The editors answer questions about their new book, Getting It Right in Afghanistan. As the United States and NATO prepare to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, the editors and contributors to this volume consider the possibilities for peace between the Afghanistan government and the Taliban.

The introduction stresses the importance of using existing knowledge to improve the prospects of the end game in Afghanistan. Despite the body of analysis that USIP and many others have produced, policy still seems stuck and the Afghan problem intractable. What does this book offer policymakers?

With this book, we wanted to show that there was a great deal of thinking about a negotiated settlement long before it became an acceptable policy option, much of it sponsored by or conducted by USIP and representing some of USIP’s earliest work on the region. Many of the writers in this volume shaped or influenced recent policy—Barnett Rubin, an advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Ambassador Marc Grossman after him, and Masoom Stanekzai, CEO of the Joint Secretariat and High Peace Council of Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme. Regardless of the results of their efforts, their thinking about the problem was no doubt helpful.

There is always a lag between the germination of a policy idea and its implementation. In Afghanistan, the problem has been compounded by the steep learning curve that policymakers faced, by the complexity of and rapidly changing nature of the conflict, and by the predominant reliance on a military approach—at the expense of alternative strategies—in international policymaking processes up until recently. The point of this book is to remind policymakers of options available and hard-learned lessons as well as to urge them to not approach the problem as a blank slate. While the events in Afghanistan continue to evolve, we feel that some of the problems are timeless.

Virtually all of the authors make the case for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. How likely is a negotiated settlement now that international troops are withdrawing and the Taliban believes they may win the war?

Several essays in the book describe the complex structure of the Taliban, making the point that it is not monolithic. Recent Afghan efforts to engage the Taliban in talks demonstrate that there is a faction willing to pursue a negotiated solution. It is, of course, impossible to say whether negotiating is a tactical concession that is part of a strategy based on war-fighting, a rival policy to fighting, or a concerted attempt to see if anything can be gained. None of the efforts has progressed far enough to make a determination. The Taliban might be having parallel considerations about the United States and other international actors.

Further, while many Afghans are now uncertain of the future of the current political order after the withdrawal of international forces, many—including the Taliban—are also very conscious of the damage suffered by the country during the last civil war period. This vivid awareness of the costs of persistent conflict may help spur negotiations among Afghan actors as they seek accommodations with each other in the post-2014 political order.

A portion of the book deals with the unresolved issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the need for Pakistan to play a role in Afghanistan’s future stability. Given changes in Pakistan’s government in recent years, what dynamics remain problematic?

The roots of distrust between the two countries are as old as Pakistan itself. Pakistan, in some sense, was born outflanked. Despite gaining nuclear weapons, it has never fully gained a sense of security. While it does not fear Afghanistan itself, it does fear an Afghanistan strong enough to be used as the instrument of India or another rival power. Some of this distrust toward Afghanistan arose because Afghanistan has produced governments that have used their minimal leverage against Pakistan, both symbolically, by voting against its membership in the U.N. in 1948, and concretely, by maintaining territorial claims against it.

What has changed, particularly in the last several years, is that instability in Afghanistan has become a threat to Pakistan. Previously, an unstable Afghanistan gave Pakistan the geopolitical advantage of denying India influence on its western flank. Now instability threatens Pakistan more than it reassures it—a concern that has particularly heightened in the last two to three years, as the international community’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has become more pronounced. This view of Afghanistan, suggested by Yusuf, Yusuf, and Zaidi, has essentially become the consensus view among Pakistani political elites, both military and civilian.

Other chapters in the book describe these geopolitical equations but also look very specifically at the border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These examinations, by Weinbaum and by Rubin and Siddique, show that even if Pakistan wanted to decisively reign in the militants on its side of the border, its options are in fact limited by a geo-history that has always kept these areas beyond the reach of states, no matter how lines are drawn on the map.

What role can the United States play in promoting a negotiated solution, assuming that is what it really wants?

As we describe in our introduction, this is one of the most frustrating parts of this puzzle. Even if we agree on who the parties to the negotiation are, each party has a different idea of who takes on what role as interlocutors or mediators. For example, the United States sees itself as trying to “help Afghans talk to Afghans” by mediating a dialogue between the Karzai government and the Taliban. The Taliban does not accept the legitimacy of the Afghan government and considers the withdrawal of international troops as its main demand and, therefore, would prefer to talk to the United States directly. Some see Pakistan as party to the negotiation, while others see them as a facilitator who can perhaps bring the Taliban to the table, and still others, like India, don’t necessarily want Pakistan involved. Within Afghanistan itself, many groups that have suffered at the hands of the Taliban don’t want to see them return to power. Although Afghans feel that they have a stake in the discussion as Afghans, they also feel they’ve been left out. The Doha process, which came close to bringing the Taliban and the Afghan government together in June 2013, had nearly found a way of cutting through this Gordian knot. Unfortunately, its quick collapse showed again how difficult it is to fit these moving parts together. Determining which role each party might play is an essential part of reaching a successful negotiated settlement.

Is there reason to be optimistic about Afghanistan’s future?

There is an election coming up in Afghanistan in 2014. While not the focus of the book, the election will have a focusing effect. An election that is more or less successful will bring in a new government in Kabul because Karzai can’t run for a third term. In many ways, this could be a face-saving device for all parties that could allow a negotiation to move forward. The Taliban could negotiate with the government because it would no longer be led by a figure that they consider a puppet. By participating in the election, the Afghan people would be able to demonstrate that they accept the current constitution as a basis for political order, which would force the Taliban to accept that they do not represent all Afghans. The withdrawal of international combat troops, scheduled for the end of 2014, would remove a major Taliban grievance and perhaps force them to articulate a more positive political agenda than they have so far. And Pakistan’s ongoing concerns about its own stability might push it to use whatever influence it has over the Taliban to enter into a serious political discussion.

Paradoxically, for all this to happen, the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan would have to remain strong. The United States will have to continue to support the Afghan government and security forces to dissuade those within the Taliban who believe a military victory is possible. It will need to clarify its relationship within the region so that Pakistan doesn’t feel threatened by Afghanistan or India and can give up the militant weapon in exchange for credible guarantees. The United States will also need to clarify to other nervous countries in the region that the objective of any future presence in Afghanistan is to ensure a stability that will eventually benefit the region. The complexities that we have tried to explain in this book demonstrate that this will not be easy to achieve, but it would be much harder if we were navigating in the dark.