At the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war almost eight years ago, the Albanian-majority Serbian province of Kosovo was removed from Serbia’s governance and placed temporarily under a United Nations protectorate, administered by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Last summer, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was tasked by the Security Council with resolving the question of Kosovo’s future status, with support from U.S. and European Union envoys (Frank Wisner and Stefan Lehne respectively).

Ahtisaari’s effort is now drawing to a close. He has delivered to both Pristina and Belgrade a plan that explicitly allows a great deal of protection for Serbs and their religious monuments in Kosovo but implicitly ends Belgrade’s sovereignty. His plan opens the prospect of a sovereign and independent Kosovo under continuing international supervision. It is anticipated that Ahtisaari will take his plan, with some revisions, to the UN Security Council this month.

This USIPeace Briefing discusses potential drivers of conflict in Kosovo during the status decision and in the period thereafter. These drivers of conflict arise from the international community, the Kosovo Albanians, Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs. They have the potential not only to make Kosovo dysfunctional but also to destabilize the region.

Delay and Uncertainty by the International Community

Delay in the status decision could drive conflict in Kosovo: the 90 percent of its population that is Albanian has been patient so far, but that will not last forever. The Contact Group for the Balkans (the United States, UK, Germany, Italy, France, Russia, and the EU) has already postponed a decision, initially expected by the end of 2006, in order to accommodate a Serbian constitutional referendum and subsequent elections. Delay past the U.S. presidency of the UN Security Council in May could begin to generate serious pressures in favor of violence within the Albanian community.

Uncertainty could also drive violence. The guiding principles for Ahtisaari’s effort established by the Contact Group eliminated options like partition, return of Kosovo to its previous status, and union of Kosovo with contiguous territories, but they left open both final status and governing arrangements within Kosovo. Ahtisaari’s proposal clarifies the internal governing arrangements but does not resolve the status question explicitly. There have been suggestions that he will go farther in his recommendations to the Security Council, but if the ambiguity is allowed to remain it will drive efforts by radicals in both Pristina and Belgrade to resolve the status question in their favor.

A potential Russian veto in the Security Council could also cause both delay and uncertainty. While Russia has thus far played a constructive role within the Contact Group, Moscow has repeatedly stated that it will veto any resolution that does not take into account Belgrade’s views on the future of Kosovo. This has caused Western capitals to hesitate seeking a clear statement on status in the Security Council.

Without a clear status decision in the Security Council, the European Union is likely to split, not only on recognition of Kosovo but also on establishment of the international civilian presence to follow UNMIK. This follow-on international presence is vital to implementation of the Ahtisaari proposal. If no EU consensus is reached during the German presidency, it will be difficult to achieve during the Portuguese presidency starting July 1.

Even if the EU manages to achieve consensus among its 27 members, there remains the question of how quickly the new international presence, led by the EU, will be put in place. UNMIK is already demoralized and exhausted. The Ahtisaari proposal provides a transition period of 120 days, during which UNMIK’s capacity can be expected to decline rapidly. If the EU is unable to build its capacity quickly, the risk of violence will rise.

The EU plans a mission with broad “Bonn-style” powers, analogous to those held in Bosnia by the High Representative. This would be a significant step backwards from the current situation, in which Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) have held major responsibilities in all areas possible under the UN protectorate. Experience elsewhere in the Balkans suggests that the locals will exploit uncertainty about governing responsibility to get the internationals to take the more difficult decisions. While Kosovo needs supervision of those aspects of government that involve inter-ethnic relations, the EU risks taking a step backwards if it appears to take on responsibilities currently held by the PISG, thus decreasing accountability and enabling the Kosovo institutions to avoid tough choices.

The United States also risks introducing delay and uncertainty. It has never stated a clear position on the status of Kosovo, but it is widely believed that the United States will be among the first countries to recognize an independent Kosovo. The United States might fail to recognize Kosovo expeditiously—say, for example, because it preferred to wait for an EU consensus to emerge. This would cause major disappointment among Albanians and hearten nationalists in Serbia. The United States needs to make it explicitly clear to its European partners that Washington will move forward in unilaterally recognizing Kosovo’s independence if the UNSC is unable to make a decision. It should also encourage other like-minded EU countries to do likewise. This might divide the EU and corner Russia, but it would ensure that delay and uncertainty do not continue.

Disappointment and Disunity of the Kosovo Albanians

The Ahtisaari proposal crosses many Kosovo Albanian red lines, providing extensive autonomy to Serb communities individually and jointly, protection for Serb monuments, and unrestrained subsidies from Belgrade. The Kosovo Albanians have nevertheless generally supported the Ahtisaari proposal, believing the internationals, who have whispered that it will lead quickly to an independent and sovereign state.

If it fails to do so, radical groups like “Self-Determination,” which has sponsored demonstrations against the proposal, could gain support from war veterans and large numbers of unemployed. The Unity Team that has negotiated with Ahtisaari could quickly be swept into irrelevance by riots, civil disobedience, and violence against the UN and against Serbs. The international community has long worried about the Radicals coming to power in Belgrade; it is just as worrisome that radicals might seize power, or at least initiative, in Pristina.

The main reservations among Kosovo Albanians about the Ahtisaari proposal concern the dismantling of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the reduced and demilitarized version of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Kosovo Albanians view the KPC as their most trusted institution and the embryo of Kosovo’s future defense force. If the dismantling is not handled well, with retired KPC personnel unhappy with the outcome, conflict could result. International donors will have to ensure that “security sector reform” satisfies the desire of Kosovo Albanians to have a visible security force committed to the protection of all of Kosovo’s population.

The Kosovo Albanians are notoriously disunited, despite the existence of the Unity Team. Each of their political parties maintains a separate security service, which under Athisaari’s proposal would be merged. Continued existence of the separate services could be a major security challenge, perpetuating disunity and threatening instability.

Another important issue of immediate concern is Kosovo’s economy. UNMIK has injected much needed financial stimulation into Kosovo’s economy, providing at least some Kosovars with jobs and income. UNMIK’s departure, if not followed by immediate assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, could create an enormous economic and financial gap.

Additionally, Kosovo’s institutions have pledged to take over a duly apportioned part of ex-Yugoslavia’s international debt, which is close to $1.3 billion, once Belgrade recognizes Kosovo. While Serbia’s recognition seems unlikely in the near term, once it occurs, international creditors will seek repayments that Pristina will be hard put to make. Major international assistance will be required (and the United States has wisely made provision for this in its future budget proposals).

Hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians still live as refugees in Europe. Many of the host countries would like to see them return to Kosovo as soon as status is decided. These refugees’ remittances are, however, vital to the Kosovo economy. Rapid repatriation would dramatically worsen Kosovo’s social and economic problems.

Serbia’s Effort to Maintain Sovereignty or Divide Kosovo

The Athisaari plan crosses few of Belgrade’s redlines, and it provides extensive protection for the Kosovo Serbs, who are the subject of most of the proposal. Belgrade could continue to finance Serb-populated territories in Kosovo (it currently provides about $150 million per year) and only inform the government in Pristina about the transactions. The proposal provides Serbs with most of what they have asked for on decentralization, police, education, and protection of vital national (i.e. ethnic) interests in the Kosovo parliament.

Belgrade has nevertheless rejected the Athisaari proposal because it sees it as a step toward independence and sovereignty for Kosovo, even though neither is mentioned in the text. Belgrade seeks to maintain sovereignty over all of Kosovo, allowing the Albanians to govern themselves autonomously but without international recognition. Serbia’s new constitution seeks to make it impossible for future Belgrade governments to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, and Prime Minister Kostunica is seeking to ensure in the current negotiations over formation of a new government that it will regard Kosovo as an indispensable part of Serbia.

Belgrade is aware that it is unlikely to achieve its primary objective of maintaining Serbian sovereignty over all of Kosovo. Its fallback position has been delay and ambiguity. If a decision is nevertheless taken, Belgrade seeks to retain de facto control of that portion of the territory on which Kosovo Serbs live and on which Serb monuments and religious sites are located.

There is little prospect that these positions will change. The political scene in Belgrade is divided between less nationalist forces (including the Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and G17) and more nationalist forces (including the Serbian Democratic Party, the Radicals, and the Socialists). The latter still control two-thirds of the votes in Parliament. They set the tone of political discourse in Serbia and made Kosovo a main issue in the recent election campaign, following a constitutional referendum in which Kosovo was virtually the only issue. The nationalist forces can form a government without the less nationalist ones, but the reverse is not true, thus putting Kostunica in the driver’s seat, at least so far as Kosovo is concerned.

What Belgrade hopes for is that it can cause further delay in several ways: by prolonging negotiations over its own new government, by blocking a UNSC decision through the threat of a Russian veto, or by preventing the EU from reaching a consensus at 27 on Kosovo’s future status. Serbia will also work hard to convince the Americans that independence for Kosovo will bring the Radicals to power in Belgrade and that a sovereign Kosovo will set an unwelcome precedent.

Belgrade is unlikely to precipitate violence openly, but it is not above hoping that Kosovo Albanians will become impatient and resort to violence. This would de-legitimize Pristina’s campaign for independence and cause further hesitation in the international community. It might also provide an excuse for open Serbian intervention, in particular to protect Serbs (or possibly UNMIK) in the north.

Some Kosovo Serbs have also threatened to respond to Kosovo’s independence by declaring independence in the northern, Serb-controlled municipalities contiguous with Serbia. If Kosovo becomes independent, it is likely that Belgrade will encourage those Serbs who live south of the Ibar River to leave their homes, thus demonstrating the failure of the international community and the Kosovo institutions to protect and maintain the multiethnic composition of Kosovo.

Other Problems: Education and Freedom of Movement

There are a number of additional problems affecting the prospects for a peaceful denouement in Kosovo that transcend ethnic lines: education and freedom of movement are two of the more important.

Kosovo’s educational system could be an important driver of future conflict over the long term. Even when they go to the same school, Serbs and Albanians not only use separate languages but also separate curricula that promote negative stereotypes of the other group, using history and myth to perpetuate hostility. There is little prospect for integrating the schools unless classes are offered in English, which is the preferred second language for both Serbs and Albanians. This could be done—the economic advantages of speaking English well are enormous in Kosovo—but it would still require a concerted effort to eliminate negative stereotypes from the curriculum.

Neither Kosovo Albanians nor Serbs can travel or study readily in the rest of Europe. With the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the EU, even these countries have become relatively inaccessible. This leaves young people in Kosovo isolated and resentful. Visa liberalization by the EU is a vital step in preventing Kosovo from becoming a virtual prison for its young and rapidly expanding population.

Conclusion: Multilateral when we Can, Unilateral if we Must

There are many things that can go wrong in the days and months ahead for Kosovo. There are forces working for delay and ambiguity, which will incite violence. The time has come for clarity and alacrity.

Given Serbia’s effort to cause further delay and uncertainty, along with the EU penchant for slowness and Russia’s reluctance to allow a clear UNSC decision, the United States needs to consider its options if a negotiated, multilateral solution proves impossible within the next few months. In that event, the Ahtisaari proposal will be a dead letter—Serbia cannot expect its implementation if there is no Security Council resolution.

If Kosovo were to remain unrecognized, it would then have a status comparable to that of Gaza or the West Bank, with all that implies in terms of instability and prospects for violence. Only U.S. leadership in moving quickly to recognize Kosovo—along with as many other countries as possible—could prevent rapid deterioration of such a situation. While the NATO forces stationed in Kosovo can no doubt keep the lid on for a while, that is only a temporary solution—one that will not stand firm if 1.8 million Albanians decide to march.

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Daniel Serwer, vice president for the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and for the Centers of Innovation at the Institute; and by Yll Bajraktari and Christina Parajon of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the United States Institute of Peace. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.