KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has marked a turning point in Syrian-Jordanian relations. For Jordan, Assad’s fall removes a regime that destabilized the country through smuggling networks and alliances with Iran. However, it also ushers in a new era of uncertainty, with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a terrorist group with Islamic Salafist roots, emerging as the dominant force in post-Assad Syria. Syria’s transition will force Jordan to address regional instability and the potential ideological spillover from HTS into its already delicate post-October 7 landscape.
At the heart of Jordan’s challenge lies a critical question: how to engage with Syria’s Islamist regime and mitigate the risks posed by a fraught transition while containing the Muslim Brotherhood and other domestic actors whose ideological alignment with HTS threatens to transform Jordanian society and politics?
Jordan appears to have adopted a broader strategy of containment through engagement with the transitional regime. Amman must address pressing issues such as securing its 380-kilometer (around 236 miles) shared border with Syria to prevent the spillover of instability. Despite the collapse of Assad’s government and the rise of a transitional authority, the smuggling threat persists, as evidenced by recent exchanges of fire with drug traffickers attempting to infiltrate the kingdom. Additionally, facilitating the safe and voluntary repatriation of 1.3 million Syrian refugees, most of whom hail from southern Syria, remains a significant challenge. Resolving long-standing water-sharing disputes is another critical objective.
These disputes, which stagnated under the Assad regime, have exacerbated Jordan’s acute water scarcity, a challenge further amplified by hosting Syrian refugees for the past 13 years. In addition to seeking solutions to these pressing issues, Jordan is also positioning itself to benefit from Syria’s eventual reconstruction process. By securing construction contracts and participating in regional energy projects linked to Syria’s recovery, Amman hopes to address its own economic challenges.
To address these priorities, Jordan convened the Aqaba Summit as the cornerstone of its containment approach. The summit aimed to build consensus among Arab partners while securing the support of key international stakeholders — including the United States, United Kingdom, Turkey and the United Nations — to ensure a unified approach to Syria’s transitional regime. The meeting sought to address critical divides over Syria’s political trajectory, particularly disagreements on the inclusion of Islamist terrorist factions in its political framework and varying perspectives on the structure of its transitional political system.
Through the Aqaba Summit, Jordan aspired to provide Syria’s transitional regime with a roadmap for achieving regional legitimacy, one that would bring Damascus back to the Arab fold. This roadmap emphasized a comprehensive, Syrian-led political process aligned with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, advocating for the rebuilding of state institutions and the preservation of Syria’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.
After carefully cultivating this initiative, Jordan advanced its diplomatic efforts further when its foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, became among the first to meet in Damascus with Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), HTS’ leader who helms Syria’s transitional regime. Following this visit, Safadi held a phone call with his counterpart in the new Syrian administration, Asaad Al-Sheibani. Al-Sheibani visited Amman on January 7, signaling further engagement. Additionally, Jordan sent a high-level delegation, including Safadi, the army chief of staff, and head of intelligence, to Turkey, HTS’s main ally in the region.
However, Jordan’s containment strategy will inevitably interact with a complex array of variables and sources of instability. Chief among those is the impending U.S. administration transition. The Biden administration has sought a pragmatic approach, sending senior U.S. officials to meet with Sharaa and easing some aid restrictions. The Trump administration’s policies on Syria and HTS remain uncertain and Amman will be watching closely as the new administration takes power.
Jordan’s containment strategy is further complicated by domestic dynamics, particularly the heightened aspirations of the Muslim Brotherhood following October 7. Over the past year, the Brotherhood has actively competed with the regime to dominate public sentiment and has increasingly adopted Hamas’s narrative. The Brotherhood’s growing assertiveness, fueled by its relatively strong standing in the recent September elections and its prioritization of transnational Islamist issues, has created fertile ground for external agendas to infiltrate Jordan’s political landscape, deepening dichotomy within Jordanian society and blurring the boundaries between domestic and regional priorities.
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s first-ever commemoration of Hamas’s founding underscores this dynamic. This celebration occurred despite growing public debate over Hamas’s role in exacerbating domestic and regional instability, and raises the specter of similar alignment and association with HTS. Al-Sharaa’s recent remarks during his speech at the Umayyad Mosque, where he declared that the collapse of the Assad regime is a victory not only for the Syrian people but for the broader Islamic “Umma,” furthers these concerns. Local commentators have flagged this statement for its alignment with pan-Islamist aspirations, raising concerns about HTS’s ideological positioning and its potential influence within Jordan.
Such concerns are further amplified by ongoing public debate over HTS’s perceived connection to the 2015 killing of Muath Kasasbeh, a Jordanian pilot brutally executed by ISIS. Kasasbeh’s killing, an event that galvanized national outrage against Islamist extremism, remains deeply engraved in Jordanian collective memory. While HTS is distinct from ISIS, its ideological roots within the broader Salafist-jihadist ecosystem continue to fuel doubts about the group’s intentions. This has sparked polarized narratives within Jordanian society regarding whether engaging with HTS is a pragmatic necessity or a dangerous legitimization of extremism.
Even if HTS successfully transitions to a governing regime, its Islamic orientation poses a unique challenge for Jordan.
Proponents of engagement argue that HTS’s rebranding and governance successes in Idlib suggest a shift toward moderation, making it a potential stabilizing force in post-Assad Syria. They contend that if Jordan has normalized relations with other brutal regimes for strategic reasons, it could consider engaging with HTS despite its controversial history. Critics, however, view HTS’s ideological ties to groups like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra as a permanent stain. They fear that legitimizing HTS could embolden dormant extremist factions within Jordan. Historically, such factions have justified attacks on Jordanian security forces and could interpret HTS’s trajectory as a model to follow.
These divergent perspectives mirror the regional and international questions surrounding HTS’ alleged shift from militancy to governance. While HTS seeks to project moderation, asserting respect for minorities and women, curbing the militant activities of Palestinian factions in Syria, and avoiding confrontation with Israel, doubts persist about the authenticity of this transformation. HTS’s positive overtures toward Amman further highlight aspirations for engagement with neighboring states and eventual international recognition.
However, this transformation remains untested and fraught with uncertainty. Syria’s fractured political landscape, along with HTS’s struggle to reconcile its deeply divided factions, the persistent influence of Iran, and the remnants of the Assad regime, cast doubts about the feasibility and authenticity of HTS’s transformation.
HTS’s success or failure will directly impact Jordan’s stability. Should HTS’s transition falter, the group could revert to its militant roots, reigniting conflict and posing renewed threats to Jordan’s security. Complicating matters further are the more favorable sentiments many Syrian refugees hold toward HTS, when compared to their views of Bashar al-Assad. Even if HTS successfully transitions to a governing regime, its Islamic orientation poses a unique challenge for Jordan. In an already stressed post-October 7 domestic landscape, the emergence of an Islamist regime in Syria could embolden Jordan’s own Islamist movements, exacerbating internal tensions. Ultimately, Jordan must navigate these overlapping domestic and regional challenges, as HTS’s trajectory, and its implications for Syria, Jordan and the broader Middle East, remains deeply uncertain.