National Third Place Winner
Timothy “Sean” Ray
Mississippi School for Mathematics and Science
Columbus, Mississippi
Coordinator: Donna Ray

In 2007, when asked to identify those accountable for the conflict in Darfur, Paul Kagame, president of genocide-scarred Rwanda, observed, “There are three components—the United Nations, the African Union, and the government of Sudan. These three are to blame for the situation; . . .they need to get together and find a solution.”¹  By writ of international law,²  this multilateral cooperation has been established as an essential component in the safeguarding of human rights. However, these institutions must acknowledge the growing rift between good intention and practical application. The case studies of two flagrant and preventable humanitarian catastrophes—the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 1995 Bosnian genocide—reveal the failure of the global community to act upon warning signs, and emphasize the need for more effective means of both preventive and post-conflict diplomacy to ensure the protection of civilian populations during times of conflict.

Rwanda
Although ethnic tension in Rwanda predates the arrival of European settlers, Belgian interference brought Rwanda’s two major ethnic groups—the Hutu and the Tutsi—into vehement contention. The Tutsi minority, favored and privileged by the “racist convictions”³  of the Belgians, became the victims of Hutu resentment during decolonization. Periodic mass killings against the Tutsi began in 1959, establishing an extremely hostile and often violent relationship between the two.⁴  The Belgians, dismayed by the dissolution of its other colonial holdings and pressured by the United Nations, replaced the Tutsi monarchy with Hutu authorities. Most of the Tutsi that remained were either killed or maimed, and those who survived went into exile in neighboring countries.⁵  This resulted in the subsequent “Hutu Revolution,” and in 1961 an enormously pro-Hutu Rwandese Republic was established.⁶  
Following a 1973 military coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana, the Revolutionary Movement for National Development (MRND) was founded. The party became a flagship of Hutu radicalization, fervently opposing an invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), comprised of exiled Tutsis. After a brief civil war, the two sides signed the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993, which mandated a power-sharing agreement. Disgruntled politicians and military officers of the MRND recruited between 30,000 and 50,000 displaced and unemployed boys and young men to join the Interahamwe, “those who attack together,” who would form the basis of the imminent genocide.⁷ 

The strains imposed by the accords exploded into outright bloodshed in 1994, when President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing him and the recently elected Tutsi president of Burundi. Hutu extremists and the Interahamwe, instinctively blaming the assassination on the Tutsis, effectuated the infamous genocide spanning one hundred days in which up to one million Tutsis and Hutu political opponents were murdered between April and July of 1994.⁸  Aside from the unrestrained killings, degradation, and destruction of families, a great many Tutsi women were raped, tortured, and sexually mutilated.⁹

The international efforts to assuage the catastrophe ultimately failed. The Arusha Accords proved to be mediated by uncommitted third-party actors, making any lapse in conflict difficult to maintain.¹⁰  Established to assist in implementing the accords, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), commanded by General Romeo Dallaire, was the only deployed international coalition that had any potential to prevent a Rwandan conflict. However, when warnings from General Dallaire, Belgian diplomats, and a United States intelligence report went unheeded, a massacre ensued, unchecked until the RPF seized power.¹¹   The underfunded and undermanned UNAMIR, supported by a reluctant United Nations, many of whose members feared the obligations associated with the word “genocide,” was unable to offer any real relief to the civilians of Rwanda.¹²

Bosnia—Srebrenica
The crimes perpetrated mainly against Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia (Bosniaks) from 1992 until 1995, which culminated in the slaying of 8,000 Bosniak males near the city of Srebrenica, had cultural, ethnic, and political origins. As the influence of communism in the Balkans began to subside, various constituent states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to seek independence. However, the Bosnian effort to obtain sovereignty was impeded by its multiethnic composition of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Remaining part of a rump Yugoslavia controlled by Slobodan Milosevic, the fervently nationalistic Serbian president, was clearly unacceptable to the majority of Bosnia's population, while Bosnian independence was anathema to Serb nationalists of Serbia and Bosnia.¹³

