The South Sudan Peace Process Archive was created with the cooperation of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with funding from the U.S. Department of State. The objective of this Archive is to provide South Sudanese citizens, regional actors, mediators, policymakers, academics, and other interested readers a window into the 2013-2015 negotiations that attempted to end the conflict that began in South Sudan in late 2013. The Archive is also intended to facilitate comparative study in conflict mediation and to help inform other peace processes.

Women at the Protection of Civilians site in Juba call for peace
Women at the Protection of Civilians site in Juba call for peace (UNMISS/Flickr)

A review of the South Sudan Peace Archive may help to illustrate: 

  1. The attempts to end large-scale violence in South Sudan
  2. The desired reforms and end-state envisioned during the peace talks, as advanced by some stakeholders, the mediators, and international peace process supporters
  3. The evolution of the process, the positions of negotiating parties, and the difficult choices made--including why some elements ended up in the final text of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS)
  4. The shortcomings of the peace process, which ultimately limited outcomes and contributed to the lack of an enduring peace

The Archive includes many documents from the peace process, an interactive timeline of events, photos, and a series of supporting tools that offer both context and search capacity. The Archive and its supporting tools include:

Key Facts

The key facts page outlines the background to the conflict, the mediating organization IGAD, its structure and mandate, the parties to the peace process and its supporters, the timeframe, location, financing, and rules and modalities of the talks, and key terms and acronyms of the process.

Interactive Timeline

The interactive timeline is a shorthand guide to the archived materials and the major events of the period. While not a comprehensive account of the conflict or the peace process, it includes a description of key events and interventions, links to important documents in the archive, and external media, including relevant photos, videos, media reports and other documents.

Archive

A central repository includes all the archived documents in one location, including: Agreements, Draft Proposals, Summit Communiqués, Agendas, Progress Reports, Public Statements by the IGAD Mediators and other relevant documents. It also includes statements and other relevant documents from the African Union, the Troika (United States, United Kingdom, Norway) and the United Nations Security Council. The South Sudan Peace Process Archive does not contain every document from the peace process. It is a curated selection, aimed to maximize understanding and not overload readers with thousands of documents that, absent further context and explanation, may confuse rather than elucidate.

View a text-only version of the timeline

2013

December 15

Violence breaks out in Juba, South Sudan's capital. The military, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), fractures on mostly ethnic lines.

2013

December 16-18

As fighting continues in Juba and spreads to other parts of the country, shuttle diplomacy begins to press the warring parties toward negotiations. World leaders place calls to President Salva Kiir and opposition leader and former Vice President Riek Machar urging them to prevent civil war.

2013

December 17

Former Vice President Riek Machar flees the capital. The Chairperson of the AU Commission urges the Government and all stakeholders to exercise restraint, avert further escalation and seek resolution of differences peacefully, and expresses the AU's readiness to assist in finding a solution to the current situation.

2013

December 18

Three groups of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals are evacuated from South Sudan by the U.S. military. Other countries also begin evacuations of their citizens.

2013

December 24

The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 2132 authorizing 5,000 additional peacekeepers for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

2013

December 27

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization of seven northeast African states, convenes its first Extraordinary Summit on South Sudan. It appoints three mediators from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, to facilitate talks between the belligerents. IGAD demands hostilities end in four days, or "further measures" will follow. Following Ugandan military intervention in support of the Juba government, the Summit welcomes Uganda’s efforts to secure critical infrastructure in South Sudan’s capital, but privately regional officials hope to limit Ugandan involvement.

2014

January 3

IGAD convenes talks in Addis Ababa between Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) and an ad hoc coalition of antigovernment forces — the SPLM/A (In Opposition) — as fighting spreads and intensifies in key towns.

2014

January 18

The AU Commission announces it is developing terms of reference for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged atrocities in South Sudan since December 15, 2013 — a key demand of anti-government forces.

2014

January 23

After 19 days of negotiation, the parties sign an agreement on ceasing hostilities and ensuring humanitarian access, to include a Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) to oversee compliance with the cessation of hostilities (CoH). The MVM will not, however, disclose its findings publicly for months to come. All parties simultaneously sign an agreement on the release of eleven high profile political detainees, all members of the SPLM. However, the government only wants to discuss a ceasefire and refuses to address political issues or causes of the conflict.

