KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
By: Haroro Ingram, Country Director, Philippines, USIP
For decades, the struggle for peace in the Philippines’ southernmost island of Mindanao has been characterized by armed conflict between the Philippines government and Moro separatist groups, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and cycles of failed peace processes. The historic 2014 peace agreement between the Philippines government and MILF led to the granting of greater self-governance with the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) five years later. What has followed since is an unprecedented, yet very fragile, period of peace and stability.
This year promises to be the most consequential in the pursuit of a sustainable peace since the BARMM was established in 2019. As the Philippines government and the MILF forge ahead with the endgame of a complicated and delicate peace process, two elections present perhaps the greatest tests of the resilience of peace gains and the viability of democracy in the region. Local and national elections held in May were seen as a barometer for the Bangsamoro’s inaugural parliamentary elections scheduled for October 13.
In the months leading to the midterm polls, an unprecedented wave of violence swept across the region. While this trend did not augur well for a peaceful election day, there were ultimately no cease-fire breakdowns and no election failures. Both government and MILF officials credited an innovative Joint Quick Response Team (JQRT) initiative — which integrates former MILF combatants into mechanisms responsible for upholding cease-fire agreements in the region’s most troubled “hot spot” municipalities — as playing a decisive role in this result.
The U.S. Institute of Peace has spent years working on the ground with local partners in conflict-impacted communities of the Bangsamoro to strengthen the government’s relations with the MILF. These highly localized peacebuilding activities then formed the foundation for the establishment of JQRTs ahead of the 2023 local elections and again for the midterms in May 2025. However, the JQRTs will face their toughest test when the Bangsamoro votes for its first democratically elected government in October.
Even for a region accustomed to election violence, the months leading to the May 2025 midterms were unprecedented in the scope and severity of conflict across the Bangsamoro. The confluence of deeply entrenched and contested local political dynasties, clan conflicts, shifting political dynamics and an already volatile security environment created a tinderbox for election-related violence.
In 2023, local elections for Barangay (the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines) officials and Barangay youth council officials (known as Sangguniang Kabataan, or SK) in the Bangsamoro set new records for election-related violence. The Climate Conflict Action Asia (CCAA) reported 438 incidents and 165 dead during the 2023 Barangay and SK elections. These figures were eclipsed during the recent election. Between October 2024 and election day in May, the CCAA recorded 719 incidents and 242 deaths due to election-related violence.
While the exact numbers may be disputed, few would dispute that election-related violence was worse and especially bad in the restive areas of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Sur provinces. Ambushes on Philippines army personnel in Basilan in December 2024 and January 2025 contributed to these intensifying tensions. Further fueling volatility in the region was shifting political dynamics that saw, for example, the Bangsamoro’s chief minister replaced and new ministers installed in the transition authority mere months before the polls.
The Philippines Commission on Elections identified over 30 hot-spot municipalities, the vast majority of which were in the Bangsamoro region. Given all this volatility, many peace process stakeholders believed that cease-fire breakdowns and election failures were inevitable during the May 2025 elections and would set up a horror scenario for the Bangsamoro’s first parliamentary elections in October.
To significantly reduce the risk of cease-fire breakdowns and election failures, the Philippine government and MILF partners identified the establishment and deployment of JQRTs as an essential component of a holistic election security strategy. The unique JQRT program had already set a precedent for success against the odds when it was first deployed during the 2023 elections. At that time, too, election-related violent incidents had spiked and there were deep concerns about peace and cease-fire agreements holding.
Ultimately, the JQRTs were credited by the government and MILF senior officials for playing a significant role in there being no cease-fire breakdowns or election failures across the Bangsamoro. During a post-election lessons learned workshop in December 2023, the JQRTs were assessed by the Philippines and Bangsamoro governments and MILF officials as an essential component for future election security planning, especially during the autonomous region’s first parliamentary elections.
