The resignation of General Pervez Musharraf, once a key Washington ally, as Pakistan’s president marks a new stage in the country’s often volatile politics. With a short-lived ruling coalition and presidential election on September 6, the country faces a host of challenges.

Qamar-ul Huda is a senior program officer in the Religion and Peacemaking Center of Innovation. Of Pakistani origin, he maintains a strong focus on the country.

J Alexander Thier is a senior rule of law advisor in the Rule of Law Center of Innovation. An attorney, he has spent 14 years working on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues.

USIP asked these two experts to put Musharraf’s departure in context.

• Describe the key events, in your view, that led to Musharraf's resignation.
• What are the prospects for the September 6 presidential election to replace Musharraf?
• What are the repercussions of the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani?
• Since the new Gilani was elected, did Musharraf really have any power?
• What are the consequences of the split in Pakistan's ruling coalition in relation to all this?
• What does Musharraf’s ouster mean for the struggle against al-Qaeda and related elements?
• How does Musharraf's departure play into the perception of Afghanistan as a strategic battlefield between India and Pakistan, especially given evidence that Pakistani intelligence facilitated the recent suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul?
• What role does the deteriorating situation of Pakistan's economy have in this?
• Does Musharraf’s ouster suggest that the position of Pakistan's military has eroded, or are the cards merely being reshuffled?
• Will this impact the situation in the religious schools/madaris?
• What does the shift in leadership say about the role of the judiciary sector and other civil society institutions in the country?
• Media reports have said the U.S., UK and Saudi Arabia convinced Musharraf that his only option was to resign. What is the nature of the Saudi-Pakistan relationship?
• What are the consequences for U.S. policy and financial assistance to Pakistan?
• What are the consequences for possible discussions on a peace treaty with India?

Describe the key events, in your view, that led to Musharraf's resignation.

Image on right: Pakistani lawyers and civil society members shout slogans against Bhutto's widower and political successor, Asif Ali Zardari, who will run for president in the Sept. 6 election by lawmakers, during a demonstration in Islamabad, Pakistan, on Thursday, Aug. 28, 2008. Hundreds of lawyers have rallied in major Pakistani cities and disrupted traffic to pressure the government to reinstate dozens of judges fired by ex-President Pervez Musharraf. (AP Photo)

Huda:

Since the elections the key objective for both the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistani Muslim League (PML-N) was to find a constitutional process to oust Musharraf, whether through treason charges, impeachment, or both. The move by two provincial assemblies to vote on the illegality of Musharraf's position as president was a sign of the parties’ success in convincing the parliamentarians.

Under Musharraf both PPP and PML-N leaders were marginalized from public office; their leaders (Benazir Bhutto and Sharif) were effectively in exile for eight and half years.

Circumventing the two major parties is part of a series of problems Musharraf generated: first, his close alliance with Islamist parties kept a short leash on their activities, but when radical parties such Terikh al-Taliban or Pakistan Taliban emerged as a force in the tribal forces, Musharraf was pressed use the military against his own people—an unprecedented move.

Second, in March 2007 Musharraf suspended Justice Iftikhar Choudhary, the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court. This set off a lawyers’ movement to demand the independence of the judiciary and to open the door on all illegal detentions. Lawyers were joined by all sectors of civil society—press, teachers, union leaders, labor, etc.—as protests were in all major cities. In November 2007, Musharraf again declared emergency rule and suspended the constitution, clamped down on the press, and limited public assembly. While he reversed these emergency measures in late December, the rise of civil society to oust Musharraf was unstoppable.

Thier:

General Musharraf initiated a political crisis in the spring of 2007 when he dismissed the chief justice and numerous other key members of the judiciary. This dismissal was a clear sign that nearly eight years after seizing power in an unconstitutional military coup, Musharraf was not serious about putting the country back on the path of democracy and constitutional rule of law. This dismissal of the quasi-independent judiciary was the final straw for Pakistan's repressed political parties and civil society.

