United States Institute of Peace

2024: Escalating Conflict and Chinese Intervention

Having gained steady momentum over the past two years, the resistance reached a turning point in 2024, posing an existential threat to the regime. Alarmed by this shift, China intervened more actively to prevent the junta’s collapse and contain the conflict.

Operation 1027, launched by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) on China’s border in late 2023, peaked in 2024, transforming the conflict’s trajectory. Its impact is evident in four key areas:

1. Nationwide Escalation: Although Operation 1027 originated in northern Shan State, it triggered major offensives in Sagaing, Rakhine, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine regions, creating simultaneous fronts that overwhelmed the Myanmar military’s capacity to respond effectively. This widespread escalation fractured the military’s command and logistical networks, highlighting its inability to maintain control over its borders. The military’s severely weakened position gave resistance forces a significant morale boost and increased their confidence in their capacity not only to wage conventional warfare against the military, but also to seize towns and cities.
2. Evolving EAO Dominance: The operation facilitated a dramatic shift in the balance of power, with EAOs capitalizing on the Myanmar military’s vulnerabilities to expand their territorial control. By the end of 2024, EAOs such as the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) had significantly strengthened their positions. The AA consolidated control over approximately 88% of Rakhine State, capturing the Western Regional Command and three military operational commands. Similarly, the KIA overran more than 200 military bases and secured 14 towns in Kachin State. Almost all of northern Shan State is now under the control of the TNLA, MNDAA or UWSA. These groups have fortified their military positions, creating bases from which resistance can launch operations in nearby areas, and consolidated local governance structures.
3. Resistance Cooperation: Operation 1027 was a catalyst for unprecedented cooperation between EAOs and newly formed resistance groups, including the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). By the end of 2024, the most powerful EAOs — except the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and two Shan rebel groups — had aligned in their fight against the military. Huge numbers of PDFs, many aligned with the National Unity Government, were deployed to support EAOs in their efforts to expel junta forces from their territory. In exchange, PDFs have gained much-needed training, equipment and battlefield experience. This may also pay dividends as EAO bases will serve as jumping off points for PDF operations into central Myanmar and will create a buffer zone for EAOs from junta counteroffensives.
4. Myanmar Military Setbacks:  The combined impact of Operation 1027 and subsequent offensives have delivered the military’s worst losses in its history. The capture of Lashio, which was the home of the strategically vital Northeastern Regional Command, and Ann, the home of the Western Regional Command, epitomized the regime’s struggles. The military has also been devastated by personnel attrition, with losses reaching unprecedented levels after the coup, including a historic surge in defections. The loss of high-ranking officers and several key commands crippled the military’s ability to coordinate operations. A severe erosion of morale among troops has been compounded by the military’s lack of public support.

Despite the intensity of the conflict, Myanmar’s crisis remains a strategic blind spot for other influential regional players such as India, creating an opportunity for China to exploit the situation to its advantage. Jolted by the fall of Lashio, China moved from hedging its bets to open support for the junta in mid-2024, viewing the military as crucial to holding the country together and advancing its regional ambitions. Its shifting position and audacious proposal to establish a state-sponsored security presence in Myanmar, has generated widespread public resentment, threatening China’s long-term interests in Myanmar.

The Current Setting and Key Trends

China’s gambit to support the military temporarily slowed the resistance’s momentum but failed to reverse the current trend of humiliating military losses. Demonstrating enhanced leverage that has resulted from major military gains, EAOs have shown increasing ability to manage China’s demand to halt their offensives against the junta. In response, Beijing has introduced a new lead interlocutor and reverted to more low-profile pressure tactics focused on areas critical to Chinese investment. In December 2024, the Myanmar military suffered significant setbacks, not only in Rakhine with the loss of the Western Regional Command, a Military Operation Command, 21 battalions, and five towns, but also in Kachin State on China’s border with the loss of the military border guard force and a string of towns. Military losses in Rakhine complicate China’s access to its strategic port in Kyaukphyu and in Kachin, threatening China’s access to heavy rare earth minerals and other valuable resources.

With new strongholds in EAO-controlled areas serving as springboards for deeper incursions into central Myanmar, the new resistance groups, many of whom operate under the joint command of the NUG and EAOs, are advancing into Myanmar’s heartland from multiple directions. In the north, forces from Kachin are pushing into Sagaing with support from the KIA; from northern Shan State, resistance forces are penetrating into Mandalay with backing from the TNLA and MNDAA; from Karen State, forces are moving into Pegu and Yangon with support from the Karen National Union (KNU); from Rakhine State, forces are penetrating Magway and Ayeyarwady with help from the AA; and from Karenni State, resistance forces are advancing toward Naypyitaw.

The movement nonetheless still faces significant challenges and constraints. Chief among these is the ability to sustain cooperation and secure continued backing from the EAOs without whose consistent coordination and support newly formed resistance groups will face considerable difficulty penetrating into Myanmar’s heartland. Moreover, critical vulnerabilities such as insufficient weapon supplies and a still loosely coordinated chain of command persist among PDFs. Despite these challenges, the groups appear poised to make steady advances into urban areas and Myanmar’s heartland.

Four Things to Watch in 2025

2024 positioned the resistance movement to achieve a critical peak in 2025. Against this backdrop, four key developments warrant close observation.

1. The conflict is likely to escalate in urban areas and central Myanmar, particularly in Mandalay, Yangon, Irrawaddy and Bago regions. While some areas may witness more conventional battles, guerrilla activities are expected to intensify across all regions. This shift in the theater of conflict will strain the military’s already overstretched resources but will also pose new challenges for resistance forces, particularly in maintaining supply chains and operational effectiveness. The densely populated nature of urban areas adds another dimension of complexity. Fighting in these regions, exacerbated by the military’s indiscriminate bombings, threatens to worsen conditions for urban populations and exacerbate the humanitarian crises. Escalation of conflict in the heartland of Myanmar, which is home to Myanmar’s military industry, will not only intensify the violence but will shape the trajectory of the broader conflict, influencing strategic decisions.
2. The consolidation of EAO-controlled territories is expected to reshape Myanmar’s political landscape. In early 2025, EAOs are likely to solidify control over most territories in Kachin, Rakhine, Chin, Karenni and Karen states. This consolidation not only helps EAOs deepen their governance structures but also creates a significant shift in Myanmar’s balance of power, forcing neighboring countries and the international community to reevaluate their engagement strategies. Simultaneously, resistance groups are likely to expand their operations into urban areas, heightening conflict in key cities such as Mandalay and Yangon. This urban escalation will challenge the regime’s ability to maintain even its limited grip on power.
3. The junta’s attempt to hold elections in 2025 that would entrench their power represents a desperate effort to build legitimacy with the international community. However, the context is vastly different from past elections, particularly those held in 2010. Recent research, including a detailed study by the BBC, indicate that the regime has full control of only 21% of the country, with the remaining territory either contested or under resistance control. Any attempt to organize elections under such circumstances is unlikely to stabilize the regime. Instead, it may exacerbate the conflict, deepen political fragmentation and further entrench EAO governance in areas under their control. Moreover, the junta’s inability to conduct elections in contested territories will highlight its diminishing authority, potentially leading to a fragmented post-election polity.
4. China’s increasing involvement in Myanmar poses significant risks for Beijing’s long-term strategic interests. If China doubles down on its support for the junta to prevent its collapse, it will fuel growing anti-China sentiment among the Myanmar public and resistance forces. Protests against China’s backing of the regime have already intensified, both domestically and among diaspora communities. Infrastructure projects tied to Chinese interests are becoming increasingly vulnerable, and Beijing’s continued pressure on EAOs to negotiate with the military is unlikely to yield results. If China persists with this approach, it may find itself not only alienating the Myanmar public but also undermining its broader regional influence.

Myanmar now stands at a pivotal crossroads. Resistance forces, bolstered by EAO strength, public support and sustained momentum, are poised to escalate the conflict into urban strongholds and the heartland in 2025. The junta, weakened by historic losses and increasingly reliant on Chinese support, faces mounting internal and external pressures. At the same time, China’s aggressive intervention risks alienating the very actors and communities it aims to influence, potentially destabilizing its position in the region.

This could be a defining year for Myanmar’s political trajectory. The dramatic achievements on the battlefield by the EAOs and allied forces during 2024 highlight their growing power, and improved cooperation between the EAOs and Bamar political forces, particularly the NUG. To dismantle the military dictatorship and rebuild Myanmar, this cooperation must be deepened. The country itself will have been devastated by conflict and overrun with crime — both petty and organized, on an international scale. To move forward, the “hanging together,” to borrow from Benjamin Franklin’s famous wisdom, of these forces will be absolutely vital.

Many observers fail to understand the profound changes that have taken place in Myanmar. As a result, they continue to explore superficial interventions that are unacceptable to the Myanmar people and will only prolong conflict. In the absence of deeper international engagement with the resistance, the conflict will continue unchecked, and the resistance will be left on its own to deal with the profound changes in Myanmar’s governance and power structures that are all but inevitable.

The U.S. should consider adapting its approach in light of these developments and likely trends for 2025. Myanmar is of immense strategic and economic value, most of which China currently dominates, including drawing most of its rare earths, jade and tin imports from Myanmar. Myanmar also serves as a crucial conduit for Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and provides direct access to the Indian Ocean, among many other benefits.

While the international community’s current influence in Myanmar is limited, more robust U.S. efforts to coordinate with its partners in the region and beyond can hasten the conflict’s end and reduce its human cost. Myanmar is at a critical junction and this year could prove pivotal. The cost of passive engagement from the international community is growing. If the U.S. takes more strategic and robust action on Myanmar, it could have a major positive impact on the lives of the Myanmar people and its own regional interests.