Presidential and parliamentary elections in Kenya are scheduled for March 4. United States Institute of Peace Program Officer Jacqueline Wilson, who works in USIP’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, returned from Kenya recently after conducting several electoral violence prevention workshops with Kenyan civil society organizations. In the following Q & A, she offers her analysis of that nation’s electoral preparations and the potential for electoral violence.

How did you perceive preparation for the March 4 Kenyan elections?

Refreshingly, much has already been accomplished ahead of the elections. Kenyans can take pride in the important steps taken since approving their new constitution in August 2010. The legislative and legal framework for the elections has been carefully put in place, judicial reforms have earned the judiciary newfound respect, and the voter registration process utilizing new biometric voter registration systems (BVR), although not flawless, registered a sizeable, and seemingly acceptable, number of voters.

More recently, however, the party nomination process to select candidates was marred by what might best be called “political shenanigans.” Party power brokers may have followed the strict language of the law but sidestepped its intentions. Set-asides for women, the disabled, and minorities (so-called “special interest groups”) were in some cases granted as consolation prizes to rejected mainstream candidates. Parliamentarians--who served to benefit from the change-- passed a revision allowing party-hopping beyond the initial deadline. These provisions of the new constitution, clearly intended to make politics in Kenya more transparent and more inclusive, may have been less so than hoped. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was silent about the disorganized party primaries; some say it even contributed to the confusion by continually postponing the date by which parties were to submit their list of nominees.

The sheer lack of voter education remains a significant gap. Less than 30 days out from Kenya’s election, I saw not a single sign of voter education despite many calls for it to occur. Although the IEBC announced that it would start simultaneous voter education in all 47 counties, civil society representatives fear this gap could contribute to violence in a number of ways. Voters who fail to understand the complexity of six ballots and the new BVR verification system may not accept how prolonged voting could affect the process (or delay results). Despite mock elections which demonstrate the time needed to get all the voters through the voting process may not be available on a single day, IEBC is reluctant to indicate that polling may need to be extended. Doing so on election day risks perceptions of rigging, as delays are frequently misinterpreted as being in favor of a particular party or candidate. Citizens may also not understand candidate thresholds that could easily result in a presidential run-off, which is crucial given the highly competitive nature of the contest. (New rules require a party to win 50 percent plus one and at least 25 percent of votes in at least half of the 47 counties).

What is the mood among Kenyan civil society about the potential for election violence?

Kenya has a robust and sophisticated civil society which is a strong asset for preventing electoral violence, but their strength and sophistication do not mean violence cannot occur. In fact, civil society experiences the same tensions felt by the rest of society. Civil society organizations frequently compete over funding opportunities rather than working collaboratively to address complex concerns that no single entity can address alone. Their effectiveness is also hamstrung by the rapidly moving electoral process. The failure to approve Kenya’s new constitution until mid-2010 compressed the sequence of needed reforms and activities, leaving much to be accomplished in a short time.

In addition, confusion and some divisions have arisen among those participating in early warning and early response (EW/ER) processes. The government desires to create a single, coordinated national EW/ER system. Disagreements, however, have resulted in duplication within government and civil society networks. Some civil society entities have launched their own EW/ER networks, in part due to mistrust and either delayed or ineffective responses on the part of government to previous early warning. This means that Kenya will have vast amounts of data on early warning indicators that may not translate into a coordinated response. In essence, responses to electoral violence will remain largely local. This is not necessarily a negative. Efforts to build the capacity of local actors (including security forces) toward productive responses to successfully tamp down local disputes before they escalate may be the fastest and most suitable approach to early response.

What does analysis from your recent workshops tell you about the potential for electoral violence?

One of the challenges of early warning is that indicators can be misinterpreted and rumors can be spread without understanding whether they are true. If reports are accurate, there is fear among many Kenyans as indicated by reports that vulnerable family members are being sent away from hotspot areas and that food, weapons and ammunition are being stockpiled. Yet stockpiling of food is not preparation for offensive action, but does indicate fear. Ethnic alliances, which some see as an indicator of impending electoral violence, are virtually inherent in the electoral process, which requires a national presence for national offices, and therefore may not be an indicator of impending violence. The challenge is to link these indicators with triggers inherent in the electoral cycle along with efforts to mobilize violent actors poised to take advantage through mobilization.

Unfortunately, there are signs of the potential for electoral violence in Kenya. Four key sources of concern include:

• the lack of voter education which could exacerbate the effect of electoral triggers, such as a delay in results or a presidential run-off;
• geographical zoning, where candidates from other parties are intimidated from campaigning, has been noted;
• reports of subtle forms of ethnic mobilization, such as secret night meetings and incitement via Facebook postings; and,
• the presence of illegal, politically affiliated armed groups.

By itself, and with adequate voter preparation, the seemingly harmless event of a delay or a presidential run-off could be accepted as an expected part of a new, more complex electoral process. Coupled with poor voter education, ethnic mobilization, a winner-take-all paradigm, and the presence of armed actors ready to take advantage, however, a delay or run-off could create a volatile cocktail of spontaneous violence.

