agreement”. But really what happened in Gaza upended those efforts, and now we have a situation where Ansar Allah is directly engaged in attacks right against U.S. warships in the Red Sea. So the Biden administration already designated them at the beginning of 2024 as an S.D.G.T. (Specially Designated Global Terrorist) group, and now we have the Trump administration coming in with a stronger F.T.O. I think a couple of points on its impact. One is that it does send a strong message to Ansar Allah, that this administration is different, and that they will react more strongly to their actions. I think number two, it, we are sure that it will put financial strain on the Houthis inside of Yemen, so some parts will not be very effective. For example, most of their leaders don't travel outside of the country, or don't have external bank accounts, but in so far as the F.T.O. puts significant pressure on the wider economy, which it will in terms of access to international banking, having, you know, access to LCs, to insurance for, you know, shippers coming in, all of these things will limit Ansar Allah's access to finances. Number three, we also know that you know it will hurt Ansar Allah, it will also hurt the population of North Yemen, the areas, particularly in which they control. This is a population where, you know, 80% of the population depends on humanitarian aid. It's  historically been the poorest country in the Arab world. So this is, you know, it's really sad for Yemen and the for the people there. We have a 30-day period to kind of investigate the F.T.O. So interesting to see if the administration is going to look at ways to try to mitigate some of those humanitarian impacts, given that the focus is, you know, pressure on Ansar Allah,

I think the third point is, what the administration is trying to do, which is changing Ansar Allah’s you know, behavior. And I think this is, it's a question on how, and if they will change their behavior. Until now, their reaction has been defiance, predictably, but it's been verbal. So they, have, you know, criticized the U.S. designation, of course. Their de-facto president has, over the weekend, sanctioned the U.S. and the U.K. It's not really clear what that means in practice, it's more symbolic. But this group's modus operandi has been to escalate, particularly militarily, when they are pressured. And so I think the effectiveness of the F.T.O. probably over time, is going to be more of a product of how it interacts with other variables, and how much you know the Trump administration is going to cooperate and coordinate with regional allies and with Yemen to kind of get, you know, a broader package in place that really reestablishes deterrence in this country. In this context, you know, their deterrence has been lost, and Ansar Allah has been pushing on open doors until this point, and kind of puts together a package that has, you know, incentives and disincentives for behavior change.

Laura Coates: Israel has been promising that the Houthis will meet the same fate as Hezbollah. We've got less than a minute or so left. Is this something that is possible?

April Longley Alley: Yeah, it's a really good question. So, you know, Israel has struck inside of Yemen already has retaliated five different times, and they've struck the international airport, the ports and electricity infrastructures, or dual use infrastructure. Just like U.S. and U.K. strikes. It was not able to deter the Houthis. It was really the Gaza conflict that shifted to this pause. I think in Yemen, you know Israel is going to face a couple of challenges that are unique to Yemen, which will make that difficult. One is the distance. Yes, it's over 2,000 kilometers away from Israel. Second is the terrain and the kind of context you're working in. This is you know, rugged, mountainous terrain in the highlands, so similar to Afghanistan, more than Gaza or Lebanon. And then also intel, you know, Israel has been focused on Hezbollah and Hamas for decades, right? But Yemen is a new target, so getting up to speed on that intel will also be difficult. And from what I hear from Yemenis is, you know, with Israel leading a push, it's also harder for Yemen to push back against Ansar Allah.

Laura Coates: We’ll have to end it there. Dr. April Longley Alley, thank you so much for joining us today. I know there's a lot more to unpack. We appreciate you bring us up to speed.