United States Institute of Peace

USIP’s Mary Glantz and Carla Freeman look at the visit and explain why the China-Russia partnership continues to strengthen and what it means for the United States amid the emerging multipolar world.

Were there any major announcements or developments that came out of Putin’s visit?

Glantz: For Russia, Putin’s visit to China accomplished exactly what he most sought: to show that both he and Russia still have important friends. There were no major announcements or developments, but a reiteration of activities already committed to. The pair issued a lengthy joint statement reasserting the parties’ intention to deepen their strategic cooperation in a variety of areas, including military and economic.

In particular, Putin highlighted the importance of trade and investment ties — especially in banking and finance — on energy cooperation, and on international and regional issues. On the latter, the joint statement asserted: “The Russian side reaffirms its commitment to the one-China principle, recognizes that Taiwan is an integral part of China, opposes Taiwan’s independence in any form, and firmly supports the actions of the Chinese side to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to reunify the country.” 

This is identical to a 2023 statement, except for the addition of the phrase “… as well as to reunify the country.” This addition was followed by a new Chinese statement saying it supports the “ ... efforts of the Russian side to ensure security and stability, national development and prosperity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposes outside interference in Russia’s internal affairs,” expanding on the support articulated in 2023 for Russian efforts to ensure national development and non-interference in internal affairs. In short, both sides appear to be taking a more aggressive rhetorical line in support of actions to defend what they define as their territorial integrity. 

On the Ukraine war, Putin seems to have come away with at least a tacit endorsement of his position on the war and its resolution. The joint statement says: “The Parties proceed from the premise that for a sustainable settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, it is necessary to eliminate its root causes and adhere to the principle of indivisibility of security, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all countries in the field of security.” In other words, resolution of the war will require addressing Russia’s complaints about the expansion of NATO and the alleged militarization of Ukraine.

Freeman: Those watching Putin’s visit to China looking for signs of strains in the China-Russia relationship were surely disappointed. Putin’s visit was timed soon after Xi’s visit to France, Hungary and Serbia and there was no indication from Xi’s red-carpet welcome to Putin and his delegation that Xi intends a Chinese rebalance to Europe. The two leaders highlighted their two countries’ 75 years of bilateral relations and agreed in the joint statement to deepen strategic coordination. In stressing support for a “political solution to the Ukraine crisis,” China aligned its position with Russia’s in implying that NATO was the underlying problem. During the meeting, Xi took the opportunity to demonstrate his “close as brothers” relationship with Putin with a rare on-camera embrace.

The carefully choreographed visit had a number of important outcomes for China. Parsing the joint statement reveals an increasingly multifaceted bilateral relationship in the works, resting on an alignment on a wide range of interests. The two sides plan to further expand already substantial bilateral cooperation in investment and trade, as well as trade in local currencies, with additional commitments to work together to boost supply chain resilience and energy security.

In addition, the two sides agreed to increase cooperation in civilian nuclear energy technology and construction and other areas of advanced technology, from aerospace and satellite navigation systems to information technology, including AI. The joint statement also references plans for joint development of Heixiazi or Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island near Khabarovsk, control over which has been a periodic source of tension between the two countries despite a 2005 border demarcation agreement. It envisions a greater role for China in shipping and the development of logistics infrastructure in the Arctic where Russia maintains a substantial military presence and has expansive claims. On the military front, the two sides agreed to enlarge the scale of joint military training activities and increase the frequency of joint maritime and air patrols.

Alongside the joint statement’s implicit criticism of NATO expansion, it also reflects Moscow’s endorsement of Beijing’s view that the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is “damaging” to regional security as well as its position that NATO is engaged in “destructive moves” in the Asia-Pacific. Xi’s Global Security Initiative also makes an appearance in the joint statement’s position that nothing short of a new international security order is required to resolve the “Ukraine crisis.” With the statement issued just ahead of the inauguration of a new president in Taipei, Xi was no doubt also pleased by Russia’s strengthened statement of support for Beijing’s aspirations to “achieve national reunification” with Taiwan.

What’s behind the deepening Russia-China partnership?

