On November 23, 1998, former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.) spoke to a public gathering at an Institute Current Issues Briefing, and discussed the challenge of the Iraqi leadership and its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) activities to U.S. foreign policy.

General Scowcroft reviewed existing U.S. policy and goals, which include both UN economic sanctions and support for United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Both efforts work toward the single, overarching goal of preventing Iraq from becoming a threat to stability in the Gulf by developing WMD and delivery vehicles. The objective is to prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his general military forces and rebuilding weapons of mass destruction. Although Saddam's current efforts to eliminate economic sanctions while retaining Iraq's current and intended stockpiles of WMD are incompatible within UN mandate/Gulf War agreements, Scowcroft noted, the Iraqi leader has been "more nimble than [the U.S.]. Our problem is that as Americans... we're not patient. We like things tied up, and a nagging problem proves very difficult to deal with in a thoughtful way."

In his remarks, Scowcroft spoke about the shortcomings of relying exclusively either on force or diplomacy in dealing with Saddam's challenge. "One of the things we need to learn to do better—not just in Iraq—is to blend diplomacy and force," noting in particular the difficulty of using force to compel a change in behavior. Scowcroft referenced the period earlier this year when the administration chose the diplomatic rather than military course of action by engaging UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the crisis. The result, argued Scowcroft, was that "instead of [a] major problem [for the U.S.], it became a UN problem." Ironically, the unraveling of Annan's February 1998 deal with Saddam Hussein in August seemed to improve the cohesiveness of international efforts to contain Saddam, he suggested. "A deal made between Annan and Saddam which didn't last may have been useful because it became apparent to all, and even those who had disagreed with the U.S. role, that Saddam was the villain and that he had violated an explicit agreement with the UN. This assisted the coalition in getting back together last summer."

General Scowcroft

Scowcroft critiqued the most recent U.S. confrontation with Saddam. In his view, Saddam's refusal to allow UNSCOM inspectors to stay in Iraq gave the U.S. a strong rationale for responding militarily. "Saddam Hussein did something which I think was particularly foolish; he not only forbade the search for suspect sites, but ended the monitoring of already identified suspect sites... Suddenly he gave the use of force new justifiability. Instead of force to bomb Saddam back into agreement, we could use it to make him do what he [prevented UNSCOM] from doing with cameras and other monitoring devices. We insisted on being able to monitor identified sites so that he couldn't rebuild his weapons of mass destruction. If [UNSCOM] couldn't monitor them, then we could take them [the weapons] out." On the sensitive issue whether the Clinton Administration was correct in pulling back from a U.S. military strike following Saddam's decision to let the inspectors back in, Scowcroft supported the administration's withdrawal. "Given the circumstances, the U.S. administration was correct in not using force, but making clear that force would be used if UNSCOM were not allowed in."

An audience member poses a question to General Scowcroft.

Where Scowcroft took issue with the administration's current stance was on the question of what it will take for the U.S. to now respond to Iraqi misbehavior. "The U.S. has indicated its willingness to act if Saddam violated the agreement, but left unclear what would constitute a violation. What would he have to do to violate the agreement? What is a triggering event? This is difficult to decide. For example, what if he refuses to turn over documents? Refuses an inspection at one site? Delays for 24 or 48 hours? He could do a lot of damage without ever having done something we all could agree was a violation serious enough to justify use of force."

Lastly, on the question of removing Saddam, Scowcroft agreed it should be a goal but then laid out the problems: "In many respects, Iraq is an artificial country. Kurds, Sunni and Shiite Muslims are all in an uneasy unity, and a good part of the opposition are either Kurds or Shiites... Are their frictions inside? Yes. Is the Tikriti clan hated by many of the other clans? You bet. Don't count too much on an opposition force raised outside the country or under protection inside the country." One of the problems with the Shiite and Kurdish revolts in 1991 was that they helped Saddam rally to his defense the Sunni-led army; otherwise he was not likely to survive such opposition. "I think we ought to look hard, if we still can, at covert action, but it's a long shot. Internal sources of discontent that are most likely to end up getting rid of Saddam are inside the Sunni clans. If we're not careful, we could solidify support for him as a result of efforts to remove him."

General Scowcroft is interviewed by media after the event.

Scowcroft concluded by reflecting both on Arab perceptions of U.S. policy and on the importance of keeping the international coalition at the UN together. He acknowledged that in the region there is a perception of a "double standard" in how the U.S. acts, which causes uneasiness. "So keeping the coalition acquiescent, if you will, is a big problem. But if we play our cards right, it is not out of the question—as it appeared to be a year ago."

Speakers

• Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.)
  Founder and president of The Forum for International Policy, and president of The Scowcroft Group, Inc., an international consulting firm. Scowcroft has assisted four U.S. presidents with national security affairs, held various positions in the Department of Defense, was on the faculty at West Point and at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and has chaired or served on numerous policy advisory councils, including those associated with arms control, defense management, and the Iran-Contra affair.

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