Youth recruitment into extremist groups in Afghanistan continues to be a major source of group building. In field studies and interviews conducted in three provinces to elicit views on extremist groups, both violent and nonviolent, and factors thought to induce youth to join such groups, violent extremist groups emerged as unpopular and mistrusted, being perceived as un-Islamic and controlled by foreign powers. Nonetheless, the activities and ideologies of such groups have not been effectively countered by the government of Afghanistan, civil society, or the international community. Programs to counter extreme violence should emphasize the Islamic basis of Afghan civil law, accommodate local differences, and be conducted in partnership with moderate voices and youth, with international organizations remaining in the background.

Summary

  • Field studies and interviews were conducted in three provinces in Afghanistan, Nangarhar, Balkh, and Herat, to elicit views on extremist groups, both violent and nonviolent, and factors thought to induce youth to join such groups.
  • The two strands of youth recruitment are a rural, less educated demographic, which has traditionally formed the primary recruiting pool for violent extremist groups such as the Taliban, and an urban, educated constituency, more amenable to nonviolent group recruitment.
  • Nangarhar presents the most worrisome case, for violent extremist groups with cross-border support networks in Pakistan are proliferating faster here than in Herat or Balkh, in part a legacy of support provided during the anti-Soviet jihad to madrassas later found to be hotbeds of radicalization.
  • The self-declared Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is probing for entry points in both Herat and Nangarhar, particularly among disaffected Taliban commanders, with greater success so far in Nangarhar.
  • The propaganda of violent extremist groups in Afghanistan often refers to grievances in the wider Muslim world, but the overarching narrative is jihad against the “occupying” U.S.-led coalition and the “un-Islamic” Afghan government. The violence is more about fighting against uninvited guests than for a particular ideology.
  • Violent extremist groups appear broadly unpopular and mistrusted throughout the study area, being perceived as un-Islamic and controlled by foreign powers. Nonetheless, the activities and ideologies of such groups have not been effectively countered by the government of Afghanistan, civil society, or the international community.
  • The international community has an important if limited role to play in advising Afghan civil society organizations on forming partnerships with moderate voices in the country to counter the messaging of violent groups, and in encouraging the state to engage in an outreach that clarifies to antigovernment but not yet violent extremists the Islamic basis of civil law.

About the Report

This report presents findings from a three-province study on violent extremism in Afghanistan that was undertaken by The Liaison Office, an Afghan research and peacebuilding organization. The purpose of the research is to inform ongoing and future programming by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the U.S. government aimed at countering violent extremism.

About the Authors

Reza Fazli, a senior researcher at The Liaison Office, has conducted sociopolitical field studies throughout Afghanistan since 2008. Casey Johnson, a USIP senior program officer, has worked as a researcher and political adviser in Afghanistan since 2008. Peyton Cooke, a consultant at The Liaison Office whose work focuses on subnational rule of law and local governance issues, has lived and worked in Afghanistan since 2010.


Related Research & Analysis

Understanding the Implications of the Taliban’s Opium Ban in Afghanistan

Understanding the Implications of the Taliban’s Opium Ban in Afghanistan

Thursday, December 12, 2024

The Taliban’s opium ban, coupled with Afghan farmers’ replacement of poppy largely with low-value wheat, is likely to worsen dissatisfaction and political tensions. The Taliban’s persistence in enforcing the ban has been notable, especially in 2024. If the ban remains in place, it would demonstrate the regime’s strength but also worsen rural poverty, increase dissatisfaction among landholders and spur political instability. This will likely lead to increased humanitarian needs and more pressures for outmigration to nearby countries and beyond, both of which are of interest to the U.S. and other Western countries. Conversely, if the ban weakens in response to pressures and resistance, a revival of widespread poppy cultivation could undermine the regime’s authority. Aid alone will not offset the economic shock of the ban, nor stimulate the long-term growth needed to effectively combat the opium problem.

Type: Analysis

How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid

How Afghanistan’s Economy Can Survive Shrinking Shipments of U.N. Cash Aid

Thursday, November 14, 2024

Afghanistan’s precarious economy is facing a new set of multidimensional risks as humanitarian aid — delivered in massive shipments of U.S. cash dollars — shrinks rapidly amid competing demands from other crises around the world. The dollar inflows, moved under U.N. auspices, have helped stabilize the Afghan economy, cover its mammoth trade deficit, and inject monetary liquidity into commerce. With much smaller cash infusions, in line with a general reduction in aid, the suffering of Afghanistan’s poverty-stricken population is likely to increase.

Type: Analysis

View All Research & Analysis