President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unexpectedly cut short their second summit Thursday after failing to come to an agreement to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and provide sanctions relief. USIP’s Ambassador Joseph Yun and Frank Aum explain what happened in Hanoi and what comes next for U.S.-North Korea nuclear diplomacy.

President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)
President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, meet at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, Feb. 28, 2019. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)

Why was there no agreement in Hanoi between President Trump and Chairman Kim?

The negotiations broke down over what denuclearization steps Kim was willing to take and how much sanctions relief Trump was willing to provide. We may need the dust to settle before we get all the details, but there seems to be differing viewpoints on what happened.

Based on President Trump’s press conference, North Korea would agree to completely dismantle its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but in return wanted the entire sanctions regime lifted, which President Trump wasn’t willing to accede to.

According to Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s midnight press conference, however, North Korea only wanted relief from five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions from 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the complete dismantlement of the Yongbyon facility. But, President Trump added one more request unrelated to the Yongbyon nuclear facility that signaled that the U.S. wasn’t interested in the North Korean proposal.

It is unclear which five UNSC resolutions Foreign Minister Ri was referring to, but most likely they would have constituted a significant part of the sanctions regime against North Korea. It is also unclear what additional request President Trump made.

It appears that the president was willing to shoot for a “big deal” that would provide complete sanctions relief as well as other incentives such as an end-of-war declaration and exchange of liaison offices, but this would require complete denuclearization, including all nuclear facilities (not just Yongbyon), weapons, and materials. But both sides realized almost immediately that the gap in how each side values denuclearization and sanctions relief was much too wide.

What comes next in the diplomatic process?

A positive outcome is that the “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which helped create the peaceful environment for diplomacy to proceed, remains in place. President Trump conveyed that Chairman Kim agreed to continue to suspend nuclear and missile tests, and all but said that U.S.-ROK joint exercises will remain suspended or at least significantly modified.

Another silver lining from the Hanoi negotiations is the confirmation that the U.S. approach to North Korea embraces reciprocity and the simultaneous discussion of denuclearization and peace. The exact sequencing of concessions is a separate matter but there is less concern that Washington will demand that North Korea denuclearizes first before any steps can be taken on peace-related issues.

Still, both principals return home empty-handed and without a clear picture of what lies ahead.

From a process perspective, a significant letdown from the Hanoi summit was the lack of any roadmap or clarity on additional working-level negotiations. Although Trump indicated that Secretary Pompeo will continue meeting with his counterpart, there was no specificity about when these meetings would happen, whether Special Representative Steve Biegun would engage in regular working-level negotiations, and what the end goals would be in the next two years. Another concern is that if the two top decision makers, Trump and Kim, couldn’t agree on a deal, then what chance do lower-level officials, like Pompeo and North Korean spy chief Kim Yong Chul, or Biegun and chief nuclear negotiator Kim Hyok Chol, have of making progress?

The outcome could be an even bigger setback for Kim Jong Un. If North Korea really wants summit-level diplomacy, they should realize that Trump is not likely to agree to a future summit without an iron-clad guarantee of success.

The biggest disappointment from the Hanoi “no deal” is likely being felt by President Moon and South Korea. The lack of any sanctions relief will make it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct serious North-South economic engagement and move forward on cooperation projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and inter-Korean railways. Moreover, Chairman Kim’s visit to Seoul, which many thought imminent, now looks unlikely anytime soon since there will be no achievements to tout at the summit.

Were there any other interesting takeaways?

One of the biggest concerns among North Korea watchers has been the lack of a common definition between the two sides about denuclearization. President Trump acknowledged in the press conference that the two countries’ visions about denuclearization were not exactly the same, so it appears more work is needed on this topic.

Also, President Trump confirmed that there are other nuclear sites beyond Yongbyon that Washington is interested in, answering affirmatively about a second suspected uranium enrichment site. Most Korea watchers already knew about these additional sites, but it helps to have presidential-level confirmation that Yongbyon isn’t the only site of concern.


Related Publications

How Northeast Asian Geopolitics Impact Peace on the Korean Peninsula

How Northeast Asian Geopolitics Impact Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Tuesday, September 17, 2024

Amid today’s renewed great power competition, the Korean Peninsula has entered a new Cold War winter without having enjoyed the spring of the previous post-Cold War era. During the post-Cold War period, the South Korean and U.S. governments anticipated that the seismic changes occurring in Europe would be replicated on the Korean Peninsula. However, over the past 30 years, none of their main policy goals regarding North Korea — such as reform and opening, denuclearization, peace settlement and unification — were fulfilled due to several factors in Northeast Asian geopolitics that favored the status quo. The enduring nature of these factors means the United States and South Korea should adjust their North Korea strategy and goals to enhance peace and security on the Korean Peninsula more effectively.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

Russia’s War and China’s Rise Set a New Path for South Korea-NATO Relations

Russia’s War and China’s Rise Set a New Path for South Korea-NATO Relations

Tuesday, August 20, 2024

July 2024 marked the third time South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol joined a NATO summit along with the leaders of the alliance’s other Indo-Pacific partner countries (Australia, Japan and New Zealand), informally known as the IP4. This represents a new phase in South Korea’s relations with the Atlantic alliance, but building a lasting friendship will take time and requires navigating a series of challenges. Amid an emerging global division of democratic and authoritarian camps and the challenges posed by China and Russia for both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, it is incumbent on both Brussels and Seoul to build a more cooperative relationship. That journey, however, has just begun.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

With Russia’s U.N. Veto, Where Do North Korea Sanctions Go From Here?

With Russia’s U.N. Veto, Where Do North Korea Sanctions Go From Here?

Tuesday, July 30, 2024

Earlier this spring, Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council proposal to extend the “panel of experts” that had been monitoring the implementation of U.N. sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs since 2009. While many saw the veto coming, the decision stands to majorly disrupt not just the enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea but could undermine the effectiveness of U.N. sanctions as a whole. USIP spoke with George Lopez, who served previously on the panel in 2010-2011 and again in 2022-2023, about why Russia vetoed the renewal, what the international community loses now that the panel is finished, and what options there might be to replace it.

Type: Question and Answer

EconomicsGlobal Policy

 70 Years After the Geneva Conference: Why is the Korean Peninsula No Closer to Peace?

70 Years After the Geneva Conference: Why is the Korean Peninsula No Closer to Peace?

Monday, July 22, 2024

July marks the anniversary of the 1953 armistice agreement that ended the Korean War and the 1954 Geneva Conference, convened to resolve the issues that the war could not. In the seven decades since, efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula have been limited and flawed. Today, the security situation in the region is arguably more precarious than ever, with a nuclear armed-North Korea and dysfunctional great power relations. Recent foreign policy shifts in North Korea do not augur well for peace in the near term. Thus, even moving the needle toward peace will likely require Washington to undertake bold initiatives.

Type: Question and Answer

Mediation, Negotiation & DialoguePeace Processes

View All Publications