KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
On the sidelines of last month’s NATO summit, the United States and Germany announced that Washington will begin episodic deployments of long-range conventional capabilities to Germany. In 1987, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to eliminate these systems under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, but Russia’s violations led the United States to withdraw from the treaty in 2019. Three years later, Russia invaded Ukraine and has engaged in nuclear saber-rattling since then. Washington plans to deploy these systems to strengthen deterrence, but Moscow has criticized them.
USIP’s Yashar Parsie explains what led the United States to decide to deploy these capabilities, how governments have responded, and what impact it could have on stability.
Parsie: This should come as no surprise. First, Russia cheated on the INF treaty — which banned ground-launched theater missiles — for years. After the United States pulled out of the treaty in 2019, the U.S. Defense Department said it would pursue conventional INF missiles as a “prudent response” to Moscow’s perfidy. Russia has fielded and perhaps used INF missiles. Now the United States plans to deploy some of those conventional systems to Germany.
Second, in readying for great power competition, the U.S. Army has made long-range fires a modernization priority and designed a new formation, the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), to employ them. From the start, the U.S. Army planned for one MDTF to be aligned to the European theater, standing up 2nd MDTF in Germany in 2021. Each MDTF was to have a long-range fires element — a Strategic Fires Battalion — although specific systems would depend on operational requirements.
Third, after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, NATO adopted a Strategic Concept committing to “significantly strengthen its deterrence and defense posture.” To deny aggression, NATO will “defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces.” The U.S. government has described Russia as an “acute threat” and, so says the National Defense Strategy Commission, this threat will prove chronic. By deploying conventional long-range fires to Germany, the United States will improve its capability to defend NATO’s eastern flank.
Parsie: The U.S. Army sees an operational imperative in winning the “fires fight by delivering precise, longer-range fires as part of the Joint Force to strike deep targets and massing enemy forces.” U.S. adversaries like Russia have built sensor-shooter networks — or anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities — to try to keep U.S. forces out of a fight. Future warfare looks to be about competing in precision salvos between offense and defense.
Ground-launched theater missiles are an asymmetry in this competition. The United States has few theater missile systems because the INF treaty — which Russia broke and others were not part of — long banned them. That places U.S. forces at a disadvantage. Ground-launched missiles are present in theater and more credibly deter adversaries and assure allies. They are prompter than strikes generated in air or at sea. And they can be hard to hunt, imposing targeting problems on the enemy.
Some of the conventional systems that 2nd MDTF will deploy fall in the lower bound of INF range limits. The 1,600km-range Tomahawk cruise missile could hit targets in Kaliningrad, Belarus and western Russia. The developmental hypersonic weapon — perhaps the U.S. Army Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, or Dark Eagle — could deliver deep strikes in Russia. That is a step change from, for instance, the tactical fires Ukraine has used in its strategy of attrition against Russia.
By design, MDTFs synchronize theater precision fires and non-kinetic effects (like electronic warfare) to degrade enemy A2/AD capabilities. For example, 2nd MDTF could support NATO maneuver forces through counter-battery fires — by suppressing Russia’s long-range launchers. Equipping U.S. ground forces with conventional long-range fires will let them “look deep and shoot deep,” so to speak, to break a Russian assault.
Parsie: The United States and its allies think this is a necessary response to Russia’s aggression. U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan called the deployment a “defensive capability.” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said it is “necessary for deterrence and peace.” Berlin’s foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, said that Germany needs a “credible deterrent,” and that U.S. long-range conventional capabilities were part of Germany’s investment in its security. That drew some domestic fire, but Germany’s governing coalition pushed back, saying that Russia’s aggression and nuclear modernization make this the “right thing to do.”
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed the news for demonstrating that “NATO is about deterrence” in the more dangerous world that Russia made. As the chairman of the Munich Security Conference put it, deterrence is the “only language that Russia understands.” Separately, France, Germany, Italy and Poland said they plan to develop similar capabilities, too, under the European Long-Range Strike Approach.
Russia sees the move as a provocation. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called the plan “destructive to regional safety and strategic stability.” He vowed a military response, “without nerves, without emotions.” President Vladimir Putin threatened to abandon Russia’s supposed moratorium on deploying theater missiles, including at sea, if the United States goes through with it. But as U.S. State Department official Mallory Stewart pointed out, Russia already broke the rules and it seems will go on breaking them anyway.
Parsie: Putin’s response harkened back to Cold War history. Yet his “rhetoric was as predictable as the analogy was inaccurate,” analysts observe. In the late 1970s, NATO decided to field new theater nuclear forces as part of a dual-track approach — in case arms control talks failed. Putin repeated Soviet fears of short-warning nuclear strikes on government and industry targets, floating that the new U.S. systems going to Germany could carry nuclear warheads in future.
The United States has been clear that these will be conventional capabilities and that they are a response to Russia’s breaking the INF treaty in the first place.
But the United States has been clear that these will be conventional capabilities and that they are a response to Russia’s breaking the INF treaty in the first place. That treaty itself came out of NATO’s dual-track approach in the Cold War and ushered in what was the golden age of arms control. This new move comes after Russia’s irresponsible nuclear conduct, forward deploying nuclear-capable missiles and full-scale invasion of Ukraine. There are ideas for future arms control — like banning theater nuclear missiles — but Russia will not hear them. As Sullivan suggested, Russia can take the opportunity to explain its position and let the United States respond.
Meanwhile, NATO should think about managing inadvertent escalation. In theory, non-nuclear capabilities can have strategic effects. For instance, conventional counterforce strikes could destroy Russia’s nuclear forces and counter-leadership attacks could degrade Russia’s command-and-control. Military planners should develop concepts, forces and posture with conventional-nuclear integration in mind. This should build military advantage through long-range capabilities while managing risk. NATO can keep the lid on stability — and strengthen its shield.