How the U.S. Can Strengthen Its Pacific Engagement

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • China’s engagement and messaging in the Pacific is more consistent than the U.S.’s.
  • But the U.S. has an advantage because of its Pacific diaspora — U.S. policymakers should build on this.
  • In the Pacific, the manner of the engagement matters just as much as policy and grand announcements.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • China’s engagement and messaging in the Pacific is more consistent than the U.S.’s.
  • But the U.S. has an advantage because of its Pacific diaspora — U.S. policymakers should build on this.
  • In the Pacific, the manner of the engagement matters just as much as policy and grand announcements.

Much like his predecessor, President Biden’s administration heightened U.S. focus on the Pacific Islands as part of his Pacific Partnership Strategy. President Trump was the first U.S. president to host the leaders of the Freely Associated States — the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau — in the White House before President Biden hosted Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders in 2022 and 2023. As the Trump administration prepares to take office, it will discover new challenges and opportunities as a result of actions taken over the last four years.

Beniamina Island, part of the Solomon Islands, June 6, 2018. (Adam Ferguson/The New York Times)
Beniamina Island, part of the Solomon Islands, June 6, 2018. (Adam Ferguson/The New York Times)

Over the past two administrations, the United States has taken steps to increase its development assistance, political engagement and diplomatic presence in the Pacific. As it currently stands, the U.S. has promised an estimated $1 billion in development assistance to the region (not including the Compacts of Free Association).

While there has been some progress in recent years, some initiatives have fallen flat. For example, the appointment of the special U.S. envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum has had little impact, perhaps in part as the position works out of Hawaii and has had irregular interaction with both the PIF and Pacific states.

Similarly, Pacific states have pushed back on existing U.S. initiatives such as “Partners of the Blue Pacific” — an exclusive grouping comprising the U.S. and traditional allied partners — because they were not consulted and see it as a colonial construct aiming to reinforce their dominance in the Pacific. Like other partner-led initiatives, it tries to capture the “Blue Pacific narrative,” which is about the projection of Pacific sovereignty and political power to counter the deficit discourse that Pacific states are small and inconsequential. It is unproductive that the U.S. and allied partners are attempting to reconsolidate their regional influence with the very Blue Pacific narrative that reimagines the power of Pacific states.

Policy Matters — But so Does the Manner of Engagement

No matter the number of engagements or the policy position, being attuned to the best way of doing business in the Pacific is critical. From my own working experience in the Pacific, there are things that Beijing does better than Washington. China for instance is extremely consistent in its engagement and messaging, follows through quickly on its promises and plays the long game well. While these are the obvious advantages of a one-party system, Chinese officials tend to be more aware of their surroundings, outside of the Taiwan issue.

This is where the U.S. and some of its allied partners have fallen short. There are a lot of promises and fanfare, but implementation is slow. Moreover, the cultural nuances of reading the room, understanding “silences” and playing the long game is not something that comes naturally. There is a difference in the Pacific between “putting up with someone” and “working with someone.” It is also obvious at times that U.S. officials and departments are not talking to one another. This is frustrating to Pacific nations with limited capacity.

Most Pacific islanders would rather work in and visit the U.S. than China. U.S. policymakers should consider how this can be a point of leverage.

From a strategic perspective, the U.S.’ greatest comparative advantage over China is the significant Pacific diaspora in the U.S., and that most Pacific islanders would rather work in and visit the U.S. than China. U.S. policymakers should consider how this can be a point of leverage.

The Trump administration can make some easy in-roads by demonstrating “good faith.” Honoring President Biden’s existing commitments in a timely manner would be a good start. But there remains uncertainty in the Pacific as to the approach that the Trump administration will take in its engagement.

Irrespective of critical policy issues, such as climate change, in the Pacific, the manner of engagement is just as important as the matter for discussion. Adherence to customary protocols and recognition of cultural values demonstrates respect and is critical to reaching common positions and forging lasting relationships.

There are currently several U.S.-based educational institutions that offer short-term trainings for Pacific government officials. However, there could be reciprocal programs where U.S. officials travel to the Pacific and are embedded in Pacific culture.

The Peace Corps is respected in the Pacific on two fronts: they provide much needed support and assistance to vulnerable communities and cultivate lasting and impactful relationships with Pacific people. They learn and are immersed in Pacific culture. Some U.S. officials who have served in the Pacific region for a long time understand “Pacific engagement,” but it’s surprising that their views are not coming through more prominently in U.S. policies.   

In reflecting on the difference of approach between the U.S. and China, a former Pacific Leader remarked to me that it related to how they were treated. Until recently, leaders have been asked to line up for a quick handshake and photoshoot with the U.S. president. By contrast, China’s president would not only meet Pacific leaders as a group but regularly receives them on state visits. A common saying Chinese officials continually reiterate: “China believes all countries regardless of size and strength are equal – and so they treat all countries equally.”

Prime Minister Fiame of Samoa has just met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing on the back of visits by Prime Minister Rabuka of Fiji in August, Prime Minister Manele of Solomon Islands and Prime Minister Salwai of Vanuatu in July, President Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia in May, and Prime Minister Marape of Papua New Guinea late last year.

Meanwhile, no sitting U.S. President has ever visited a Pacific Island country, and an inaugural visit by a sitting U.S. president to the Pacific would certainly have an impact.

Only time will tell whether the U.S. is in this for the long run.

Sione Tekiteki is the former director of governance and engagement at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, which included leading on the coordination of Pacific Leaders high-level international engagements and multilateral advocacy. He worked in the Pacific islands for over 20 years before recently taking on an academic role at the Faculty of Law, Auckland University of Technology.


PHOTO: Beniamina Island, part of the Solomon Islands, June 6, 2018. (Adam Ferguson/The New York Times)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis