KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
On November 26, Israel and Lebanon agreed to a cease-fire to be implemented in phases over 60 days. If it holds, the deal will end over a year of the heaviest fighting in decades between the two sides. Formally a deal between Israel and Lebanon, the agreement is effectively between the former and Hezbollah. The next two months will serve as a crucial test for the possibility of a sustained truce and a more durable and comprehensive resolution of disputed border areas between the two countries.
The agreement calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to north of Lebanon’s Litani River, and the dismantling of its military infrastructure. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are also compelled to withdraw in phases from Lebanese territory, with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and existing U.N. peacekeepers to deploy in areas as Israeli forces withdraw. The agreement also strengthens an existing oversight committee, which the United States will lead, that will track implementation and seek to address violations.
USIP’s Mona Yacoubian and Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen analyze the significance of this agreement and its potential implications for the region.
Yacoubian: For Lebanese civilians, the cease-fire provides relief from nearly 14 months of hostilities with Israel initiated by Hezbollah in solidarity with Hamas a day its unprecedented terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. The conflict has exacted a significant toll on Lebanon with more than 3,700 killed and an estimated 1.2 million Lebanese displaced, according to the Lebanese government. South Lebanon and the Beirut suburb known as Dahiyeh — both Hezbollah strongholds — have borne the brunt of the destruction where, in some cases, entire villages have been destroyed. The World Bank estimates $8.5 billion of physical damage and economic losses in Lebanon, with housing most severely impacted; nearly 100,000 housing units have been destroyed, at an estimated cost of $3.2 billion.
Upon news of the cease-fire, thousands of Lebanese began streaming back to their homes, although the LAF and IDF have warned them not to return to villages near the border still under Israeli control.
For Hezbollah, its acceding to the cease-fire conditions underscores the significant hit to its power and influence in the wake of Israel’s punishing offensive. Not only did Hezbollah relent on its previous insistence on a Gaza cease-fire as a precondition to quieting its guns, but the militant group also agreed to conditions that, if fully implemented, would ultimately lead to its disarmament. The agreement commits to the full implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 — which ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war — and “predecessor” U.N. resolutions that call for the “disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.” While some Hezbollah supporters have attempted to portray the cease-fire as a victory, other observers highlight the terms of the agreement as reflecting a significant erosion of Hezbollah’s power.
UNSCR 1701 was never fully implemented, and while it allowed for nearly two decades of relative quiet on the Lebanese-Israeli border, Hezbollah was left unchecked. In the intervening years, the militant group dramatically expanded its arsenal and capabilities, ultimately holding the preponderance of force in Lebanon. It leveraged this dominance to override the Lebanese government’s sovereign power to make decisions of war and peace. This overreach ultimately led to the group’s comeuppance.
Starting in mid-September with an unprecedented attack on Hezbollah-associated pagers and two-way radios, Israel unleashed a barrage of decimating strikes, assassinating Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, his presumed successor and many senior and mid-level commanders. Last week’s lightening offensive by rebels in Syria — whom Hezbollah battled successfully for years as part of an effort to prop up the Assad regime — is another indicator of Hezbollah’s dramatic decline.
However, while Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, it remains a potent force that could well reconstitute. Indeed, despite the heavy toll taken on the group, Hezbollah still managed to unleash its most significant barrages against Israel in the weeks just prior to the November 26 cease-fire agreement. Over the years, it has also proven to be resilient and adaptive to new challenges.
Many factors are at play that will determine whether Hezbollah experiences a crowning blow or whether it rises again from the ashes. If the cease-fire agreement fails and Israel feels compelled to prolong its presence in Lebanon, re-enter the country if it has withdrawn, or continue to hit Lebanon with wide latitude, Hezbollah could capitalize on deepening anti-Israel sentiment to regain its strength. Similarly, if the Shia community is left feeling aggrieved or if other communities seek to settle scores at the Shia population’s expense, Hezbollah could exploit these tensions to regain its strength and potentially plummet Lebanon into serious civil unrest if not civil war.
Beyond securing and stabilizing conflict-devastated areas, Lebanon’s government faces a monumental reconstruction challenge.
For the Lebanese government, the challenges ahead are significant. Under the agreement, the LAF will play a major role in stabilizing southern Lebanon and ensuring against Hezbollah encroachment or violations of the cease-fire. The agreement ultimately envisions 10,000 Lebanese soldiers deploying to the south, reasserting Lebanese sovereignty as Israeli forces withdraw. Yet, substantial obstacles to the successful implementation of the plan lie ahead. First, the LAF suffers from manpower, training and financial resource deficits. U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein estimates that it could take up to two years before the LAF is able to fully deploy 10,000 troops to the south. Efforts to raise resources and other forms of support to the LAF will likely take precedence in the coming weeks.
Beyond securing and stabilizing conflict-devastated areas, the government faces a monumental reconstruction challenge. Yet, Lebanon has been without an elected president since October 31, 2022, with a caretaker government in place. Reflecting the greater urgency to elect a new president, Speaker Nabih Berri has called for the Parliament to meet on January 9, 2025 with the hope of electing a new president. (The Lebanese parliament has met 12 times since November 2022 without being able to elect a president.) Even prior to the outbreak of conflict with Israel last October, the country was in the throes of an unprecedented socioeconomic crisis, with poverty levels tripling over the past decade. Plagued by pervasive corruption, Lebanon will need to implement long-demanded reforms as part of any rebuilding effort.
Yacoubian: To date, the fragile cease-fire agreement is largely holding, although on December 2, Hezbollah fired on Israeli positions in the disputed border zone, violating the cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile Lebanese authorities accuse Israel of violating the cease-fire agreement with continuing strikes in south Lebanon. U.S. officials on Monday expressed concern over the durability of the cease-fire given both sides’ recent moves. With continuing volatility on the ground and Hezbollah’s likely efforts to rebuild its arsenal and exploit any security vacuums that arise, an enduring cease-fire will face many potential threats.
The latest cease-fire agreement differs from UNSCR 1701 in important ways. U.S. negotiators have highlighted lessons learned from failed efforts to implement that resolution. In particular, the United States and France will remain deeply engaged in the implementation of the agreement, with Washington charged with chairing the group focused on monitoring and implementation.
The group — identified in the agreement as the “mechanism” — is comprised of an expanded tripartite grouping (Israel, Lebanon and the United Nations) put in place as part of 1701. The mechanism will also include France and will endeavor to address reported violations as soon as they arise. It is hoped that with the United States and France as key stakeholders committed to the effective enforcement of the agreement, it will have a higher chance of success. Perhaps more controversial, a reported letter of assurance from the United States to Israel allows for Israel to respond directly to violations if not addressed effectively by the enforcement mechanism. Lebanese negotiators reportedly raised concerns about the guarantees to Israel but ultimately agreed to the terms.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu provided three reasons for his embrace of the agreement: 1) it would allow Israel to focus on the Iranian threat; 2) provide space and time for the army to rest and replenish weaponry stocks; and 3) to separate the two fronts of Lebanon and Gaza, thereby isolating Hamas. Netanyahu further stated that “with the United States' full understanding, we maintain full freedom of military action,” listing scenarios under which it would attack. Whether this last statement is Netanyahu’s understanding or framing solely of the provision that both sides may exercise “their inherent right of self-defense, consistent with international law,” or is grounded in something more specific in a reported side letter from the U.S. to Israel, is unclear.
That both sides were trading accusations of cease-fire violations barely 24 hours after the agreement took hold underscores the fragility of the deal.
However, that framing surely increased support for the deal within Israel. It is a long- and widely-held view among Israelis, particularly since the end of the 2006 war, that neither the LAF nor U.N. mission in Lebanon has the capacity or will to confront Hezbollah. Some local political leaders from Israel’s northern towns have decried the deal as outright surrender to Hezbollah. And with approximately 120 Israelis dead and upward of 60,000 still displaced from their homes in the north of the country, Netanyahu was faced with needing to address mounting pressure to restore calm that could pave the way for reconstruction and return, while also trying to assure those skeptical communities that their safety is assured and sustainable.
That both sides were trading accusations of cease-fire violations barely 24 hours after the agreement took hold underscores this balancing act and also the fragility of the deal. But without a cease-fire in Gaza, an exhausted Israeli military, and the likely weighing of both the outgoing and incoming U.S. administration’s stated interests and expectations of winding down the wars, the Israeli government was faced with a cost-benefit calculation. Ultimately, it chose to secure an agreement that could begin to address the aforementioned challenges, and at a time when it had dealt Hezbollah (and by extension Iran) enough significant setbacks to make them more amenable to a deal.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: In announcing the cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah last week, President Biden noted that he and other key mediators Egypt, Qatar and Turkey would be making another push to “achieve a cease-fire in Gaza with the hostages released and an end to the war without Hamas in power.” Subsequently, Egypt has been acting to bring some momentum to such an effort, reportedly engaging Hamas, Israel, the Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration in a concerted effort to leverage the opening potentially provided by the Israel-Lebanon agreement to bring about an agreement.
The question is whether Israeli and Hamas leadership have changed their calculus in light of the November 26 agreement. On the Hamas side, it may be true that they now feel more isolated with Hezbollah’s agreement to a deal with Israel, and the implication of Iran’s acquiescence. They may also be concerned that with the northern front taken off Israel’s active military agenda, Israel will be able to apply more concentrated pressure on Gaza. Both assessments could argue for Hamas loosening its heretofore demands for full Israeli withdrawal or for an agreement leading to a permanent end of conflict. However, Hamas is more likely to consider itself having little left to lose. And with the Israeli hostages still in their control and their only remaining significant leverage, this may likewise argue for them gripping tightly to that card for as long as possible, holding out for a significant number of Palestinian prisoners in exchange.
For Israeli political leadership, this is currently a non-starter. At the end of the day, Israel does not see itself locked in a zero-sum battle with its northern neighbor, with whom it has an end-game vision for a post-conflict future: living side-by-side with Lebanon as a sovereign neighbor untethered from the influence and control of Hezbollah and its Iranian patron. In that regard, it is willing to take a chance, with international support and backing on a conflict-ending agreement that could lead to such a political horizon. The overwhelming Israeli security cabinet support for the cease-fire underscores this reality: while the deal was rejected by just one voting member — far-right coalition member Itamar Ben Gvir — he made it clear that he would not bring down the government over the agreement.
Gaza is a different proposition. Fourteen months on from the October 7 attack and ensuing war, the Israeli government has still not articulated a future post-war vision for Gaza, let alone for the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There remains a stark security- and political-establishment divide, whereby the former has assessed that military objectives have been largely met, and recommended a deal that would end the war and bring back the hostages. By contrast, Ben Gvir, among other coalition members, holds an expansionist outlook that seeks both to maintain military control over Gaza and to resettle there. He is also adamant that he will not countenance any hostage deal that would come at the expense of releasing Palestinian prisoners.
As for diplomatic openings beyond a Gaza cease-fire, chiefly in question is the expansion of the Abraham Accords to finally include Saudi Arabia in the fold of regional actors that have normalized with Israel. A deal pursued doggedly by the Biden administration, and one that will undoubtedly be picked up by the Trump administration should it remain unfulfilled, a U.S.-brokered agreement that includes a normalization path for Saudi Arabia and Israel retains the potential to unlock a Gaza cease-fire. However, it is unlikely to come before the latter is achieved, and it will require the Israeli political leadership to agree to a pathway to a two-state political horizon that it has staunchly resisted. Bottom line, the tensions and unbridgeable gaps that have stymied agreements to date remain. Movement toward a Gaza cease-fire, and an end of unfathomable suffering for Gazans, the Israeli hostages and their respective loved ones, will rely on the mediators succeeding where they have not so far: in effectively exercising the respective leverage they hold on each of the parties to force a change in calculus and political will.