France’s rapid intervention in Mali in early January is particularly striking when compared to the lengthy debate over international intervention in Syria, which has thus far produced only inaction. What considerations made French intervention in Mali feasible while constraining action in Syria?

While both Mali and Syria have deep histories and carry complex implications for neighboring countries and regional stability, the two conflicts are of course very different.

The path to military intervention in Mali was clearer, as was the execution of the campaign, despite the challenges of the ongoing fight and forthcoming stabilization and reconstruction efforts. France’s interest in Mali, the increased threat of terrorism and United Nations Security Council support for intervention, even if not initially for unilateral French action, eased the way, along with the low risk of a military campaign to regional and international powers.

Mali is one of France’s closest allies in sub-Saharan Africa, a relationship borne of colonization in the late 1800s. There are reportedly more than 6,000 French citizens in Mali, a minority of whom are expatriates.

Northern Mali hosts militant groups such as Ansar al-Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), the “fastest-growing al Qaeda franchise in the world today,” according to Bruce Reidel, a Brookings Saban Center Senior Fellow. AQIM is the dominant power across a huge swath of northern Mali, an area the size of France. All the groups are excessively well-armed with weapons from Libya following the fall of Moammar Qaddafi. When Tuareg rebels began mounting major offensives a year ago against the Malian army in the country’s north, they soon gained the backing of extremist fighters flooding in from neighboring Libya.

The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2085 on December 20, calling for a gradual and localized approach to resolving the conflict It authorized the deployment of an African-led mission to support government efforts to regain control over Northern Mali. The resolution tasked the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), in coordination with the European Union and international partners, to strengthen the Malian defense and security forces – but explicitly called for further planning before beginning a military operation. The resolution did not approve unilateral military action on the part of any member state, and it clearly articulated that assistance efforts be led by African forces. But in January, the fall of Konna – a strategic town in central Mali – and the warning from Mali’s government that the fall of Bamako and one of only two international airstrips were imminent – raised the prospect of a jihadist takeover in a country with direct ties to France and the accompanying easy access for potential attackers targeting Europe.

The unanimous approval for the December resolution shows there was consensus on the need for international involvement and military support generally. Once the French intervened, the Security Council unanimously backed the action, agreeing that French troops should be joined by a force of the regional Economic Community of West African States as soon as possible. Russia and China are typically opponents of any external intervention, and have played a spoiler role on Syria, but even they did not object.

That illustrates Mali’s relatively minor strategic importance with respect to the core interests of great powers compared with that of Syria. It also helped that the military effort required to push back the Malian rebels and maintain control was estimated to be far less than what would be needed to back the Syrian opposition’s campaign to depose Bashar al-Assad. U.S. officials have cited a lengthy list of risks in Syria, including a still-divided opposition, the threat of weapons falling into the hands of al-Qaeda-linked extremists and the strength of Assad’s army. Russia’s and China’s explicit resistance to international intervention in Syria also has stymied any Security Council resolution allowing military action there. President Obama has warned that use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime is a “red line” for the United States, although what response that would bring is not clear. There are seemingly few if any moves by the Syrian opposition or the regime that could trigger international action the way the jihadist advance on Bamako did for the French in Mali.

Another noteworthy difference between the Mali and Syria scenarios is the legal status of the entities seeking assistance. Despite repeated calls for intervention in Syria , neither the Syrian National Council nor the newer Syrian National Coalition has been recognized as the “governing body” of Syria. Myriad international actors have recognized the coalition, formed with the November agreement for the council to join several other opposition groups as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” but this affords the group no new legal standing. The Assad regime retains its status as the sovereign government of Syria, according to the U.N. Charter. A request for intervention by the coalition, therefore, does not hold the same legal weight or justification as a request by the sovereign government of Mali.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 24, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appealed anew for Security Council members to support U.N. efforts to build a “meaningful political process to replace the military momentum,” and “overcome the deadlock, and find the unity that will make meaningful action [in Syria] possible.”

At the International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait on January 29, U.N.-Arab League Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi described Syria as “breaking up before everyone’s eyes,” and pleaded for the Security Council to “grapple with this problem now.” Donor pledges exceeded the U.N.’s $1.5 billion humanitarian aid request, even as relief needs continue to grow.

Despite grave humanitarian concerns, the complexity and risks of the Syria conflict seem likely to continue muddying the path toward international intervention there, especially with international legal justification.

What do you think these two cases tell us, if anything, about the conditions necessary for international intervention elsewhere, given the contemporary political and legal system? Tell us what you think by submitting a comment below.

Rachel Brandenburg is a USIP Program Officer for Middle East Initiatives who formerly worked in the State Department’s Office of Middle East Transition.