Kosovo and Serbia: Still in Need of a Plan

New USIPeace Briefing addresses the root causes of the violence and possible solutions.

WASHINGTON – Almost three months after rioting in Kosovo and Serbia left more than a dozen people dead, hundreds wounded, over 4,000 displaced, and dozens of churches, mosques and public buildings damaged, little has been done to address the root causes of the violence. The net result has been continued tension. Without significant reforms, renewed and worsened conflict could erupt.

The U.S. Institute of Peace convened experts and analysts to discuss the problems and potential solutions on May 20, 2004. James Lyon and Alex Anderson of the International Crisis Group led the discussion with brief presentations, followed by questions from the floor. This briefing summarizes that discussion.

Wishing Away the Problems...

The violence spawned a wave of accusations that continues to this very day. Local Kosovar political leaders, media and even civic organizations blame the international community for the violence, saying that it has not acted fast enough to establish Kosovo’s status, hindering economic reform and reconciliation. Several leading Kosovar political leaders and civic organizations have even traveled to Washington in the wake of the violence to plead their case, only to be given a chilly reception.

For their part, authorities in Belgrade showed restraint during the violence, but have otherwise been provocative. Serbian parliament resolutions declaring Kosovo an inalienable part of the country, support for the parallel structures in Kosovo, and the nationalist inauguration speech by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica agitated the Albanians. There is concern that if such actions persist and the ultra-nationalist Radicals continue to surge in Serbia, as expected in the presidential elections scheduled for June 13, authorities in Belgrade will not be able to exercise the same degree of restraint in the future as they did in March.

State media in Serbia continues to inflame the situation in Kosovo, reminding viewers of the mistreatment of Serbs by the Albanian majority since the end of the war in 1999 and using derogatory and inflammatory language to describe the Albanian community. It is evocative of the same kind of nationalism that Slobodan Milosevic stirred up to chilling effect in the early days of the wars in both Croatia and Bosnia.

Any solution must address the stereotypes and misinformation that continue to be broadcast by the media in both Serbia and Kosovo, which are accepted by the vast majority of the population. Media outlets also tend avoid positive news, such as the recent war crimes trials in Serbia, perpetuating misinformation and ensuring that communities retain stereotypes of one another. The financial and political assistance that has been provided to the development of media in both Kosovo and Serbia, is unfortunately failing to prove worthwhile.

The international community meanwhile continues to place the onus of responsibility on Kosovo, reminding its political leadership that it has a commitment to uphold the “Standards Before Status” process. While achieving the Standards remains vital to progress in the region, the international community has painted itself into a corner by holding off a decision on Kosovo’s status for too long. Creative thinking will be needed to break the deadlock, which one analyst claimed resembled a “Tale of Three Cities,” as Belgrade, Pristina and New York (the home of the United Nations) continue to trade accusations. In fact it is a “Tale of Eight Cities,” given the disunity between Washington, Brussels, London, Paris and Berlin in their approach to the region. Participants urged renewed commitment by both the United States and the European Union, which over the past several months have become overwhelmed by commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some participants observed that the European Union is eager to follow U.S. leadership on Kosovo.

To their credit, UNMIK and KFOR have launched internal reviews that could be useful in forestalling or responding to future violence. However, it seems unlikely significant changes will be made on the part of the international community or local Kosovo leadership any time soon. This raises the prospect that individuals or even organizations may attempt to stoke additional violence for their own benefit.

Time for Re-engagement and Difficult Decisions . . .

If the international community hopes to prevent a relapse of the March violence and help Kosovo get back on track towards stability and prosperity, it should begin by:

  • Developing a road map for Kosovo’s final status by ruling out some options this year and concluding the process in 2005. Some suggested that the US government state clearly that Kosovo could never return to Belgrade’s rule, thereby allaying Albanians’ worst fears. A second option would be to put forward the possibility of Conditional Independence. Yet another is to make Kosovo a trusteeship.
  • Pursuing the dialogue between Belgrade, Pristina and the international community by looking to benefit from comparisons with other negotiated settlements. Participants were nearly unanimous in their concern that the process thus far is not being properly managed by the United Nations. There have been various programs encouraging dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina over the past three years. These include a State Department funded initiative to promote dialogue between NGOs and political parties and an OSCE program focusing exclusively on NGOs. In its pursuit of official dialogue, the international community should tap in to these initiatives for added expertise and insight.
  • Addressing the question of authority in Kosovo. More powers should be transferred to local authorities accompanied with transfer of accountability. Attention must also be paid to Kosovo’s Serbs, who continue to be misled by Belgrade and ignored and abused by Pristina.
  • Enabling significant returns, as has been done in Bosnia. Though security plays a crucial part in whether a displaced person will decide to return to Kosovo, they are also likely to consider economic incentives and the viability of local institutions.
  • Stepping up the pace of economic reforms and establishing long-term development strategies for Kosovo. Participants noted that Kosovo is headed towards economic recession and has a serious capacity deficit.
 

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Albert Cevallos, Senior Fellow at the Institute’s Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace, and Ylber Bajraktari, Operations Coordinator of USIP's Peace and Stability Operations program. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

 

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Peace Brief