Kosovo was left at the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war in 1999 in limbo. It is still there, despite Security Council Resolution 1244, which foresaw a process for deciding its status. That process has occurred, but because of a threatened Russian veto, the Security Council failed to approve the plan prepared under the leadership of former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, which provides for Kosovo’s independence under international supervision with extensive protection for its Serb population.

The UN Secretary General invited the Contact Group—France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the U.S.—to pursue further, direct negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade, but with little prospect of movement on either side. Belgrade continues to insist on maintenance of its sovereignty over Kosovo, and Pristina continues to insist on independence. On December 10, the Contact Group will report to the UN Secretary General, who in turn will report to the Security Council (UNSC).

A small group of experts with long Balkans experience met at USIP September 5 to discuss the situation and suggest ways forward. Others (consulted electronically) join in associating their names with this paper. Listed at the end, all believe that Kosovo’s independence must happen without further delay, in order to prevent regional instability.

This USIPeace Briefing does not reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.

No Further Delay or Discussion of Partition

The earliest possible decision on Kosovo status is December 11, followed under the Ahtisaari plan by a 120-day transition period for departure of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and establishment of a new International Civilian Presence (ICP) and Rule of Law mission by the European Union. A decision on Kosovo’s status has already been delayed repeatedly. Elections in Kosovo are overdue by a year, delayed in anticipation of a status decision (they are now scheduled for November 17). UNMIK needs to be replaced. Further delay in determining Kosovo’s status will only increase unrest, heighten tension and uncertainty, strengthen both Albanian and Serbian extremists and guarantee an unsatisfactory outcome.

Moscow has hinted that partition of Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians is a possible compromise. Some European diplomats have said that they could accept partition if Belgrade and Pristina agree to it. Partition is a dangerous and even irresponsible proposal to which Western officials should not lend legitimacy. It would risk sparking violence throughout the region and open up endless negotiations since Pristina’s price for Belgrade’s sovereignty over northern Kosovo would be sovereignty over Albanian-majority areas in southern Serbia—to which Belgrade will not agree.

Partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines is therefore a bad idea that threatens to destabilize the Balkans, in particular Macedonia, and to encourage nationalist rhetoric, especially in Bosnia. The Contact Group—Russia always agreeing—ruled it out from the start of the negotiations. The U.S. and EU should continue to reject partition definitively and forcefully.

The EU and U.S. Must Prepare to Act

The existing Security Council resolution—1244—does not determine Kosovo’s ultimate status but provides for a process that culminates in a political decision on status to be taken in an unspecified way. Nor does 1244 prohibit Kosovo from declaring independence and other states from recognizing its sovereignty. It is preferable but not legally necessary to decide Kosovo’s status in a new UNSC resolution. Such a resolution would provide the EU the basis its member states want for deployment of the ICP.

Russian opposition has thus far precluded that option, but must not be allowed to halt the process. The U.S. and its principal European allies, including all the EU members of the Contact Group, should be ready on December 10 to announce in announce in concert their intention to recognize Kosovo as an independent state at the end of the transition, period subject only to Kosovo’s acceptance of minority guarantees along the lines recommended by President Ahtisaari, if necessary without a new UNSC resolution. The purpose would be to ensure effective international oversight in an independent Kosovo and to minimize the risks of instability.

The preferred way of doing this would be to continue to regard UNSC resolution 1244 as valid. States prepared to recognize Kosovo would decide to proceed with implementation of essential parts of the Ahtisaari plan on the basis that the status process Resolution1244 foresaw has concluded. The UN, NATO and all other international organizations could continue to exercise their functions as laid down in Resolution 1244 in an independent Kosovo, much as they have in an independent Bosnia since 1995.

A less desirable, but possibly necessary, alternative would involve deeming UN Security Council resolution 1244 to have been fulfilled with conclusion of the status process. An ad hoc coalition would agree to recognize Kosovo in exchange for Pristina’s implementation of essential parts of the Ahtisaari plan and would appoint a High Representative to exercise the oversight functions foreseen there. The UN would withdraw.

Under either alternative, NATO would continue to exercise all its functions under its existing mandate.

So far, Moscow has insisted that a Kosovo status decision be taken in the Security Council, while blocking the decision the Americans and Europeans want to take. The more united the U.S. and Europe are, the more likely Russia will choose a more constructive role. While some in Europe have worried about the impact of proceeding without a Security Council resolution on the Russian elections, it is unlikely the Kosovo issue will be decisive, as the pro-Kremlin vote is already strong. Likewise, the impact on U.S./Russian relations is likely to be marginal. The Russians will have to live with any decision the U.S. and Europe take, and the U.S. and Europe will have to live with Moscow’s reaction.

Washington should begin discussing these alternative arrangements for proceeding without a Security Council resolution with its principal allies. Moving ahead expeditiously is preferable to continuing the present situation. It is vital to deploy the ICP and the EU Rule of Law Mission as soon as possible. Such a move could be facilitated with an invitation from the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo. The EU could also use the need to prepare Kosovo for EU accession as a basis for deployment of its mission, as it did in Montenegro.

The sooner it is decided how to proceed, the better, as leaving uncertainty about what will replace UNMIK, and when, is an invitation to troublemaking. Indeed, early deployment of the EU Rule of Law mission to reinforce the already significant EU presence would enhance prospects for Kosovo stability.

Pristina Must Protect Serbs, Belgrade Must Stop Blocking a Decision

Pristina has failed to do all it could to get Serbs back to their homes throughout Kosovo and treat them properly. This has played directly into Belgrade’s hands, as Belgrade prefers that Serbs return only to Serb-majority areas in Kosovo.

Pristina has, however, participated actively in the Ahtisaari negotiations and has accepted his plan. It is vital that the core elements of the Ahtisaari plan protecting the Serb population now be implemented as legal requirements.

Despite the Contact Group’s efforts to rule out partition and to decide Kosovo’s status in a timely manner, Belgrade has sought delay and division of Kosovo’s territory. It is also encouraging Serbs to boycott Kosovo’s elections, in opposition to EU and U.S. policy.

The U.S.-inspired decision to admit Serbia into Partnership for Peace, despite Belgrade’s failure to send Ratko Mladic to The Hague, and the EU’s decision to proceed with negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), despite Belgrade’s uncooperative stance on Kosovo, have weakened the international community’s position and contributed to failure of the status negotiations. While continuing the SAA negotiations, Belgrade has threatened retaliation against countries recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

It is time for the EU and U.S. to decide on the future course of their relations Serbia if Belgrade continues to reject the internationally mandated and supervised Ahtisaari plan, which provides ample protection for Serbs in Kosovo. Belgrade needs to understand the consequences of continuing to jeopardize peace and stability in the Balkans.

Conclusions

It is preferable for the U.S. and EU to act together to bring stability to Kosovo. But waiting longer for a 27-member EU consensus is not a viable option and threatens to unravel the whole final status process. The decision process foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 1244 has been completed. The outcome is the Ahtisaari plan, which needs to be implemented. Neither the Russian veto nor Belgrade’s insistence on delay should be allowed to obstruct the international community’s decision on Kosovo.

December 10 should be the end of the status process, leading directly to a declaration by the U.S. and principal allies of their willingness to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty provided it implements essential parts of the Ahtisaari plan. Washington, and as many European capitals as possible, need to find the foresight to begin planning for this scenario at the ministerial and head of state level in early this fall and the courage to act decisively in December. The USG should begin discussing alternative arrangements with its principal allies, in order to prevent prolonging, and likely deterioration, of the present unsatisfactory situation.

Given the importance of this issue and the potential instability that may occur if the deadlock is not broken, the following associate their names with this paper:

• Morton Abramowitz, Century Foundation
• Janusz Bugajski, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• James Dobbins, RAND
• Marshall Harris, Alston and Bird
• Soren Jessen-Petersen, USIP
• Edward Joseph, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
• James O’Brien, The Albright Group
• John Menzies, Whitehead School, Seton Hall University
• Lawrence Rossin, Save Darfur Coalition
• Louis Sell, University of Maine at Farmington
• Daniel Serwer, USIP
• Paul Williams, Public International Law and Policy Group