2014

January 27

A coalition of civil society organisations calls for civil society to be involved in the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities agreement alongside the belligerent parties and IGAD, but is unsuccessful in formalizing that role.

2014

January 29

Seven of the eleven SPLM political detainees are released a few days after parties sign the Jan. 23 agreement. Four remain in custody and will soon stand trial in Juba for treason.

2014

January 31

IGAD Extraordinary Summit No. 2 is convened, welcomes agreements and encourages launch of second phase of talks, mandates mediators to develop framework for phase II and modalities on structure, timing, representation, and inclusivity. Though their role is not formalized, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan Donald Booth and other international diplomats provide coordinated support to the peace process.

2014

February 9

Phase II of the process—negotiations on broader political issues—begins in Addis Ababa, though government remains reluctant to entertain political dialogue. Seven of the eleven political detainees join peace talks in Addis Ababa, as a third independent group, against the wishes of the government of South Sudan.

2014

February 24

The IGAD Mediation develops a draft Declaration of Principles and Modalities to frame further talks, but the document is abandoned.

2014

March 7

The African Union announces the establishment of a five-member Commission of Inquiry (CoI), chaired by former Nigerian President Obasanjo, to investigate human rights abuses and make recommendations on accountability and reconciliation. It is unclear how the AU inquiry will coordinate with the IGAD mediation.

2014

March 12

The African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan adopts its terms of reference and agrees on the support required for the fulfillment of its mandate.

2014

March 13

IGAD Extraordinary Summit #3 calls for a regional "protection and deterrent force" to be deployed with UN/AU support, but the declaration has not been preceded by sufficient diplomatic work to make this feasible. The Summit Communiqué reiterates a call for allied armed forces to withdraw - the Ugandan army which is fighting on behalf of the Juba government. It stresses the humanitarian situation and the importance of an inclusive process, including the participation of the former political detainees (FDs) in the talks. It also welcomes the establishment of the AU Commission of Inquiry.

2014

March 21

More than 700,000 civilians have been displaced since the conflict began on Dec. 15, 2013. Some 85,000 have taken refuge at UN protection sites across the country.

2014

April 7

Talks adjourn at the request of the negotiating parties. After the region declines to support multilateral sanctions, U.S. President Obama establishes bilateral sanctions regime by Executive Order, including asset freezes and travel bans for anyone that threatens peace and stability, undermines the peace process, or commits gross human rights violations.

2014

April 11

IGAD's ceasefire monitors officially begin field operations.

2014

April 17

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base in Bor is attacked, leaving at least 59 sheltering civilians dead.

2014

April 24

Violent confrontation and further atrocities in key towns yield a spike in international outrage and renewed regional focus on the deployment of a deterrent force.

2014

April 25

First report of the IGAD ceasefire monitors is completed, on violations of the CoH in Unity State by the SPLM/A (In Opposition), and sent to the mediators in Addis Ababa. The report will not be publicly released for several more months, however, as IGAD mediators are concerned its disclosure may disrupt the negotiations.

2014

April 28

IGAD mediated peace talks resume in Ethiopia.

2014

May 2

As the GRSS continues to stymie political talks, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visits Juba to secure Kiir's commitment to a negotiated “transition” and his direct participation in Addis talks.

2014

May 6

U.S. sanctions Gen. Marial Chanuong, head of the presidential guard, and Gen. Peter Gadet, of the SPLM/A (IO), for their involvement in the conflict. Acrimonious negotiations ensue over the participation of a wider set of South Sudanese stakeholders in Phase II of the peace talks, as well as the modalities, decision-making procedures, and other questions of the process format and structure.

2014

May 9

Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam negotiates directly, albeit separately, with Kiir and Machar, resulting in the May 9 Agreement, which formally endorses the negotiation of a transitional government and reforms during a transitional period, and blesses a "multi-stakeholder" process to include: civil society, faith leaders, former detainees, and other political parties in future talks. The parties re-dedicate the shaky cessation of hostilities (CoH) and produce a draft matrix for its implementation, but cannot agree on the timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces.  

2014

May 19

Mediators consolidate initial positions of the parties into a single negotiating text—the Framework document, after which the talks adjourn.

2014

May 27

Now hosting more than 100,000 displaced civilians, the UNMISS mandate is refocused on civilian protection.

2014

June 5-7

The IGAD Mediation convenes Symposium in Addis Ababa to initiate multi-stakeholder phase of talks, inviting all parties to hear presentations from international experts and participate in discussion sessions on: transitional governance models, transitional justice, security, and constitutional reform. The parties are open, friendly, and frank in discussing solutions, but positive atmosphere quickly dissipates as disputes arise and the mediation tries to use the event to select political party and civil society delegates for the next round of talks. This exercise damages mediation credibility.

2014

June 10

IGAD Extraordinary Summit No. 4 welcomes May 9 Agreement and inclusive process, endorses right of non-combatant stakeholder groups to participate and the right to determine their own representation, again threatens collective action and punitive measures against any party who fails to meet its commitments, and affirms a 60-day deadline for the formation of transitional government.

2014

June 20

Talks open as broader political agenda is finally agreed, but immediately bogs down over questions of representation of other stakeholders.

2014

June 23

Just three days after they begin, the talks adjourn for further consultations after the warring parties refuse to participate in the inclusive multi-stakeholder format.

2014

June 27

IGAD chief mediator Seyoum Mesfin briefs the UN Security Council in New York on the conflict and status of the peace process.

2014

July 11

The EU sanctions one Government official, Santino Deng, and joins the U.S. in also designating SPLM/A (IO) General Peter Gadet for sanctions.

2014

July 20

On the day that mediators visit Juba to consult with President Kiir and other members of the GRSS, the SPLM/A (IO) attacks Nasir, in violation of the CoH.

2014

July 23

IGAD mediators hold consultations with all stakeholders to determine the way forward and aim to resume talks by the end of the month.

2014

July 31

Despite earlier plans to resume negotiations by the end of July, formal peace talks remain stalled. More than 3.5 million people face emergency food insecurity in South Sudan.

2014

August 1

Days before talks resume, the head of the civil society delegation to the talks is shot by an unknown assailant in Juba, prompting concerns about intimidation of process participants.

2014

August 4-5

After another round of shuttle diplomacy and consultations with stakeholder groups, IGAD mediation resumes formal talks; the mediation criticizes the SPLM/A (IO) for not showing up for the resumption of talks and calls for them to re-join the process immediately.

2014

August 13

The UN Security Council visits Juba as part of a multi-stop Africa tour, and expresses disappointment that the conflict continues. The council holds direct consultations with Salva Kiir and consults Riek Machar by video conference.

2014

August 24

After being detained and force marched by SPLM/A (IO) forces, a ceasefire monitor collapses and dies in Unity State. IGAD condemns the death but takes no tangible action in response.

2014

August 24-25

IGAD Extraordinary Summit No. 5, initially due to be held earlier in the month, eventually convenes and condemns CoH violations, reiterates that solution requires inclusive and broad-based talks, including full participation of named stakeholder groups, expresses disappointment at failure to form transitional government per identified (60-day) deadline, levels threats against those obstructing peace, and endorses the Protocol on Agreed Principles.

2014

August 25

After last minute changes to the proposed power sharing structures, made following Ugandan intervention at the IGAD Summit, Machar rejects the Protocol. The government signs. Other stakeholders are not invited to sign.

2014

August 26

Confusion over the signing of the CoH matrix leaves the mediation claiming the SPLM/A (IO) has signed, which the SPLM/A (IO) refutes. For the first time, IGAD publishes a summary of CoH violation reports.

2014

August 28

Following SPLM/A (IO), FD, and civil society anger at the events at the latest IGAD Summit, the talks adjourn indefinitely.

2014

September 22

After consultations, stakeholders agree the IGAD mediation should develop a new text merging the provisions of the Protocol and the earlier positions of the negotiating delegations. The Mediation opens a new round of talks in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia and tables a new negotiating text developed on that basis. The government bars non-government aligned political party representatives from leaving Juba to participate in the talks - the mediators proceed with talks anyway, against the advice of most peace process supporters.

