United States Institute of Peace

Russia Presses on Multiple Axes

Russian forces have been pressing toward that goal throughout this winter and spring. In a series of brutal battles, Russian forces have inched forward in Donetsk, grinding away at Ukrainian forces short of men, weapons and ammunition. This month, Russian forces suddenly opened a new front against Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, advancing about 10 kilometers from the Russian border and straining already stretched Ukrainian forces. As a result, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy complained that while the Ukrainian army currently has the situation near Kharkiv under control, “a very powerful wave (of fighting) is going on in Donbas. ... No-one even notices that there are actually more battles in the east of the country, specifically in the Donbas direction.”

The new Russian offensives come at a very bad time for Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are short of men because of a months-long delay in passing an expanded mobilization law, which lowers the draft age from 27 to 25, provides incentives to soldiers and makes it easier for the state to identify conscripts. At the same time, Ukrainian forces were running desperately short of ammunition and weapons as U.S. lawmakers debated for months before joining in a bipartisan authorization of that much-needed support. With Russia often enjoying a five-to-one advantage in artillery fire, many analysts believe the Russians are attacking now to take advantage of this disparity before the bulk of the U.S. armaments arrive.

Kremlin Goal: Limit Help for Ukraine

Key to Putin’s vision of winning a long war is the Kremlin’s ability to continue to limit NATO’s involvement in the conflict. To that end, Russia announced on May 6 that it would hold military exercises in its Southern Military District (near Ukraine) that would include practicing the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

In case the exercise was not a clear enough signal to NATO leaders, multiple official Russian voices amplified the message. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement explaining that the exercise “should be viewed in the context of the recent militant statements made by Western officials.” It referred to comments by French President Emmanuel Macron about the possibility of sending NATO troops to Ukraine, and British Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s assertion that Ukraine has the right to decide how to use British-supplied weapons and “absolutely has the right to strike back at Russia.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry condemned that statement as an assertion of Ukraine’s right to use Western-supplied arms “to strike targets on the Russian territory.”

At Moscow’s annual celebration, May 9, of the World War II victory over Nazi Germany, Putin reinforced the message, warning those who might threaten Russia that “our strategic forces are always at combat readiness.”

New Defense Minister

To outlast the West and win a war of attrition, however, Russia must continue to reshape its economy and military-industrial complex for a long war. Putin took initial steps in this direction with his 2022 order for a “partial mobilization.” In addition to ordering additional manpower into the fight, Russia mobilized its defense industry, creating around-the-clock work shifts. This year, it is further militarizing its economy by spending about 30% of the state budget on the armed forces.

Putin's cabinet shuffle this month reflected this priority. He replaced Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu with Andrei Belousov, an economist who for the past four years has served as first deputy prime minister. In announcing his appointment, the Kremlin stressed that Belousov will focus on strengthening the defense industry. Belousov declared that his first priority would be “optimizing” military spending “so that every ruble of budgetary funds … brings maximum effect.”

A part of the cabinet reshuffle’s message to Russians is an implicit defense against arguably the most domestically damaging accusation against Putin’s government and its war effort: that it is steeped in financial corruption. In the weeks before Shoigu’s ouster, authorities arrested at least five people — businessmen, defense officials and, notably, Shoigu’s deputy — on charges of bribery or other corruption. Belousov is publicly regarded as uncorrupt and, at his appointment, Russian state media underscored his probity. Whether this is just public posturing to counter the criticisms of pro-war hardliners like the late Yevgeny Prigozhin or a sincere effort to root out corruption from the defense industry is unclear. Regardless, it is a sign of the Kremlin’s commitment to continue the war.

Foreign Relations

While shifting its economy and industrial investments for indefinite war, Russia is investing heavily in relationships with states that will provide it weapons and/or diplomatic support. Russia has already made significant purchases of ammunition and drones from North Korea and Iran, deepening its ties with those states willing to publicly flaunt international sanctions.

Putin’s recent visit to China also reflects the close relationship between foreign policy and the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. China is already a key supplier of components for Russia’s defense industry — and a highlight of Putin’s visit was an agreement to increase military cooperation. The two powers emphasized that point with Putin’s visit to the Harbin Institute of Technology, a cutting-edge military research institution.

In China, Putin also obtained the diplomatic support he needs to continue pushing back against Western attempts to isolate him. Putin and Xi issued a joint statement that argued: “The Parties proceed from the premise that for a sustainable settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, it is necessary to eliminate its root causes and adhere to the principle of indivisibility of security, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all countries in the field of security.” In other words, the Chinese side agreed to Putin’s premise that his war on Ukraine is a justified response to potential NATO expansion. Putin’s visit and the indications of Chinese support show that hopes for China to pressure Russia to end its war sooner rather than later are misplaced.

Conclusion

Russian actions in Ukraine, at home and in its international relations indicate that Putin is prepared for war over the long haul. He is content to grind away at the Ukrainian forces, moving mere kilometers at a time, because he believes that he can outlast the West. He is undoubtedly emboldened by debates in the West over the utility of continued military and financial aid for Ukraine, and by the shift of international attention to the war in Gaza.

This determination means that Ukraine, the United States and like-minded countries will have to prepare for a longer-term investment if they want to stop Russia’s aggression — and the consequent, long-term damage to hopes for a world ruled by laws rather than brute force. Most estimates of Russian military and economic power have concluded that it will peak in relation to Ukraine’s power this year and begin to decline in 2025. The war will essentially become a contest of wills between Putin’s determination to expand his authoritarian rule, and the commitment of Ukrainians and their supporters to democracy and a peaceful world order. The Ukrainians have demonstrated amply that their resolve will not fail. If the West sustains its will to support them, they can win.