Persistent, widespread protests forced the hand of Pakistan's constitutionally illegitimate general/president to reappoint the chief justice, resign his position as chief of army and allow the exiled major party leaders back into the country. The movement to reinstate democracy and remove Musharraf snowballed from there—resulting in a stinging election defeat for Musharraf's party and allies in February 2008 and the formation of a coalition of the two largest parties bent on his ouster.

What are the prospects for the September 6 presidential election to replace Musharraf?

Huda:

Legislators are prepared to elect the next president; it looks like the PPP and allies will vote for PPP head Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s widower. He has made several promises to the nation as to what he plans to do as president, but the average Pakistani thinks he has too many with legal problems. Regardless, Zardari is well situated to take on the presidency.

What are the repercussions of the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani?

Huda:

The assassination attempt on Gilani is yet another indication how security forces have little control on the streets. In August, the three major military operations in the Frontier Province and militant suicide bombings in Islamabad, Peshawar, and other major cities have left over two hundred casualties and eighty-five dead. There is a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence between the government and militant forces, and neither side has produced a viable solution to transform the conflict.

Since the new Gilani was elected, did Musharraf really have any power?

Thier:

Since the successful elections and Musharraf's handing over of his military command to General Ashfaq Kiyani, who has tried to remove the military from the political sphere, Musharraf's power has steadily declined. However, it had been unclear to what extent Musharraf still enjoyed the backing of the military and intelligence services—the leadership of which he appointed over the last eight years—which are Pakistan's most powerful institutions. As the junior coalition partner, Sharif's PML-N continued to push hard for Musharraf's removal, there were increasing signs that both the military and the U.S. government, which had strongly backed Musharraf, would stay out of the fray. At the same time, Musharraf became extremely unpopular among the Pakistani public and Sharif's party gained strongly in popularity with its unwavering stance against Musharraf. This dynamic placed pressure on the leaders of the PPP—namely Gilani and Zardari, to move against the president as well.

What are the consequences of the split in Pakistan's ruling coalition in relation to all this?

Huda:

Since the February 18 elections there has been tremendous optimism for democratic resurgence and for a new era of political, economic and social stability. The last seven months was viewed as an important transitional period for the PPP and PML-N to forge lasting alliances to create a culture of political cooperation.

However, it has been anything but an alliance of mutual cooperation. Zardari and Sharif have publicly disagreed in several major areas such as the reinstatement of the supreme court judges, counterterrorism operations in the Northwest Frontier province, economic stimulus policies and ways to deal with radical influences in the country. The coalition split is another indication of party leaders' inability to cooperate on common ground and for basic national interests. Pakistanis are frustrated with PPP and PML-N's petty bickering, ineptitude and inability to create a functional working government that brings services to the people.

What does Musharraf’s ouster mean for the struggle against al-Qaeda and related elements?

Huda:

Al-Qaeda is a real threat in the region, but the forces that are actively working in Pakistan are the Tehrikh-e Taliban and sectarian radical groups formerly known as Lashkar-e Tayyeba, Jaish-e- Mohammed and Lashkar-e Jhangvi. There are several more splinter radical groups who view themselves as the true defenders of the faith and who are fighting to purify the country from secular and international influences. Al-Qaeda is not directing these groups, nor does it have any real influence. But, the further radicalization of Islamists during Musharraf’s rule has increased terrorism and not controlled it.

How does Musharraf's departure play into the perception of Afghanistan as a strategic battlefield between India and Pakistan, especially given evidence that Pakistani intelligence facilitated the recent suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul?

Huda:

The Karzai government will look forward to working with any civilian government in Pakistan and the Afghan president hopes to influence ISI (Pakistani intelligence). Musharraf and his military allies were viewed in Afghanistan as a major impediment for positive bilateral relations; however, both countries need to agree on a deal to address terrorism and regional security issues.

The day of Indian embassy bombings in Kabul there were three major suicide bombs in Pakistan's cities, killing over 93 civilians. There were rumors in Pakistan that these bombings were coordinated by both Indian and Afghan intelligence forces. The level of Suspicions about the intelligence agencies of all three countries must be addressed. These agencies’ interference in neighboring states must be curtailed.