2014

September 27

Speaking in New York at the UN General Assembly, President Kiir calls on the "international community to exert efforts on the rebels to sign the [Aug. 25] Protocol Agreement." Peace process supporters convene a high-level meeting on UNGA margins to discuss the situation in South Sudan.

2014

October 5

After substantial progress on a range of governance issues, talks in Bahir Dar adjourn for consultations with party leadership.

2014

October 12 - 20

During the adjournment of the IGAD talks, the Arusha process resumes and adopts a communiqué and framework on inter-SPLM dialogue, which overlaps with the existing IGAD mediation agenda.

2014

October 27 - 29

Serious fighting occurs in Unity State on the eve of the resumption of talks.

2014

November 1 - 5

Ongoing talks make little progress in resolving outstanding issues, including on the arrangements for a potential sharing of power between the belligerents.

2014

November 6 -7

At IGAD Extraordinary Summit No. 6, a mediation document outlining the powers and responsibilities of the president and prime minister of a prospective transitional government is tabled for discussion, but no agreement can be reached. IGAD heads of state threaten punitive actions against the South Sudanese belligerents, specifically mentioning travel bans, asset freezes, and an arms embargo, as well as the threat of direct military intervention.

2014

November 9

Following IGAD Extraordinary Summit No. 6, parties sign the so-called implementation matrix for the cessation of hostilities agreement, which the mediation asserted the SPLM/A (IO) had initially signed in August but was then disowned. The matrix is designed to allow more practical steps to be taken in the implementation of the CoH.

2014

November 15 - 16

IGAD hosts a Cessation of Hostilities implementation workshop between the rival commanders.

2014

December 6 - 12

SPLM/A (IO) asks for more time to consult on the proposals made at the IGAD Extraordinary Summit of Nov. 6-7, and eventually convenes the first of two conferences, held in Pagak, aimed at consulting its constituencies and coordinating political objectives. The Conference issues conclusion affirming IO positions on a range of issues.

2014

December 17

IGAD's threats of punitive action made Nov. 6-7 in the event agreement is not reached are not followed by any concrete measures.

2014

December 23

Talks reconvene but again make little progress, and adjourn almost immediately.

2015

January 12

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi invites lead negotiators to Khartoum at his own initiative. He urges speedy resolution of the conflict and reiterates China’s support for the peace process.

2015

January 21

President Kiir, Riek Machar, and the FDs sign the FDs sign the ‘Arusha Communique’ committing to reunify the SPLM, although the immediate implications or consequences for the IGAD talks are unclear.

2015

January 29

During the annual African Union (AU) Summit, the AU Peace and Security Council defers the release of the now-completed CoI report, worried it may upset the peace talks. The report is eventually released in October 2015.

2015

January 30 - 31

IGAD mediators table a proposal, focused on power-sharing, in an attempt to resolve some of the most contentious outstanding differences between the parties. Face-to-face negotiations ensue between President Kiir and Riek Machar in Addis Ababa.

2015

February 1

The parties agree to a limited range of issues in the “Areas of Agreement” document and agree to finalize negotiations on the remaining issues by March 5. They also agree to resume talks in late February.

2015

February 6

The Troika of the US, UK and Norway issue a statement expressing disappointment at the South Sudan parties’ failure to achieve a peace deal and echo public calls for the AU Commission of Inquiry report to be released.

2015

February 18

President Kiir writes to Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam, the Chairman of IGAD, to say he will not be able to return to Addis to continue direct negotiations, as previously agreed.

Two days later Hailemariam writes to Kiir expressing concern at this decision. He urges Kiir to return to Addis in the near future, so that the March 5 deadline for agreement can be respected.

2015

February 23

Despite Prime Minister Hailemariam's request, Kiir does not immediately return to Addis Ababa, and the talks resume on February 23.

2015

March 2

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry issues strongest statement to date, condemns Kiir and Machar's failure to compromise, urges an immediate deal, and questions the legitimacy of the government in Juba.

2015

March 3

Pressure on the parties eventually leads to face to face talks between President Kiir and Riek Machar in Addis Ababa, on the basis of the texts discussed on February 1. The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 2206 establishing a UN sanctions regime for South Sudan.

2015

March 5

The deadline to finalize negotiations is missed.

2015

March 6

IGAD Chair and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam issues “letter to the people of South Sudan” noting that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have failed to meet their commitments to peace. The letter foreshadows the likely expansion of process to broader “IGAD Plus” format.

2015

March

Ongoing violations of the CoH are documented by IGAD’s ceasefire monitors, but the mediators do not publicly disclose most details of the violations.

2015

April 19-23

The SPLM/A (IO) convenes the second Pagak conference aimed at consulting opposition forces and coordinating political objectives. The SPLM/A (IO) issues resolutions welcoming the new IGAD Plus mechanism while noting the implementation of the Arusha Agreement is not possible without first reaching a negotiated peace agreement. The government begins a full-scale military offensive in Unity State.

2015

May 1 - 31

Talks remain stalled as the date for the commencement of IGAD Plus mediated talks is repeatedly delayed. The ongoing government offensive expands to Jonglei and Upper Nile states.

2015

May 5

The U.S. announces it plans to provide $5 million to promote justice and accountability in South Sudan, and specifically references the proposed hybrid court while talks remain stalled as the date for the commencement of IGAD Plus mediated talks is repeatedly delayed.

2015

June 1

The government, SPLM/A (IO) and SPLM (FD) request the mediation to draft a compromise agreement for their consideration, noting that they had failed to make the necessary concessions.

The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator is expelled from South Sudan.

2015

June 2

The former president of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, is appointed as AU High Representative to South Sudan. Konaré's role is to support the IGAD talks, although he has no formal mediation mandate.

2015

June 10

Urged by the U.S. and other partners, and on the sidelines of the AU Summit, IGAD finally announces creation of “IGAD-Plus”—a broader mediation format intended to: invest a larger number of African and international partners in a sustainable outcome, offer substantive support to IGAD, and help offset the harmful consequences of regional differences among IGAD states. It includes IGAD plus five AU states—Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa, representing the five sub-regions of Africa, as well as the Troika, China, EU, and UN.

2015

July 1

SPLM/A (IO) forces attack an UNMISS protection of civilians site in Malakal.

2015

July 24

Representing months of work by the parties and mediation, and after consulting IGAD Plus partners, mediators table a comprehensive draft peace plan - the “Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” - to the parties and announces the proposal to the public, stipulate that elements could be changed through joint agreement, but otherwise the parties would be expected to sign the agreement by August 17.

2015

July 27

U.S. President Obama convenes meeting of IGAD and AU leaders in Addis Ababa in an attempt to forge regional consensus and increase the sense of urgency amid lagging peace talks.

2015

July 21

Prominent SPLM/A (IO) generals are dismissed and later announce a break with SPLM/A (IO) leader Machar, as deep internal divisions threaten to unravel the loose constellation of forces that comprises SPLM/A (IO).

2015

July 28

U.S. President Obama addresses the African Union, noting that "given the current situation, Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar must reach an agreement by August 17th...if they do not, I believe the international community must raise the costs of intransigence…"

2015

August 10

Some regional leaders convene in Uganda and make some controversial amendments to the draft proposal tabled on July 24.

2015

August 16-17

After all day negotiations, neither President Kiir, nor any other government representative, signs the agreement. Following a delayed start to the ceremony on the morning of the 17th, SPLM/A (IO) and FD sign the peace agreement in Addis Ababa, as do a number of other prominent South Sudan personalities, civil society and faith based leaders. Ongoing disputes over the representation of other political parties continue to prevent their participation, and there are no signatures from this stakeholder group, although many individual parties signal an unofficial acceptance of the deal.

2015

August 17

Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam and Kenyan President Kenyatta give President Kiir and the GRSS a further 15 day period for 'consultations', at Kiir’s request. Kiir fires the state governors of Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, Warrap and Western Equatoria states, to head off any possible political opposition from these senior figures.

2015

August 19

As deadline approaches, the US circulates a draft resolution to the members of the UN Security Council threatening an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against South Sudan if President Salva Kiir refuses to sign a peace accord by September 1, the latest deadline for a deal.

2015

August 23

Despite having signed the peace agreement less than a week ago, SPLM/A (IO) forces attack government positions in Nhialdiu, Unity State.

2015

August 26

The government of South Sudan invites South Sudanese and international stakeholders to a ceremony in Juba, signaling its intent to sign the deal. The ceremony is delayed for hours as government factions for and against the deal lobby President Kiir. Ceremony convenes, and after reading a list of detailed “reservations” which call in to question the government’s commitment to the deal, President Kiir signs the peace agreement in Juba, witnessed by IGAD heads of state, who refuse to endorse these so-called reservations.

2015

August 26

U.S. and other international parties welcome the deal. National Security Advisor Susan Rice issues a statement noting the agreement as “a necessary first step towards ending the conflict,” while stating that the United States does “not recognize any reservations or addendums to that agreement.”

2015

September 2

Mere days after the agreement is signed, government helicopter gunships attack SPLM/A (IO) positions in the vicinity of Malakal, Upper Nile State.

2015

September 10

The deadline for the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) oversight mechanism is missed, as IGAD member states continue to consult on the body’s leadership and terms of reference. While the government lobbies for a less powerful institution, partners push for JMEC to have strong terms of reference, including the power to settle disputes.

2015

September 13 - 17

Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements workshop convenes to detail operationalization of agreement provisions on cantonment, coverage of the ceasefire, and transitional security arrangements for Juba.

2015

September 16

SPLM/A (IO) refuses to sign ceasefire workshop minutes given disagreements over the numbers of forces in Juba. Proposed UN Security Council sanctions against chief of the staff of the SPLA Gen. Paul Malong and SPLM/A (IO) general Johnson Olony are blocked by Security Council members Russia and Angola.

2015

October 2

Contravening the agreement and further alienating the other parties to the agreement and regional and international partners, President Kiir issues an executive order creating 28 states to replace the existing 10; though popular on the ground, the move is seen as an attempt to extend political patronage, gerrymander districts in order to control elections and resources, and undermine the agreement’s power sharing provisions.

2015

October 19

The IGAD mediation responds to the government's decision to form new states and asks the government to place a ‘moratorium’ on the order, and allow the question of the number of states to be determined through the permanent constitutional process. After partners express concern over the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the body mandated to oversee implementation of the August 2015 agreement, IGAD appoints former President of Botswana Festus Mogae as JMEC Chairperson.

2015

October 27

Having deferred its release for months, the AU finally releases the Commission of Inquiry report, though confidential advance copies have already been provided to GRSS and the SPLM/A (IO).

2015

November 3

Parties discuss altering the timelines for establishing the transitional government, given delays in agreements to security arrangements. They suggest the transitional government should be formed between December 15 and January 15, 2016.

November meetings also see the SPLM/A (IO) agree to the transitional security arrangements after the GRSS agrees to alter numbers.

2015

November 27

Parties disagree over the size of the SPLM/A (IO) advance team to Juba, that will initiate implementation, which further delays the deal's timeline. JMEC begins operations in South Sudan and establishes a secretariat. JMEC calls its first meeting, but the SPLM/A (IO) advance team fails to arrive, and the meeting does not obtain quorum.

2015

December 15

The UN Security Council re-authorizes UNMISS (Resolution 2252) and tasks it with support to implementation of the Agreement, in concert with JMEC.

2015

December 21

Following intensive engagement with the parties by JMEC, IGAD member states and the Troika, the SPLM/A (IO) advance team arrives in Juba.

2015

December 22

The first meeting of JMEC to reach quorum is convened.

2015

December 23-24

Implementation institutions such as the National Constitutional Amendment Committee and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism begin to meet. There is participation from most stakeholders, but disputes over the representation of political parties and civil society continue, and will plague the initial phases of the implementation process, much as they affected the IGAD mediation.

2015

December 24

In a further abrogation of the agreement, President Kiir issues decrees relieving the 10 state governors and appointing replacements, on the basis of 28, rather than 10 states, further operationalizing the 28 states first announced in October 2015. 4 more states will later be created bringing the total to 32.

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