Do we know whether electoral violence will occur?

As Kenya watchers know, electoral violence has been occurring for a number of months already. The Tana River violence, although portrayed as pastoralist/farmer clashes, was clearly motivated by electoral ambitions. Sporadic violence related to disputes over the demarcation of new county borders (determining which county claims resource-producing assets) occurred in several locations. The party nomination process and resulting party-hopping has produced some violence.

Indicators of potential electoral violence exist in several areas of Kenya. Many Kenyans I met fear a recurrence of the 2007 post-election violence in which more than 1,100 died. Yet political actors are both responding to fear and perhaps stoking it. Reports of upwards of 30 “gangs,” political militias or “bodyguard forces” who are reportedly enforcing “zoning” (where certain candidates are not welcome), coupled with the weakness and mistrust of police creates a recipe for insecurity.

Statements from the Uhuru-Ruto alliance, both of whom have been indicted by the International Criminal Court, indicate their intention to undermine the court’s credibility, especially by winning (reasoning that Kenyans would not elect criminals as their president/vice-president). Although the ICC indictment is putting pressure on the candidates, it may also be have a positive impact on the process. It seems clear that candidates are sensitive to the realization they could be held accountable for hate speech, incitement, and violence, and therefore are being more subtle in their approach. That said, local actors described mobilization cues transmitted via text messages and social media, as well as songs in vernacular languages. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission, tasked with monitoring and countering hate speech, is under-staffed, overwhelmed and has proven unable, to date, to address these surreptitious tactics.

Unresolved underlying issues such as historical ethnic claims to land continue to impact political processes, and can both exacerbate political tensions and be used as a rallying cry. The lauded potential impact of the devolution of power ensconced in the new constitution (such as the 47 counties which replace eight provinces) may exacerbate these tensions rather than alleviating them. In fact, some say the new constitution has created 47 new power struggles as the new county governors, senators and legislative assemblies create new zones for political competition.

What is USIP doing to prevent electoral violence in Kenya?

USIP has worked in Kenya for a number of years. USIP grantees are active in social media, drama, youth work, research into linkages between domestic violence and electoral violence, and other efforts to stem electoral violence and other social cleavages. USIP has also trained members of Kenya’s civil society on data collection and monitoring efforts through its courses on the Ushahidi platform. I conducted an early pre-election assessment trip in September 2011, holding meetings with civil society and governmental actors in Eldoret, Mombasa and Nairobi, and I just returned from helping facilitate several workshops in Nairobi and Nakuru with the Institute for Defense Analyses and local partner EISA (Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa). Additionally, the Academy’s Debbie Liang-Fenton and Linda Bishai also have conducted several iterations of the Academy’s “Preventing Electoral Violence in Africa” course. USIP Press recently published Voting in Fear, on electoral violence in Africa by Dorina Bekoe.

What other actions can be taken to circumvent the cycle of electoral violence?

The good news is that many, many efforts are underway to help prevent, mitigate and resolve electoral violence. The proliferation of early warning networks means that early warning will be available. However, the efforts of civil society and other actors to mitigate violence must be as sophisticated as the strategies employed by power brokers intent on winning at all costs. Peace actors must prepare action plans that read the early warning, anticipate the triggers, and mobilize mitigating actions quickly. During a recent workshop in Nakuru, local actors received phone calls about tensions and violence in two hotspots to which they responded immediately. Rapid response by well-connected, reputable interveners will be critical to mitigation.

Potential actions local peace actors should utilize include:

• Analyze holistically both peace actors and those who might use violence (visible and those working behind the scenes), as well as indicators, potential triggers, and the motivations of all actors.
• Utilize scenario-based planning to play out potential response options.
• Strategize ways to reframe or counter ethnic or economic mobilization messages by transforming them from destructive to constructive.
• Identify influential local actors who can intervene to stop escalation, and gain their commitment to do so.
• Encourage transparency and information-sharing to counteract rumors.
• Form local or sub-regional civil society networks (physical or virtual) to encourage collaboration rather than competition.
• Promulgate voter education and civic engagement through any means possible.
• Utilize the strong social media and text messaging penetration in Kenyan society for voter education, early warning, early response and violence prevention.
• Convey focused messages aimed at mitigating key triggers, such as “Delays don’t mean Deception,” or “Rumors may be just Rumors.”
• Utilize domestic observation networks to disseminate political party codes of conduct as well as evidence of their being ignored.
• Utilize under-explored sources of leverage such as mothers of vulnerable youth and business leaders who stand to lose if violence occurs.

In short, despite the presence of worrying indicators, Kenyan citizens seem determined to ensure they are not disenfranchised from their constitutional rights by power brokers determined to win elections through any means. Kenyans learned so much in 2007, not least that their democracy can never be taken for granted. Peaceful elections in March 2013 would demonstrate Kenyans have taken that lesson to heart.