In April 1992, despite threats of violence from Serbian nationalists, the Bosnian Parliament issued a declaration of independence.¹⁴  Within weeks of the declaration, Milosevic ordered the siege of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), marking the beginning of a bitter and overwhelmingly one-sided civil war. The Serbian nationalists and JNA imposed a reign of terror upon the Bosnian Croats and Muslims; thousands were driven from their homes, held in detention camps, raped, tortured or summarily executed.¹⁵  Perhaps the most vicious breach of humanitarian law occurred outside the town of Srebrenica, despite its designation as a UN “safe zone”—a specially protected site supported by UN peacekeepers and NATO aircraft.¹⁶  The arrival of hostile Serbian forces resulted in an Srebrenica that was starkly different from a “safe haven.” After being separated from their families, 8,000 male Bosniaks were killed, the largest mass murder in Europe since World War II.

The crimes committed in Bosnia were merely observed by international actors, leaving the perpetrators to do as they wished. The United Nations withdrew its troops in April 1992, leaving only a small group of Dutch peacekeepers in a country where there was no longer any peace to keep.¹⁷  Despite the plethora of reports that detailed the “ethnic cleansing” that was occurring throughout the Bosnian war, real action was not taken until four months after the Srebrenica massacre, including an American-sponsored Dayton peace agreement and the introduction of a NATO-led international military force in Bosnia.¹⁸ 

Resolutions
A report issued by the UN subsequent to the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda lamented its own failure to effectively prevent such catastrophes. The report stated, “The cardinal lesson of Srebrenica is that a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means.”¹⁹  In 2006, the UN Security Council reaffirmed “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”²⁰ 

The acknowledgment of past failure and the assumption of responsibility are critical steps to ending genocide, yet these steps are useless unless practically applied. The continued practice of genocide, and the severity of other instances in Bangladesh, Uganda, Cambodia, and more recently Sudan, have prompted renewed interest in the development of methods to halt occurrences of state-sponsored ethnic cleansing and mass murder.²¹   I recommend the implementation of a “diplomatic triage” by UN, regional, and national institutions to maximize their capacity to deal with crimes against humanity.

My proposed diplomatic triage strategy is a means of assessing humanitarian situations in an effort to efficiently distribute the scarce resources of global, regional, national, and local institutions. Conflicts involving crimes against humanity would be triaged based on various factors, including urgency, scale, and the chance of success. Once situations were evaluated, key multilateral institutions would cooperate in deciding upon an approach. The goal of diplomatic triage is to deal with threats against civilian bodies during conflict as swiftly and efficiently as possible in places where third-party involvement would be most favorable.

Once a country or region becomes plagued with conflict, it becomes extremely difficult to “cure.” Therefore, conflict prevention is one of the two primary components of diplomatic triage. Effective preventive diplomacy was largely absent in Rwanda and Bosnia, and its utilization had the potential to save thousands of lives.²²  Prevention begins with the ability of outside actors to read critical warning signs. Released in 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known better as the Brahimi Report, outlines specific measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to predict possible conflicts and negotiate peaceful resolutions for situations similar to Bosnia and Rwanda.²³ 

The other major component of diplomatic triage is the prevention of relapse. Once a conflict has ended, the application of effective post-conflict diplomacy is essential. Ethnic tension in Rwanda will not heal itself. The estrangement of the third-party negotiators during the Arusha Peace Accords resulted in the agreement’s failure. As seen in the former Yugoslavia, the designation of an area as a safe zone must be guaranteed, and the deplorable state of modern Bosnia can largely be attributed to the faulty Dayton Agreement.
The first conflict of the millennium involving crimes against humanity is already upon us. As we enter the 21st century, Darfur exemplifies the shortcomings of the United Nations and other organizations to fulfill their responsibilities. Despite having imbued themselves with the power to prevent such blatant crimes against humanity, they lack an efficient approach to solve the problem. Diplomatic triage serves as a fundamental process for increasing the effectiveness and awareness of international actors to deal with such situations. Acknowledging failure and declaring “never again” is simply not enough.

Notes
1.  "Rwanda President ‘Ringing an Alarm Bell’ on Darfur." Reuters,May 2, 2007. UN News Service. Accessed December 18, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN0242867420070503

2.  United Nations General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” Resolution 60/1, October 24, 2005. UNHCR Refworld. Accessed December 20, 2008.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44168a910.html

3.  “Because Europeans thought that the Tutsi looked more like themselves than did other Rwandans, they found it reasonable to suppose them closer to Europeans in the evolutionary hierarchy and hence closer to them in ability.” Des Forges, Alison. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 34.

