Only two and a half years removed from its birth, South Sudan is in crisis. A dispute between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, his former vice president, has quickly taken on ethnic overtones and escalated into widespread fighting, with dire consequences. Over 1,000 people have been killed -- perhaps many more -- with another 200,000 displaced. The national army has split in two and is essentially fighting itself. Forces loosely aligned with Machar control several key parts of the country, including some oil installations. As a result, the exuberance and optimism that accompanied South Sudan's independence is all but lost. In its place is fear of another failed state and civil war in the heart of Africa.

south sudan soldiers
Photo Credit: Flickr/Steve Evans

Yet there is some hope for the future. Peace talks between delegations representing Kiir and Machar began on Jan. 5 in Ethiopia under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, an organization of eight East African countries. So far, the negotiations have focused on securing a cease-fire -- a positive first step to bring an immediate end to the killing, destruction, and displacement -- and the release of 11 political detainees, senior South Sudanese politicians whom Kiir accuses of participating in an alleged coup attempt led by Machar.

To achieve any real, sustainable peace, however, negotiations need to go well beyond these limited objectives. A narrow, elite bargain between powerful political figures in the divided ruling party won't be enough. Such a deal would ignore the broader population and its needs, perpetuate the trend of exclusionary and corrupt politics, and do nothing to address root causes of instability. This mistake has been made time and again in Sudan's violent history and could easily be repeated in South Sudan.

To avoid this outcome, the ongoing negotiations need to adhere to three core principles.

First, there cannot be a simple return to the previous status quo; negotiations need to produce a framework for inclusive governance that addresses the failings of the current political system. Too much blood has already been spilled -- trying to turn back would all but ensure the reprise of violence. In recent years, Kiir has strayed from the consensus-building strategies that served him well prior to South Sudan's independence and has become increasingly reliant on a small group of advisors from his home area. Journalists, NGO workers, and others have been harassed and even killed, calling into question the government's commitment to democracy and respect for human rights. The ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement has faltered in its transition from a guerrilla movement to a political party, showing no capacity to manage the growing tensions between its leaders. These issues must be dealt with for peace to last.

Indeed, no short-term agreement will be sufficient if it does not at least begin to address the fundamental problems in South Sudan's political system and chart a future that will be acceptable to most parties. Successful negotiations should establish a path for South Sudan's political development that is anchored in the process of developing a permanent constitution. That process, if it is inclusive, transparent, and participatory, can be a vehicle for nation-building and reform.

Second, in developing this path there is a need to reach beyond national political elites and armed militias. South Sudanese civil institutions have to be included. State-level officials must be consulted, engaged, and informed about the agenda, issues, and options for agreement. Members of parliament ought to be briefed regularly and encouraged to update their constituents.

Civil society requires full communication: Citizens must be allowed to provide input to negotiators and mediators, and they must be allowed to monitor deliberations. This means holding regular press conferences to inform the media so that radio, newspapers, and social media can help to tamp out misinformation and rumor rather than fuel further violence.

South Sudanese from different segments of society -- civil society, religious communities, the business sector -- should moreover be physically present during the political process, if not at the table themselves, and then regularly consulted by negotiators and mediators. In past negotiations in Sudan, such as the talks to end violence in Darfur, there have been some efforts along these lines, but they have always had the feel of tokenism. These negotiations are an opportunity to break the trend. Showing that those doing the fighting do not have all the power and that those who resisted the call to arms will play an equally important role in defining South Sudan's future is crucial to lasting peace.

Third, the international community must play an active role in helping define the long-term peace process and be a substantive participant in it. Governments, regional organizations, NGOs, and concerned individuals around the world have been seized by the crisis and have responded with relative haste. More than 60,000 South Sudanese are already under U.N. protection, and a major increase in U.N. peacekeepers is in the works; the costs of picking up the pieces of the economy and restoring stability will fall heavily on donors. South Sudan's history, notably the extensive international support for its people's right to self-determination and pressure on Khartoum to accept the referendum result, also sets it apart from other fragile states. This history places additional responsibilities on the international community, especially the United States, given its strong support for South Sudan. It also puts an additional onus on South Sudan to constructively engage the outside world.

