Rethinking U.S. Engagement with U.N. in the Context of Ukraine: Part Two

Editor’s Note: Read part one of this series on renewing U.S. engagement in multilateral institutions.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is a salient reminder of the world’s vulnerabilities to the potential cataclysmic impact of modern warfare. Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest, is one of the underlying reasons why its actions in Ukraine have gone unchecked directly by NATO forces. Amid these threats, rules-based international institutions such as the United Nations have long been crucial to peaceful conflict prevention and resolution — but their effectiveness has been hampered in recent years by the United States’ withering commitment to multilateralism.

President Biden departs after addressing the 76th Session of the U.N. General Assembly at the U.N. headquarters in New York. September 21, 2021. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)
President Biden departs after addressing the 76th Session of the U.N. General Assembly at the U.N. headquarters in New York. September 21, 2021. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Should Drive the U.S. to Reinvest in U.N. System 

In this context, the U.N.’s main organ of hard power, the Security Council, is left powerless with Russia’s guaranteed veto as a permanent member. For cynics, this adds to the argument that the U.N. is toothless and obsolete. But rather, it should be a reason to deepen engagement and work to adapt the U.N. — the best mechanism for global security that humankind has ever known — to reflect the world as it is in 2022 rather than 1945.

As mentioned in part one, the Biden administration has been reengaging with the U.N. system following several rapid withdrawals in recent years. Much of the work of the Biden administration started straight away, including rejoining the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Paris Climate Agreement, expanding support for COVAX and rejoining the World Health Organization, as well as committing to a national budget with fully assessed dues and the partial repayment of U.N. peacekeeping arrears

Using the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a catalyst, there might now be an opportunity to pivot from being “back at the table” to a more proactive strategy of multilateral renewal and strengthening. Despite the prospect of continued gridlock in the Security Council, renewed U.S. leadership now could significantly increase the effectiveness of the U.N. system to meaningfully address the world’s most pressing peace and security challenges. Below are some recommendations that might support that approach:

Rebuild Case for U.S. Leadership in the U.N. System

Using America’s largely unified position on Ukraine, we should rebuild the case for U.S. leadership in the U.N. system. American leadership in the international system is considerably stronger when we stand united, and the Ukraine crisis puts into stark focus the consequences of letting the international system atrophy. Some of the pillars of the argument should include: 

  • Great power competition: It is easily forgotten that the post-World War II international order was modeled on U.S. values and rights, enshrined in the U.N. Charter and brought about one of the most prosperous periods of human history. Those values are now under threat by Russia, China and other rising authoritarian powers who seek to reshape the international system — including the U.N. — in their image. It is critical that the United States holds the line within the U.N. system and continues to build a broad coalition of states to defend and advance these values against a growing authoritarian onslaught. 
  • Conflict Management: While U.N. peacekeepers are often in the news for their challenges, evidence of their effectiveness is clear and compelling: Peacekeeping works and is a remarkably sound investment for U.S. taxpayers relative to direct U.S. or allied military engagement in conflicts around the globe. And peacekeeping is not the only mechanism at the U.N.’s disposal to mitigate and contain a conflict. U.N. political and specialized agencies are often on the front lines of responses to conflicts, as they are in Ukraine. 
  • Global burden-sharing: Though imperfect, the U.N.’s system for assessing dues helps spread the cost across all member states based on their relative economic size. This global burden-sharing is unique in history and underappreciated domestically. While the United States continues to shoulder the burden of the largest percentage of U.N. dues, it is a relatively low percentage (less than one-third) and is a mere pittance in comparison to the cost of direct U.S. or allied military engagement. The U.N. system remains the best, and indeed only, mechanism to ensure that the international community — U.S. allies and adversaries alike — share the burden of maintaining global peace and security. 

Pursue U.N. Security Council Reform

Next, the United States should lead an international coalition to consider options for Security Council reform. Russia’s ability to veto any meaningful Security Council action has renewed longstanding calls to reconsider the conditions of the Security Council, including the body’s membership and under what conditions permanent members can (or should) be able to use their veto power. 

