During the year of “transition” in Afghanistan in 2014, attention was focused on whether or not the government would survive. The greatest threat was not Taliban violence but a possible breakdown of the elite consensus during the election and a return to civil war. The transition, however, has also forced the Taliban to react to new facts on the ground.

A Taliban spokesman said they would not give up the south (Nov. 21, 2001). Much has changed in Afghanistan since then, but there are still some areas of the country that value the Taliban way of life and moral code of conduct. NYT/Ruth Fremson
A Taliban spokesman said they would not give up the south (Nov. 21, 2001). Much has changed in Afghanistan since then, but there are still some areas of the country that value the Taliban way of life and moral code of conduct. NYT/Ruth Fremson

With developments in the past year, the militant group is forced to confront a mobilized electorate, a withdrawing international community and a new government. Three new USIP research papers by Michael Semple, Antonio Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, and Sean Kane, shed light on Taliban reactions to the transition.

“The Taliban may have entered a path that takes them closer to Afghan mainstream politics.”

Publicly, Taliban spokesmen continue to denounce the new national unity government and vow continued attacks against the Afghan state. Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians reached record levels in 2014, and show no immediate signs of waning. At the same time, Afghanistan’s conflict landscape is changing, with most international security forces withdrawing and the new government showing some signs of interest in renewing talks about peace talks.

Semple’s study focuses on how the Taliban justify their use of violence against the Afghan state. He notes that Taliban messaging repeatedly emphasizes the unifying leadership role of ‘amir,’ or supreme commander, Mullah Mohammad Omar.

Beyond this centralizing figurehead, Semple describes the Taliban leadership as cohesive but narrow. Top insurgent commanders form a close network through social ties developed through shared religious education or prison detention, as well as their fight for power in the 1990s.

These ties have afforded the Taliban a longevity and cohesion that is rare in the Afghan political context (although other accounts suggest that this cohesion has been strained by years of conflict). At the same time, the insularity has made it more difficult for the group’s leaders to recruit beyond their primary social base.

“Because their social base is so narrow, the Taliban’s attempts to regain power rest on a negation of pluralism, rejection of the idea of a popular mandate and assertion of the divine right vested in their Islamic emirate,” Semple writes. That limits the prospects for participation in the modern Afghan political system unless substantial shifts first occur within the Taliban movement.

Despite their apparent rejection of pluralistic politics, Taliban representatives have, in recent years, held tentative discussions with representatives of the international community and the Afghan government. Any real negotiation, however, will ultimately engender a significant debate over the basic structure of the Afghan government, which is the focus of Kane’s study.

Kane draws on cases from the Philippines, Myanmar/Burma and Colombia to show how other state-insurgency conflicts have attempted to resolve disputes over their respective constitutional frameworks in the course of a peace settlement. He analyzes the implications of a constitutional renegotiation in the Afghan context, noting major points of disagreement on the part of the Taliban.

“In the best case, the Afghan government could proactively use talks with the Taliban [over the constitution] to seize the political high ground by putting the armed movement in the position of having to justify some of its more out-of-date and unpopular positions on constitutional issues to other Afghans,” Kane argues The very act of engaging in a negotiations process, he suggests, might force the insurgency to reassess its refusal so far to engage in multi-party politics.

Giustozzi and Mangal suggest that the Taliban might have already begun such an engagement during the election. In a somewhat different analysis from Semple, they find evidence of a fractured movement, with apparent divisions in the run-up to the first round of the 2014 presidential election that deepened between by the second round. Splits emerged between various networks over whether to use violence to suppress participation in the election or instead engage strategically to prevent the election of candidates who were strongly opposed to the Taliban, the authors write.

Some Taliban commanders demonstrated greater pragmatism, balancing their use of violence with local-level acquiescence to the elections, and at some points actually encouraging residents to vote.

“The Taliban may have entered a path that takes them closer to Afghan mainstream politics, which for the most part is not derived from liberal and democratic principles but is instead a matter of strongmen, manipulation and corrupt patronage networks,”  Giustozzi and Mangal write.

These reports collectively suggest that the Taliban have been participants of a sort in the Afghan political system, but only informally to date, and largely through violent means. The ability and willingness of the insurgency to shift its participation to non-violent, pluralistic political competition remain untested and uncertain at this stage.

But the prospect of Taliban engagement with and acceptance of the formal Afghan political system will have major implications for Afghanistan’s future, and should remain a continued focus of study and effort in the coming years.

Colin Cookman is a senior program specialist in USIP’s Center for South and Central Asia.

Related Publications

The Challenges Facing Afghans with Disabilities

The Challenges Facing Afghans with Disabilities

Thursday, February 29, 2024

By: Belquis Ahmadi

In Afghanistan, obtaining accurate data on the number of persons with disabilities — including gender-disaggregated information — has always been a challenging endeavor. But based on the data we do have, it’s clear that more than four decades of violent conflict have left a considerable portion of the Afghan population grappling with various forms of disabilities, both war-related and otherwise. And the pervasive lack of protective mechanisms, social awareness and empathy surrounding disability continue to pose formidable challenges for individuals with disabilities, with women being disproportionately affected.

Type: Analysis

GenderHuman Rights

What to Expect from the Doha Conference on Afghanistan

What to Expect from the Doha Conference on Afghanistan

Thursday, February 15, 2024

By: Kate Bateman;  Andrew Watkins

On February 18-19, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will convene a meeting on Afghanistan in Doha to discuss the ongoing humanitarian and human rights crises and the recent report on a way forward by U.N. Special Coordinator for Afghanistan Feridun Sinirlioğlu. Special envoys from U.N. member states and international organizations will attend; representatives from Afghan civil society, women’s groups and Taliban officials have also been invited. The conference is a critical, high-level opportunity for donors and the region to chart next steps on how to improve the situation in Afghanistan and engage with the Taliban regime.

Type: Question and Answer

Global Policy

The Latest @ USIP: U.N. Engagement in Afghanistan

The Latest @ USIP: U.N. Engagement in Afghanistan

Wednesday, December 20, 2023

By: Kanni Wignaraja

While some parts of the Afghan economy managed to stabilize in 2023, poverty continued to increase and now stands at 69 percent of the population. Kanni Wignaraja, director for Asia and the Pacific at the U.N. Development Programme, discusses UNDP’s efforts to build resilience in local markets and promote women-owned enterprises in Afghanistan; explores ways to navigate relations with the Taliban; and examines how the decline in international aid is affecting humanitarian efforts in the country.

Type: Blog

EconomicsHuman Rights

How the Taliban Enables Violence Against Women

How the Taliban Enables Violence Against Women

Thursday, December 7, 2023

By: Belquis Ahmadi

In just 28 months, the Taliban have dismantled Afghan women’s and girls’ rights — imposing draconian restrictions regarding their education, employment and freedom of movement. Any perceived violation of these oppressive policies is often met with harassment, intimidation, and verbal and physical abuse orchestrated by the Taliban’s Ministry of Vice and Virtue. And when women are detained by authorities, they have been subjected to cruel treatment, including torture.

Type: Analysis

GenderConflict Analysis & Prevention

View All Publications