Given the volatile security environment, the complexity of the region, and the ongoing implementation of the Philippines government-MILF peace agreement, there was broad recognition that MILF members drawn from local communities had to play a role in the 2025 midterms. Of course, that role needed to complement the broader multi-agency architecture for election-violence prevention that fused both Philippines and Bangsamoro governments’ efforts.
The unique structure of the JQRTs saw unarmed local MILF members working with army and police personnel to monitor and prevent cease-fire breakdowns and election failures during the polls. Deployed in the most concerning hot-spot municipalities, the MILF members had an important role as navigators of highly localized dynamics, bridges between the security sector and communities, mediators to de-escalate tensions and first responders where tensions threatened to boil over. That the JQRT’s MILF members volunteered in the most challenging conditions is a testimony to the perceived importance of this initiative for upholding a fragile peace and enabling elections.
For months prior to the May 2025 polls, Philippines government and MILF partners worked in the background to coordinate and re-activate JQRTs across the Bangsamoro region. As it had done two years earlier, the U.S. Institute of Peace alongside its local implementing partner, the SCCB Project, worked closely with the Philippines government and MILF personnel to support these initiatives. The JQRTs would eventually be formalized in jointly agreed upon guidelines on cease-fire-related functions for the May 2025 elections. It is important to highlight that the JQRT’s role was multifaceted yet constrained by strict operating procedures and a primary focus on preventing actions that would constitute or lead to cease-fire breakdowns.
The JQRTs were again considered a success by Philippines and Bangsamoro governments and MILF officials. A series of intensive post-election lessons learned workshops were held this month in which senior officials alongside JQRT members met to dig into their performance and begin preparations for the historic October polls. The picture that emerged from these assessments was how the JQRTs proactively worked to ensure tensions in hotspot areas would not escalate while playing key roles as communicators and mediators between the security sector and local leaders and communities. A consistent theme during the workshops was how JQRTs were able to communicate in the vernacular, mediate in culturally nuanced ways and personally reach out to key personalities in local dynamics to stifle potential problems early.
Whether the Philippines can emerge as a capable contributor to its alliance with the U.S. and its own defense will depend on whether it can finally achieve sustainable peace in its restive south.
Another important lesson to be drawn from these experiences was the importance of maintaining the JQRT focus on preventing cease-fire breakdowns and avoiding the temptation to broaden their role. This narrow focus has the added benefit of managing expectations around JQRT function and efficacy. It also requires the development of standardized operating procedures and more comprehensive orientation procedures to ensure all JQRT members are fully aware of the scope of their roles during elections.
What was also acknowledged by Philippines government and MILF partners is how the successes of the JQRT program were built on years of grass-roots efforts to strengthen Philippines government-MILF relations in the Bangsamoro’s most restive areas. A variety of confidence-building, deconfliction, mediation and community-outreach activities have underpinned this ongoing work. For example, the Kambollayoka peace basketball program has brought together MILF, army and police personnel to play exhibition games in mixed teams to strengthen relationships, build trust and confidence with local communities, and act as forums for deconfliction and mediation. Sustaining such activities as the foundation for the re-deployment of JQRTs for the October elections will be vital.
The Philippines is a critical ally and partner for the United States in the Indo-Pacific. For over a decade, it has faced relentless pressure from China especially in the waters of the West Philippine Sea. There is no questioning Filipino motivation and intent as the archipelagic nation embarks on an audacious re-posturing and military modernization effort for its territorial defense. Whether the Philippines can emerge as a capable contributor to the alliance and its own defense will depend on whether it can finally achieve sustainable peace in its restive south. These are the stakes currently at play and the region’s trajectory hinges on the peaceful conduct of the Bangsamoro’s first elections in October 2025.
There is a significant risk that election violence may derail the peace process. Faced with this harsh reality and with limited resources to deploy, the question facing officials is how best to manage these risks. Priority needs to be given to preventing violence that constitutes a breakdown of peace and cease-fire agreements. This is where, once again, the JQRTs will need to play their vital role during the October polls.