Security Council reform has historically been the third rail of international politics, with the status quo winning out. But Russia’s flagrant war of aggression in Ukraine has laid bare just how starkly the current power imbalances at the U.N. are at odds with 2022 geopolitical and normative realities. And while those imbalances have long hampered the Security Council’s effectiveness, the current situation may threaten to break it entirely.  

That’s why we should put serious ideas for reform back on the table. The issues plaguing the Security Council are not due to innate flaws, as some critics might contend, but rather with a reticence to incorporate how international power dynamics have shifted over the body’s lifespan. 

The Ukraine crisis offers a chance for us to update the Security Council in a way that rectifies these imbalances and generates collective goodwill among member states. In particular, the United States could demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism by considering options for substantive changes in membership, including by adding more permanent members from the “Global South,” particularly leading states from Africa and Latin America, who continue to demand a greater voice in international decision-making. 

The United States could also seek to adjust the conditions under which permanent members can exercise their veto, including by strengthening the conditions when belligerent states must recuse themselves from Security Council decisions and considering stronger measures to prevent the use of the veto in situations credibly determined to involve mass atrocities or crimes against humanity. While this would entail reforming the United States’ veto power as well, such a concession could be used to signal the seriousness of our efforts to reinvigorate the U.N. system. 

Given the vagaries of the existing U.N. Charter, any reform effort is likely to stall — amendments to the U.N. Charter require a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly, and ratification by two-thirds of all member states, including all permanent members of the Security Council. However, this moment is an opportunity to show good faith and signal a shift in the exercise of American power. 

Strengthen Other U.N. Mechanisms for Peace and Security 

In the absence of substantive reform, stasis could be the norm in the Security Council for the foreseeable future. In that case, it’s possible to work around the Security Council to meaningfully address salient peace and security challenges. While the United States should not stop making every effort to influence Security Council deliberations on critical peace and security issues — including Syria, Myanmar and Ethiopia — it should aim to strengthen mechanisms of multilateral conflict prevention and resolution that don’t require Security Council unanimity. The recent U.S.-U.N. Re-Engagement Roundtable series offered some recommendations for accomplishing this, including increasing funding for the U.N. Peacebuilding Fund, special political missions and resident coordinator work in fragile states.

Build a Stronger System of International Accountability

The United States should also strengthen the international legal architecture to deter future crimes of aggression. With some calling for the need to prosecute Putin as a war criminal, the International Criminal Court has rarely had a moment of such strong support. To be sure, accountability for Russia’s war in Ukraine will be critical not only to the terms of an eventual peace settlement there, but also to deter future crimes of aggression. The United States has always had a complicated relationship with the ICC, and while ratification of the Rome Statute is likely a non-starter domestically, there are a number of steps that the United States can take to strengthen the court and the growing network of accountability mechanisms in Ukraine: 

  • Take a forward-leaning approach to intelligence declassification and sharing with international prosecutors and fact-finding commissions and ask our “Five Eyes” partners to do the same.
  • Support grassroots efforts to collect open-source data as evidence of international crimes.
  • Augment the capacity of international proceedings and investigations. This would involve possibly seconding Department of Justice or other Federal justice staff to various international criminal courts (not necessarily the ICC) — similar to the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials after WWII, where U.S. officials served as judges and defense council, respectively.
  • Increase credibility through continuing sound congressional and military investigations into alleged U.S. violations of international law (e.g., illegal detention and torture), limiting any room for the International Criminal Court’s complementarity jurisdiction.  

Andrew Cheatham and a senior expert in the Executive Office where he advises on issues programs, policies and field operations.


PHOTO: President Biden departs after addressing the 76th Session of the U.N. General Assembly at the U.N. headquarters in New York. September 21, 2021. (Doug Mills/The New York Times)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis