After Osama bin Laden: The Future of Pakistan and Afghan Reconciliation

USIP experts discuss how the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden impacts Pakistan, the prospects for Afghan reconciliation and U.S. policy in the region.

May 19, 2011

A REVENGE ATTACK IN PAKISTAN? – The Taliban claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing at a military training center in northwest Pakistan on May 13. The group said it was in revenge for the killing of Osama bin Laden. But it remains uncertain if it truly was. “Frankly,” said USIP’s Moeed Yusuf, “violence is set to rise but it could well be other groups using the opportunity to raise the stakes under the guise of al-Qaida,” he said. “We won't find out for some time. What is certain though is that there is more turbulence ahead for Pakistan.”

According to The New York Times, the attack may have been the work of a splinter group of the Taliban led by Umar Khalid that is fighting the Pakistani Army in a mountainous region nearby. But Khalid has not yet claimed responsibility for the attack, even though some Pakistani Taliban have been known to claim responsibility for attacks they were not behind.

RECONCILIATION POSSIBLE? Regardless of who is behind the attack in Pakistan or what the future holds in Pakistan, the killing of Osama bin Laden is creating reverberations on many levels. The operation raised questions anew about U.S. policy in Afghanistan and whether the Obama administration can justify keeping 100,000 troops there much longer. Members of Congress, the American public and policymakers wonder if now is the time to renew efforts to reconcile with senior members of the Taliban. That could open the door to reduce more significantly the size of the American force come July, when President Barack Obama has pledged to make a substantial withdrawal of troops. Media reports indicate the administration may redeploy between about 5,000 troops to fulfill President Obama’s pledge last year.

For the most part, the U.S. military has long argued that reconciliation should occur only when the U.S. can negotiate from a position of strength. And with the work of the surge forces still underway, many commanders believe the dynamic on the ground is not sufficiently established.

IGNORING OSAMA DEATH AT OUR PERIL – The U.S. should seize the moment and use the death of bin Laden to begin serious talks. “[Bin Laden’s death] won’t have an impact if we don’t pay attention to it,” said USIP’s Andrew Wilder. “If Pakistan is in a weaker position, this could be used as leverage to encourage them to play a more constructive role,” Wilder noted. He notes that al-Qaida was not playing a large role in Afghanistan, but that it could create the catalyst needed to bring Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. together.

“That’s a real convergence of interests,” he observed.

“FIGHTING WHILE TALKING” – A flaw of counterinsurgency strategy is that many of its practitioners believe the fight must continue until it reaches a tipping point. Only then can true reconciliation begin. Not true, said Wilder, who believes negotiating with the Taliban need not be a sequential matter. “Fighting while talking – we should do both simultaneously.”

A ‘PLAN B’ FOR THE TALIBAN – In the wake of the killing, USIP’s Scott Worden said so much depends on Pakistan’s strategic and political outlook than the outlook of the U.S. While al-Qaida probably lent support to the Taliban, that wasn’t one of the main pillars holding them up, he says. And so it doesn’t make sense for the U.S. to pack its bags and leave Afghanistan.

IS IT AN ARTIFICIAL MOMENT? – There’s no question that the killing of Osama this month created a moment – it’s just what to do with it that remains the question. “It does have an energizing effect…we have had a victory,” Wilder said, adding, it’s time to use the moment. “We need to use that as leverage to negotiate in a touch manner on what we need from Karzai in the coming years,” he commented. “If we play our cards right, I think we are in a better place to negotiate.”


The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis