The socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe have been declining for years, but on March 11, 2007, they seemed to take a dramatic turn for the worse. Following months of protests, the Zimbabwean security forces embarked on a political crackdown that resulted in the arrest and assault of opposition leaders, including Morgan Tsvangirai, head of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the main opposition party. Against these worsening conditions, the United States Institute of Peace convened a public meeting on April 25, 2007, led by Michael Bratton, Adrienne LeBas, and Martha Mutisi, to discuss the triggers leading to the March 2007 crackdown, the changes within the political parties in Zimbabwe, the challenges facing civil society organizations (CSOs), and the public’s response to past political violence. This USIPeace Briefing summarizes the meeting’s discussions and highlights recommendations for the way forward.

Triggers of the March 2007 Crackdown

The March 2007 crackdown occurred against the backdrop of worsening economic conditions and protest. Beginning in December 2006, Zimbabwe experienced a series of strikes by public servants—including doctors and nurses—over salaries and working conditions. In February 2007, the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe, which is associated with the pro-opposition Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, was joined by the Zimbabwe Teachers Association, which is traditionally aligned with the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), in a widespread strike over wages and working conditions. As these strikes and other protests began posing a threat to ZANU-PF’s power, the ruling party responded by using security forces to break up a prayer rally by the MDC.

In many ways, the panelists explained, similar conditions existed during other periods in which government has violently repressed public protest. From March to June 2003, opposition activists were brutally attacked and detained. In May 2005, ZANU-PF carried out Operation Murambatsvina, which was officially undertaken to remove vagrants and illegal dwellings and business. (In fact, some believe it was more likely aimed to preempt mass protest against an expected increase of food prices in the face of deteriorating economic conditions and clamp down on key illegal markets, like foreign exchange). However, the panelists agreed that the March 2007 crackdown differed in a number of important ways from Operation Murambatsvina and the March-June 2003 events: the national leaders of the MDC were targeted directly—not just the district and branch leaders and MDC supporters—and there was evidence of a fragmentation within the security forces and ZANU-PF itself.

The latest crackdown is likely to further alienate the population and reduce support for ZANU-PF, as occurred with Operation Murambatsvina. An October 2005 Afrobarometer survey¹ revealed that 54 percent of all adult Zimbabweans experienced some effect of Operation Murambatsvina, which included the destruction of dwellings, eviction from homes, closure of businesses, arrests for illegal trading, or loss of jobs. Although Harare and Bulawayo residents reported among the highest numbers of home destructions (respectively, 72 percent and 66 percent of all residents reported that their dwellings were destroyed), the groups affected by Operation Murambatsvina were wide-ranging: they included not only opposition strong-holds but residents of Mashonaland West (Mugabe’s hometown) and Mashonaland East and Mashonaland Central (ZANU-PF strongholds)—perhaps indicating dissent within the party. However, if Operation Murambatsvina was also meant to shore up support for ZANU-PF, it backfired. The Afrobarometer survey indicates that support for ZANU-PF decreased from 30 percent in May 2004 to 19 percent in October 2005, while support for MDC increased from 10 percent in May 2004 to 34 percent in October 2005. In addition, institutional trust declined: 52 percent expressed trust in the police in 2004, whereas only 39 percent trusted the police in 2005. In much the same way, one panelist warned, the March 2007 events will further erode the base of ZANU-PF.

Internal Strains in ZANU-PF

While the recent decision by ZANU-PF’s politburo and central committee to expand parliament² and redraw the boundaries of some constituencies may convey strength, many noted that ZANU-PF has been weathering internal strains as well. Since 2000, the succession struggle has divided ZANU-PF into several factions, one of which was led by Emerson Mnangagwa, the speaker of parliament. Recently, the anti-Mnangagwa faction has splintered into several factions, chief of which is the group led by Solomon Mujuru, the former chief of the army, and husband of Vice-President Joyce Mujuru. There have been other signs of dissent between members of ZANU-PF and the party leadership. For example, the politburo and central committee of ZANU-PF defeated Mugabe’s proposal to extend his term until 2010 in favor of allowing Mugabe to run in the 2008 elections and move up the date for parliamentary elections. Still, it is not clear how much of this was a defeat for Mugabe or whether Mugabe simply changed his mind. Some experts noted that these resolutions were not subjected to an open debate but forced through at the last minute—suggesting the need of the central committee to marginalize dissenters. As one of the panelists pointed out, many of the reactions to fissures and re-alignments seen in ZANU-PF resembled past crackdowns, when dissenters were quieted. In short, these tensions in ZANU-PF do not indicate a turning point. Rather the current economic decline and political stalemate seem likely to continue, without any prospect of a negotiated settlement with the MDC.

Internal Strains in MDC

The MDC is also split, stemming from internal disagreement about whether to participate in the November 2005 senate elections. Welshman Ncube and Arthur Mutambara, MDC leaders based in Bulawayo, wanted to participate in the senatorial elections, but Tsvangirai felt that doing so would legitimize the ruling party. Since the MDC split, there has been increasing evidence of a declining commitment to non-violence by the MDC. Notably, the national executive of the MDC may have lost control of so-called Mass Action Committees—grassroots structures largely comprised of youth that were created to undertake party security. Episodes of intra-MDC violence have also occurred, with the MDC-Mutambara faction bearing the brunt of the attacks. It was felt that these divisions in the philosophy and the strategies used by the MDC make it increasingly difficult to propose that differences with ZANU-PF are resolved with a negotiated settlement.

In the end, while panelists agreed that there has been a great deal of political movement within both ZANU-PF and MDC, it was not significant enough to suggest a change of course. Both parties are led by hardliners and the future only portends further stalemate and continued economic and political decline. In particular, the MDC split increases resistance against negotiating with ZANU-PF or creating a government of national unity.

The Region’s Quiet Response

While some countries, such as Mauritius, Botswana, and Zambia, have criticized Mugabe’s policies, the Southern African Development Commission (SADC), the main sub-regional organization, has not voiced any significant disapproval of Mugabe’s handling of political opposition groups and the economy. This is surprising, one panelist pointed out, because the region has faced an influx of Zimbabwean refugees and, more indirectly, has suffered a decline in foreign direct investment. Moreover, Mbeki’s legacy as a force for democratization will be hurt if Zimbabwe continues to regress. While SADC’s behavior can be partly explained by the region’s general reluctance to criticize a liberation leader, SADC leaders may also fear that increasing the focus and pressure on Zimbabwe will invite more scrutiny of their domestic policies by the international community.

After the March 2007 SADC meeting, Mbeki was appointed to mediate between ZANU-PF and the MDC. However, given that many conclude that South Africa’s policy of “Quiet Diplomacy” has failed, there is skepticism about his effectiveness as a mediator and his political will to intervene. As one panelist noted, by officially criticizing Mugabe’s land seizures, Mbeki may fear a backlash from some in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) who call for more radical land redistribution policies in South Africa. In particular, the MDC’s close relationship with the Congress of South African Trade Unions would be a threat to the ANC, should the MDC come to power in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, another panelist added, South Africa is alleged to have profited from Zimbabwe’s conflict, since many Zimbabwean professionals and firms have relocated there. Nonetheless, many participants agreed that South Africa holds the key to a reduction of political violence in Zimbabwe.

The Role and Space for Civil Society

As the traditional buffer between the state and its citizens, civil society organizations are finding it ever more difficult to operate in Zimbabwe. According to one panelist, the relationship with government and civil society has grown increasingly contentious, as ZANU-PF has become uncomfortable with civil society’s involvement in advocating greater democratization or reform of government institutions, moving away from its focus on development and humanitarian issues. The recent constitutional amendments that prohibit demonstrations and curtail freedom of the press constrain the activities of civil society. But civil society organizations are using increasingly confrontational methods, such as protests and strikes, which are being met with violence from state security services. Efforts to achieve change through negotiation—such as the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, which started in 1997 and includes government, labor, and business representatives—are considered ineffective. Meetings between Mugabe and religious leaders have not yielded any improvements, either. In addition, one panelist warned, international support also seems to be declining. Donors have seen little improvement in Zimbabwe’s civil society, due to the hostile environment in which it operates, and appear reluctant to continue supporting CSOs. Continental and regional silence also hampers civil society. The international community was urged to support leaders of civil society organizations through training and capacity-building programs and offer protection to activists from state security agents. The work of civil society organizations promises to become increasingly more difficult: in April 2007, the government of Zimbabwe de-registered all nongovernmental organizations, requiring them to register anew before they could continue with their work.

The Way Forward

Many warned that Zimbabwe’s future will most likely include continued violence, repression, and economic decline. The following recommendations were made to address these issues:

• The agricultural sector must be supported in order to help alleviate the food shortages in Zimbabwe. While this may amount to conferring some legitimacy to the land re-distribution policies, the reality is that the current land owners do not have the training or access to markets needed to produce enough food for Zimbabwe.
• Quiet diplomacy will not work. African leaders should speak out against the heavy-handed actions of ZANU-PF and the security forces. SADC member states must also lend greater support to CSOs.
• Political negotiations must begin. Reformist elements in ZANU-PF should be empowered. Equally important, talks between the MDC and ZANU-PF must take place.

Notes

1. The Afrobarometer project conducts regular surveys of social, political, and economic conditions in Africa. The October 2005 Afrobarometer survey conducted in Zimbabwe included 1,048 random participants and 64 participants that were internally displaced by Operation Murambatsvina. For the full survey see: Eldred Masunungure and Anyway Ndapwadza, “Summary of Results: Round 3: Afrobarometer Survey in Zimbabwe, 2005,” http://www.afrobarometer.org/zimbabwe.htm.

2. The legislature will expand from 150 to 210 members, while the senate will increase from 66 to 84 members.

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Dorina Bekoe, a senior program officer in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.