Elections Could Plunge the Democratic Republic of Congo into Violent Conflict

Congolese went to the polls on Nov. 28 to elect a president and 500 members of parliament in an atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust and violent unrest. Raymond Gilpin, director of USIP’s Sustainable Economies Center of Innovation examines the elections and their implications.

December 7, 2011

Congolese went to the polls on Nov. 28 to elect a president and 500 members of parliament in an atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust and violent unrest. Opposition candidates accused incumbent President Joseph Kabila of rigging the electoral process and using the security forces to intimidate and brutally suppress dissent. In a country almost the size of Western Europe where infrastructure is woefully deficient, corruption is endemic and insecurity is rife, voting and vote counting have been beset by many problems.

Most analysts fear that opposition protests could trigger a spate of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Raymond Gilpin, director of USIP’s Sustainable Economies Center of Innovation examines the elections and their implications.
 

Why were these elections problematic?

These are the second elections held in the DRC since the fall of long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. Many had hoped that these elections would afford the Congolese people an opportunity for self expression and self determination. An estimated 18,000 candidates ran for 500 parliamentary seats. In the capital, Kinshasa, the ballot was a multi-page booklet listing more than 1,500 candidates. Many attribute the unprecedented number of candidates to the $6,000 monthly salary parliamentarians receive in a country where the average annual per capita income is less than $300. There were 11 presidential candidates and only one round of voting (the result of a constitutional amendment enacted in January this year).

Three important issues arise. First, the sheer number of candidates confused the electorate and divided the opposition. Second, the single round of voting made these elections more zero-sum than most. Third, the combination of deep-seated mistrust and heightened zero-sum competition could make violent conflict more likely. Election results, scheduled to be released on Tuesday Dec. 6, are likely to be delayed. The atmosphere is already tense in and around the capital and other major towns. Some 3,000 people have fled Kinshasa to avoid what they believe could be violent conflict when the results are finally announced.
 

Is there any evidence of fraud?

On Monday, Dec. 5, the DRC electoral commissioner, Daniel Ngoy Mulunda, released provisional results with roughly two-thirds of the votes counted, showing Kabila leading with 46 percent of the vote and second-placed Etienne Tshisekedi with 36 percent. Although observers from the African Union and the sub-regional Southern African Development Community (SADC) described the polls as “successful,” a number of international observers have expressed concern. There have been reports of counterfeit ballots being flown in from South Africa, voter intimidation, armed gangs terrorizing polling stations in the southern city of Lubumbashi and other claims of fraud. John Stremlau, part of the Carter Center’s monitoring delegation is quoted as having described the elections as “problematic.”
 

Are there any signs of violence?

The run-up to voting was tense. In addition to sporadic skirmishes, an incident involving Tshisekedi on the eve of the elections demonstrated the volatility of the situation. Clashes between supporters of the leading opposition candidate and security forces on the eve of the elections became violent, with a number of deaths and serious injuries reported. This violence cast a shadow on the elections. Tshisekedi made some inflammatory remarks during the campaign, most notably his threat to call on his supporters to storm the prisons and free all political prisoners. He has also iterated that the only way he could lose is if there is fraud, stating that Kabila risked “committing [a] suicidal act” if he did not obey the will of the people; implying that a Kabila victory would only be achieved by fraud. Many fear that his campaign rhetoric may incite violence among his supporters.

Both South African President Jacob Zuma and Roger Meece, the head of the U.N. mission in the DRC (Monusco) have been in contact with Kabila and Tshisekedi since the elections urging restraint. Although both camps have apparently agreed to respect the results, protests should not be ruled out. Peaceful protests could easily turn violent. Opposition supporters protesting in Belgium and South Africa have already had violent clashes with police in those countries. Violent protests could easily escalate, particularly given the tensions fuelled by inflammatory rhetoric and accusations of electoral fraud.
 

What can be done to prevent post-election violence in the DRC?

DRC’s electoral commission must release all the results expeditiously and in a transparent manner. Detailed disaggregated results must be published to facilitate verification. The initial delays in releasing provisional results from opposition strongholds was seen as an attempt to falsify the results. Disproportionately nullifying results in opposition regions could also trigger unrest. Irregularities must be addressed openly, and in accordance with the DRC’s constitution, in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety. This is critical if the voters are to have any confidence in the process and accept the outcome.

In this vein, the U.S. should work with regional leaders to keep the communication channels open and ensure an orderly transition. This must go beyond the political leaders in the DRC to include key community, religious and traditional leaders. Rebuilding institutions and establishing effective and participatory governance must be prioritized, with a focus on quick-impact initiatives that promote equity, create jobs and strengthen the social contract. In spite of the competing demands on its time and resources (particularly Syria, Afghanistan and North Africa), the United Nations must issue a strong statement in support of democracy in the DRC and be prepared to deploy adequate resources if needed.

A return to violent conflict could once-again draw in the DRC’s neighbors, with catastrophic regional consequences. Organizations like USIP could be instrumental in fostering productive dialogue, building capacity to protect vulnerable groups and implementing conflict-sensitive economic programs.


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis