As the two-month countdown begins for the January 30 elections in Iraq, postponement is a subject of intense debate in both Iraq and the United States.

As the two-month countdown begins for the January 30 elections in Iraq, postponement is a subject of intense debate in both Iraq and the United States. Some in Iraq would like to participate in elections but are seeking delay in order to gain more time for political preparations; others are seeking delay and plan to boycott elections but really would prefer to scuttle them altogether. Still others are concerned that technical preparations are not complete or that security will not be adequate in some parts of the country, and could impede the electoral process.

A distinguished panel at the U.S. Institute of Peace gathered on December 1, 2004, to discuss "Elections In Iraq: What Will January Bring?" Panelists included Ambassador Feisel al-Istrabadi, who represents Iraq at the United Nations; Jeff Fisher, a senior IFES official assisting in the Iraq elections; Institute of Peace Senior Fellow, Phebe Marr, one of the world's leading experts on Iraq; and State Department Iraq Coordinator Ronald Schlicher. The panel was moderated by Dan Serwer, Institute of Peace Director of Peace and Stability Operations. They offered unique insights beyond the daily headlines on the upcoming elections, which are highlighted below. These positions are based on the presentations and do not reflect positions taken by the Institute.

Strong momentum on the ground...

Grassroots support and significant improvement in elections preparation are making the prospect of January elections a reality, panelists commented. More than 200 parties and 4,000 individuals have registered to compete from all sectors of the Iraqi population. There is "operational momentum pushing towards elections," IFES's Jeff Fisher observed. Two hundred staff are working at the Iraqi Election Commission headquarters in Baghdad and another 6,000 Iraqis are working throughout the country. The number of election workers will increase dramatically as January 30 approaches. "Automatic registration" will be provided to 14 million Iraqis thanks to the willingness of the electoral commission to use the "ration" database that existed prior to the war. Despite the great challenges posed by extension of the franchise to "regime displaced migrants" outside of the country, preparations are underway to conduct balloting in 14 countries. This is possible because the International Organization for Migration is utilizing the network it established for out-of-country voting for Afghanistan's recent presidential elections.

...and no legal basis...

Another reason the date needs to hold, according to several panelists, is that the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) under which Iraq is governed during this interim period makes it extremely difficult to postpone the elections. The TAL specifies the election date and does not allow for any amendment of its provisions before elections. Iraq's interim government cannot change the date. The Iraqi Elections Commission says it does not have the authority to postpone the elections. And U.N. Security Council resolution 1546 states that elections are to be held no later than January 31, 2005. While the speakers at USIP's meeting left the door ajar for postponement on compelling technical or security grounds, the legal framework commits Iraq and the international community to elections by January 31, 2005. Fisher warned that an attempt to change only the date of the elections and nothing else would likely fail and cause the political agreement on which the TAL is based to unravel, causing even more serious political problems than going ahead as scheduled. A maximum effort to hold the elections on January 30 is necessary.

...but some still want delay...

Despite the advanced state of preparations and the legal requirements, all the panelists agreed that obstacles remain. The 17 parties that recently called for postponement include "heavy hitters, " such as former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi. Their concerns about security and the level of technical preparations in parts of the country have to be taken seriously. At the same time, advocates for delay would have to demonstrate that slipping the date would ensure increased credibility, something they have not yet done. Because of the single-district proportional system to be used in the elections, postponement in some places is not feasible.

A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between those calling for delay and those supporting a boycott or cancellation of the elections, said several speakers. Those who advocate postponement are engaged in the process and are generating a debate that is a healthy sign of democracy. Those who call for cancellation and boycott are opposing the democratic process and should not be heeded, said Ambassador Istrabadi. Allowing those who oppose elections altogether to prevail would hand a significant moral victory to the insurgents.

For some of those who are now advocating delay, the prospect of being left out of something as important as the writing of the constitution will likely provide a powerful incentive for participation, according to USIP Senior Fellow Phebe Marr. Indeed, most of the 17 parties have prepared the necessary party lists and still plan to compete in national elections at this point, even if their demand for delay is not satisfied.

...and worry about low turnout in some areas and other kinds of disenfranchisement.

The panelists commented on the range of issues that could cause low voter turnout:

  • Security concerns in particular areas. There are no easy answers, though polling centers are being designed to enable queuing indoors and robust security measures.
  • Displaced people. They will be able to vote in the national elections (but not in the provincial ones) without returning to their home areas. Those displaced by violence in Fallujah, for example, are automatically registered if they are in the public distribution database and can vote in the national elections from other locations.
  • The disabled. Provisions for people with disabilities, who are numerous in Iraq, are not yet adequate.
  • Voter intimidation, security of poll workers, and other issues of disenfranchisement. These need to be monitored by an election observation process that is still being organized. There is evidence of a robust domestic effort, but invitations for international observers have just been issued, and it is not clear how many internationals will run the inevitable risks. The European Union is making substantial contributions to funding the elections and has provided some technical assistance as well. A trust fund is expected to be set up at the United Nations within the coming days to help defray expenses for a "protection force" for its election workers.
  • Insufficient knowledge among voters of the electoral system or the candidates or parties. Polling indicates that most voters do not have an adequate understanding of the electoral system and how it will represent them. Greater resources for voter education are required. The U.S. Agency for International Development is ramping up its assistance to the voter education program.

What are the likely outcomes?

Phebe Marr suggested two hypothetical election outcomes. In the first, strong blocs prevail, including a "Shia" list supported tacitly by Ayatollah Sistani, a united Kurdish list, and one or more centrist lists that cross ethnic lines. In the second, fragmentation brings into the assembly smaller political groupings, including local and tribal leaders with strong local constituencies and less propensity to "identity" politics.

Ethnic and sectarian divisions have often been exaggerated in the press, which unfortunately portrays Iraq's Shia, Sunni and Kurdish communities as homogenous, the panelists agreed. In fact, they are not united. Even if there is a single Shia list going into the elections, cohesion could easily fall apart following the establishment of the assembly. The Sunni community is very fragmented. The often divided Kurds of the North are for the moment united behind a powerful agenda: continued regional control and autonomy, though there are signs of a grass roots challenge to the well-established Kurdish leaders. Sectarian strife between now and the elections will favor the emergence of strong blocs organized along ethnic lines. This will make negotiations over the new constitution far more difficult.

Religion will in any event play a greater role in Iraq after these elections, Marr observed. Many Sunnis and Kurds will, however, oppose strong Islamic influence. Iranian influence in particular will find resistance, even among the Shia, who are divided on the Iranian theocratic model as on many other issues.

Will elections expedite the departure of the U.S. and international community? Not likely. Ambassador Istrabadi sees the need for the international community to provide assistance to Iraq for a decade at least, though the nature of the international presence will change as Iraqis take on increased responsibilities for security and governance. The conduct of elections is an early chapter in the building of a new Iraq.

 

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Beth DeGrasse, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;and Courtney Rusin, the operations coordinator for the Peace and Stability Operations program. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

 

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Peace Brief