Freeman: Xi and Putin clearly have a personal rapport, which some speculate reflects at least in part their shared experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union as a traumatic event and a concomitant shared worldview. Although Xi has never expressed outright support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he appears to see the Ukraine conflict as part of a global struggle against U.S.-led Western hegemony, or even imperialism. There are hints in the joint statement of a shared vision of a China-Russia partnership enabling a shift toward a new global order.

But strategic convenience also underpins China’s improving ties with Russia. Beijing perceives the U.S. challenge to its increasingly assertive position on sovereignty claims and maritime jurisdiction, as well as U.S. tariffs and other restrictions on Chinese access to U.S. advanced technologies, as efforts to constrain its rise. Forging deeper ties with Russia has a strategic and security logic, particularly given the two countries’ long shared border — a past source of military friction but now a channel for Russian resources — and Moscow’s considerable prowess in the military, technological and scientific arenas.

Glantz: In addition to their shared world view, Russia is drawn to China because of the economic and military support China offers. As the U.S.-led sanctions regime has essentially cut Russia off from its traditional suppliers and customers, Russia has become increasingly dependent on Chinese investment, imports and money for its energy and other natural resources sales. 

According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, China is Russia’s main supplier for dual use technologies like machine tools and microelectronics, and Putin’s visit to the Harbin Institute of Technology, an institution for cutting-edge military research, signals that this relationship will likely become even more significant.

On the economic side, China’s purchasing of Russian oil and gas is also reaching record levels, providing Russia with much needed income to fund its war against Ukraine. In 2023, half of Russia’s oil and petroleum exports went to China. Russia’s trade with China has exploded, reaching a record $240 billion last year, a 60 percent increase from the prewar period. Still, this left Russia’s Gazprom with an $8 billion loss in 2024 that likely cannot be addressed until the two countries agree on a Power of Siberia 2 pipeline.

Finally, Russia relies upon China for diplomatic support in the United Nations and throughout the Global South through its co-leadership in organizations like the BRICS bloc of leading non-Western economies and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Thus, the Russia-China relationship is a strengthening one, though still not a “partnership without limits.”

What does this strengthened partnership mean for the United States, particularly amid the emergence of a more multipolar world?

Freeman: Stronger bilateral relations allow China and Russia to coordinate their diplomacy at the global level, posing both challenges and opportunities for the United States.  

Not only are Beijing and Moscow’s positions frequently aligned at the United Nations, including in the U.N. Security Council, the two countries also coordinate within other multilaterals, especially those in which they both play leading roles. This year, for example, Russia and China respectively hold the chairmanship or secretary-general roles in BRICS and the SCO. They are using those platforms to promote their view to the emerging and developing world that the current international order is failing to deliver development and security — and that it is time for a change they can lead. This view appears to be gaining traction in some quarters, particularly countries confronted with U.S.-led sanctions.

But the idea of abetting a China-Russia alignment that smacks increasingly of a quasi-alliance despite the two countries’ anti-bloc rhetoric has little appeal across the Global South, disinterested in aligning with one set of countries against another. Although many emerging economies and countries in the developing world express frustration with Washington, they nevertheless continue to seek engagement with the United States. The door remains wide open to U.S. policy initiatives.

Glantz: For the time being, the Russia-China relationship seems strong and based on a collection of truly shared interests, not on a marriage of convenience. Unfortunately for the United States, those interests, with some differences, are centered upon a view of the United States as their main competitor or a hindrance to the attainment of their goals. Thus, the United States will likely see China and Russia working together (to a greater or lesser extent) for the time being to challenge U.S. positions both diplomatically and geo-strategically. In particular, both have rejected the U.S.-led rules-based international order, which they see as a system set up by the United States for the benefit of the United States. 

That said, however, Russian and Chinese strategies and tactics do not always coincide, and this may lead to eventual friction between the two. For example, Russia has burnt almost all of its bridges with Europe and is having to reorient its economy toward the east. China, in contrast, is still very much invested in an economic relationship with that continent. Russia’s invasions of its neighbors are, so far, something else that China has refrained from doing, focusing instead on economic and diplomatic competition. To exploit these differences and advance its foreign policy agenda, the United States will undoubtedly have to take a nuanced approach in its dealing with both partners in this relationship.