Thier:

An effective transition to civilian government in Pakistan should help ease relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the new government has reached out to the Afghans and the international community concerning the problems Pakistan faces with its militancy at home. Effective civilian control of the military and ISI would hopefully increase transparency in the role of military and intelligence services in supporting the Taliban and other anti-Afghan government elements. However, such a transition may take considerable time, allowing for the possibility that the "government" in Pakistan will simultaneously pursue different policies.

What role does the deteriorating situation of Pakistan's economy have in this?

Huda:

I do not think radial Islamists are being energized by an economic decline; if anything their activities have a negative effect on sustaining growth. The problems of food shortages, inflation reaching 13 percent and the weak rupee are devastating the middle class and lower middle classes. In the first five years of Musharraf, Pakistan's economic growth was between 7.1 and 7.8 percent, one of the highest in Asia. At present however, with security issues and poor governance, the economy is tanking.

Does Musharraf’s ouster suggest that the position of Pakistan's military has eroded, or are the cards merely being reshuffled?

Huda:

The Pakistani military is far from eroded. The Frontier Corps that is fighting the Taliban is probably demoralized and exhausted from seven years of operations, but the overall military remains in sound condition. There is a major learning curve for the military to retrain itself to think about its emerging role in non-conventional warfare and counter-terrorism operations.

Will this impact the situation in the religious schools/madaris?

Huda:

My work with religious schools indicate that madrasa students and teachers alike feel there is a real cleavage between those in power governing the state and those who are not. Whether under a military government or civilian government, the historical legacy of attempting to co-opt and control the independent madrasa institutions is still very real. While Musharraf attempted to coordinate several reform measures with madrasas, and allocated several million dollars to teach contemporary subjects, this effort only impacted a handful of schools.

What does the shift in leadership say about the role of the judiciary sector and other civil society institutions in the country?

Huda:

Any hope lies within the judiciary and civil society institutions. In the last three years, the surge of activity from judiciary and civil society members has indicated their public assertiveness and desire to maintain democratic institutions. Musharraf’s departure is an example of civil society activism and judicial resilience to maintain independence from military forces.

Thier:

The biggest winner from the political crisis of the last 18 months has been Pakistani civil society, as they organized and catalyzed the peaceful, democratic overthrow of a military dictator. The judiciary and the lawyers’ movement in particular became avatars of a principled counterweight to military rule and corrupt political parties—a professional class in Pakistani society that would stand for the rule of law above other prerogatives. If they can capitalize on this image, they may be able to help transform the Pakistani political system onto more stable ground, with multiple independent centers of power checking each other and enforcing the rule of law.

Media reports have said the U.S., UK and Saudi Arabia convinced Musharraf that his only option was to resign. What is the nature of the Saudi-Pakistan relationship?

Huda:

These reports put too much stock on the influence of these three states on Pakistani domestic politics. Musharraf's departure marks his own realization that his time has expired and his dwindling support. Saudi Arabia is a major ally of Pakistan and is the country’s primary major supplier of oil. It is highly dubious that the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is interested in advising and directing the lives of Pakistan’s politicians and military leaders.

What are the consequences for U.S. policy and financial assistance to Pakistan?

Huda:

The U.S. will continue with military aid and a new measure to support the education sector. There is a U.S.-backed five-year package to develop infrastructure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to improve basic institutions. There could have been more successes if these aid packages were initiated six years ago.

What are the consequences for possible discussions on a peace treaty with India?

Huda:

Musharraf left a positive legacy in improving relations with India. He initiated a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) with India; this effort led to several bilateral dialogues on a peace process. Musharraf opened the door to several options to resolving the Kashmir issue; in one, he had retracted the traditional Pakistani position of a plebiscite in Kashmir. His alliance with Islamists allowed him to control the infiltration of insurgents crossing the LoC into India. Musharraf repeatedly encouraged bilateral cooperation with India, yet there was never an official peace treaty between the two nations. Once a stable Pakistani government is established, we will see the revival of a peace treaty.

The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.