The international community, as guarantors, monitors, donors, advisors, and mentors, must insist that it be a constructive party to how this conflict is brought under control and how South Sudan's future is defined. During any sort of interim phase that follows the negotiations, a degree of joint South Sudanese-international community administration and management should be instituted. This partnership will be needed to assess the state of the oil sector, the economy, and how damage from the current conflict will be addressed, and the government in Juba should submit its budget and plans for approval to a joint mechanism established for this process. International experts and advisors should also have a formal role in the constitution-making process, as international participation can help reassure various communities about the outcome and prevent elite deal-making that ignores the interests of the general public.

If negotiators and mediators adhere to these three principles, a deal struck has a chance to put South Sudan on a new footing. Many more challenges will await, among them: healing and reconciliation, justice and accountability, and reforming and downsizing the army. But horrific as the violence since mid-December has been, the crisis also presents an opportunity to address unresolved issues and put South Sudan back on the path of democratization, good governance, and peace -- a path from which it deviated well before the current crisis.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take policy positions.

Reposted with permission from ForeignPolicy.com, Source: “Terms of Endurance"


Latest Research & Analysis

Philippines: Former Combatants Help Keep the Peace During Recent Polls

Philippines: Former Combatants Help Keep the Peace During Recent Polls

Wednesday, June 25, 2025

By: Haroro Ingram, Country Director, Philippines, USIP

For decades, the struggle for peace in the Philippines’ southernmost island of Mindanao has been characterized by armed conflict between the Philippines government and Moro separatist groups, like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and cycles of failed peace processes. The historic 2014 peace agreement between the Philippines government and MILF led to the granting of greater self-governance with the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) five years later. What has followed since is an unprecedented, yet very fragile, period of peace and stability.

Type: Analysis

With Cease-fire Holding, Can Israel and Iran Move Toward De-escalation?

With Cease-fire Holding, Can Israel and Iran Move Toward De-escalation?

Wednesday, June 25, 2025

Israel’s stunning and sophisticated June 13 attack on Iran set off a worrying 12-day escalatory spiral. Iran responded in short order with ballistic missile and drone strikes, which led to a series of tit-for-tat exchanges between the two sides. A cease-fire is now in place -- but will it hold?

Type: Analysis

What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

What Are the Limits of U.S.-India Security Burden-Sharing in the Indian Ocean?

Monday, June 23, 2025

By: Nilanthi Samaranayake, Adjunct Fellow, East-West Center

When viewing U.S. partnerships in the maritime domain, relations with India, in particular, have thrived — especially over the past decade. Moreover, the partnership enjoys bipartisan support in the United States. Indications after Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the White House in February 2025 are that U.S.-India security relations will continue to be strong in the second Trump administration.

Type: Analysis

What’s at Stake for China in the Iran War?

What’s at Stake for China in the Iran War?

Monday, June 23, 2025

China has major energy and economic interests that are threatened by an escalating conflict. But Beijing may also see some strategic opportunities with the U.S. focused on the war. Ultimately, China is likely unwilling, and unable, to make a serious effort to broker peace.

Type: Analysis

The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry

The Element of Surprise: Space and Cyber Warfare in U.S.-China Rivalry

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

The 2024 revelations over China’s effort to implant malware in critical U.S. infrastructure by the Volt Typhoon hacking group — as well as the Salt Typhoon group’s successful breaching of at least nine major U.S. telecoms — have renewed concern over Beijing’s constant, ongoing efforts to hack Western companies, governments and non-governmental organizations. Unlike past incidents, like those involving Chinese military unit 61398, which were largely about cyber espionage, the Volt Typhoon group was actively implanting malware designed to disrupt critical infrastructure such as water and power systems.

Type: Analysis

View All Research & Analysis