4.  Sebarenzi, Joseph K. "Rwanda: The Fundamental Obstacles to Reconciliation." Global Security and Cooperation Quarterly 3 (Winter 2002). Accessed December 20, 2008.
http://www.ssrc.org/gsc/newsletter3/sebarenzi.htm

5.  "Unearthing the Genesis of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda." New York Times,            April 2, 2008, sec. Africa News.

6.  Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 36.

7.  Baines, Erin K. "Body Politics and the Rwandan Crisis." Third World Quarterly 24 (2003): 484.

8.  Riemer, Neal. Protection against Genocide. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2000, p. 57.

9.  Ibid.

10.  Stettenheim, Joel. "The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, ed. Melanie Barton,, John H. McGuinness, and Margaret E. Greenberg. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 213–226.

11.  Riemer, Protection against Genocide, p. 56.

12.  Ibid.

13.  Riedlmayer, Andras. "A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project. Summer 1993. Accessed December 29, 2008.
http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm

14.  Ibid.

15.  "History of the War in Bosnia." Center for Balkan Development/Friends of Bosnia. Accessed December 30, 2008.
http://www.friendsofbosnia.org/edu_bos.html

16.  Joseph, Edward P. "Bystanders to a Massacre: How the U.N. Failed Srebrenica." Washington Post, July 10, 2005.

17.  “History of the War in Bosnia.”

18.  Crossette, Barbara. "U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre." New York Times, November 16, 1999.

19.  Ibid.

20.  United Nations Security Council. “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” Resolution 1674, April 28, 2006. UNHCR Refworld. Accessed January 1, 2009.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4459bed60.html

 21. Krain, Matthew. "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides." International Studies Quarterly. September 2005. AccessedJanuary 2, 2009.
http://www.genocidewatch.org/internationalintervention.html

22.  Ibid.

23.  Standton, Gregory H. "How We Can Prevent Genocide: Building an International Campaign to End Genocide." January 4, 2009. http://www.genocidewatch.org/howwecanpreventgenocide.htm


Bibliography

Print Sources

Baines, Erin K. "Body Politics and the Rwandan Crisis." Third World Quarterly 24 (2003): 484.

Des Forges, Alison. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 34.

Joseph, Edward P. "Bystanders to a Massacre: How the U.N. Failed Srebrenica." Washington Post, July 10, 2005.

Riemer, Neal. Protection against Genocide. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2000, p. 57.

Stettenheim, Joel. “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, ed. Melanie Barton,, John H. McGuinness, and Margaret E. Greenberg. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, pp. 213–226.

"Unearthing the Genesis of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda." New York Times, April 2, 2008, sec. Africa News.


Internet Sources

"History of the War in Bosnia." Center for Balkan Development/Friends of Bosnia.
Accessed December 30, 2008.
http://www.friendsofbosnia.org/edu_bos.html


Krain, Matthew. "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides." International Studies Quarterly. September 2005. AccessedJanuary 2, 2009.
http://www.genocidewatch.org/internationalintervention.html

Riedlmayer, Andras. "A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project. Summer 1993.  Accessed December 29, 2008.
http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm

"Rwanda President ‘Ringing an Alarm Bell’ on Darfur." Reuters,
May 2, 2007. UN News Service. Accessed December 18, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN0242867420070503

Sebarenzi, Joseph K. "Rwanda: The Fundamental Obstacles to Reconciliation." Global Security and Cooperation Quarterly 3 (Winter 2002). Accessed December 20, 2008.
http://www.ssrc.org/gsc/newsletter3/sebarenzi.htm

Standton, Gregory H. "How We Can Prevent Genocide: Building an International Campaign to End Genocide." Accessed January 4, 2009. http://www.genocidewatch.org/howwecanpreventgenocide.htm

United Nations General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome.” Resolution 60/1, October 24, 2005. UNHCR Refworld. Accessed December 20, 2008.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44168a910.html

United Nations Security Council. “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” Resolution 1674, April 28, 2006 UNHCR Refworld. Accessed January 1, 2009.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4459bed60.html