Prabowo claimed a commanding victory in national elections held on February 14. His victory marks the culmination of a decades-long rehabilitation of his image after unceremoniously being discharged from a top leadership position in the army amid accusations of human rights abuses during President Suharto’s authoritarian rule, which ended in 1998.

Prabowo has served as outgoing President Joko Widodo’s defense minister since 2019, a term that saw the salience of his past fade as he worked hand in hand with counterparts from the United States and Australia. Prabowo was also seen by the United States and its allies to be an important internationalist in Jokowi’s cabinet, which was intensely focused on domestic economic development rather than regional security, despite Indonesia’s critical role as Southeast Asia’s largest country and the fact that China illegally asserts claims to the far reaches of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.

Indonesia’s Balancing Act

As the largest country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia recognizes that it is a key prize in U.S.-China competition, with both powers vying for more influence. Indonesia has fostered a warm relationship with the United States since the fall of the Suharto regime, characterized by a continual upgrading of ties, including, most recently, to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

At the same time, China presents alluring investment and economic development opportunities for a country focused on escaping its middle-income status. However, the threat posed by China’s nine-dash line — through which Beijing stakes claim to much of the South China Sea, including land parcels — to Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea places Indonesia at odds with Beijing on security issues. In this regard, Indonesia often looks to the United States, its largest military engagement partner, for assistance with bolstering its defense capabilities.

This balancing act follows the script of Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy and nonalignment policy, which have anchored Indonesia’s post-independence international identity. Drawing inspiration from its foundational role in the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia has long sought to “row between [the] two reefs,” in the words of national founding figure Mohammad Hatta, by advancing its interests on the regional and global stage without falling under the influence of great powers. Even as shifting geopolitical winds have reshaped the world order, these founding principles have forged a remarkably enduring foreign policy approach flavored by pragmatism and nonalignment.

The Jokowi administration followed this framework, with Jokowi enthusiastically courting Chinese investment to fuel an ambitious infrastructure rollout and to spur growth in Indonesia’s critical minerals sector. However, heightened tensions in the disputed waters around the North Natuna islands simultaneously prompted an uptick in defense engagement with the United States, including through increasingly expansive Super Garuda Shield joint exercises. Meanwhile, Jokowi also focused attention on other important investors, including Japan, South Korea, Germany and the United Arab Emirates, and expansive limits of Indonesia’s nonaligned ideology were put on display through Jokowi’s personal efforts to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table.

The Prabowo administration is poised to continue this balancing act. Prabowo is keen to explore ever-deeper economic ties with China, given his campaign pledge to continue the Jokowi-era laser focus on economic growth to achieve a “Golden Indonesia” by 2045. At the same time, the former military commander and current defense minister has his eyes on China’s aggression in the South China Sea.

In the Jokowi administration, Prabowo oversaw significant projects for military modernization strategy and his remarks on the campaign trail further indicate that Indonesia will remain focused on expanding its maritime defense capacities, for which the United States will remain a key partner.

Lingering Conflict at Home

When Prabowo was a senior military officer in the 1990s, there was a legitimate fear that the country could unravel, given its vast scale and diversity. The one part of Indonesia that ultimately achieved independence was Timor-Leste, where Prabowo was personally involved in military efforts. More than 25 years after the fall of Suharto, fears of a Balkanized Indonesia are long gone, notably due to peace in Aceh and community-level efforts in Maluku.

The one outlier is West Papua, where an unresolved independence movement replete with mounting violence stubbornly lingers. The Jokowi administration focused on the conflict episodically and its major policy initiatives focused on extensive decentralization within West Papua, an approach grounded in the idea that economic development and shared resources could mitigate conflict. However, as a senior Indonesian official said in 2023, “nothing has worked.” Instead, the conflict made headlines in 2018 when West Papuan rebels killed 24 construction workers and again in 2023, when they took hostage a New Zealand pilot who is still being held. Meanwhile, Jokowi continued longstanding restrictions on journalists and civil society visiting. Prabowo will be unable to ignore the conflict, and it is an open question which tools he might employ.

Embracing a More Prominent Role on the World Stage?

While the underlying currents of Indonesia’s foreign policy are unlikely to alter with the incoming administration, Indonesia will likely play a more active role on the international stage under Prabowo and will seek to contribute to the resolution of major international conflicts, such as Ukraine and Gaza. Prabowo presaged this at the June 2024 Shangri-La Dialogue, where he unexpectedly — including for Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi — proposed a controversial sweeping peace plan to end the war in Ukraine. In the speech, he called for a cease-fire, a demilitarized zone and a United Nations referendum to determine the status of “disputed areas.” Leaving the specifics aside, the episode demonstrated Prabowo’s personal ambition to be a global statesman.

Prabowo is also likely to flex Indonesia’s muscles as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country on issues related to Gaza. He is likely to continue balancing Indonesia’s outspoken support for Palestinian sovereignty with calls for a peaceful, negotiated end to the conflict. The political resonance of the issue in Indonesia is also likely to become a challenge for U.S.-Indonesia relations, much like the Iraq War did in the 2000s.

Closer to home, Prabowo is likely to be vexed by the conflict in Myanmar, which undermines Indonesia’s international standing, given its natural leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the region’s largest country. As a former army officer, now legitimately elected as Indonesia’s leader, he may see an opening to dialogue with Myanmar’s military government, an approach that would run counter to recent Indonesian efforts to sideline the junta’s State Administrative Council and engage pro-democracy forces. During Indonesia’s 2023 ASEAN chairmanship, it attempted to confront the Myanmar crisis through “non-megaphone diplomacy” but ultimately failed to move the needle.

Broadly, a key variable is Prabowo’s temperament and how he might make decisions. Despite his decades-long public image transformation from special forces commander to “cuddly grandpa,” his temper is legendary and he is widely seen to be unpredictable. With a direct conflict with China in the South China Sea, this will be a dynamic to watch.

Meghan Sullivan is a program assistant in USIP’s Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands program.