Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your Committee. The views I express are mine only, and not those of any organization with which I am affiliated.

I will focus on the impact of Shi’a-Sunni relations on the situation in Iraq, as I believe this to be the nexus of the problems.

At present the situation in Iraq looks bleak. We have,

• an insurgency composed of many groups with different agendas
• sectarian violence in which the actors are shadowy and the motives are murky
• a political structure that feeds on and strengthens sectarian and ethnic divisions
• political deadlock and a national reconciliation process that is going nowhere
• state institutions that are under-capacitated or downright dysfunctional
• a government that is ineffective in its primary task of serving the people.

Despite this, we should not fall into the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc: the situation we have now is not the inevitable result of the collapse Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, the political structure that was adopted by the CPA in the early days, along with flawed policies and decision on the part of the CPA and Iraqi political actors, made this outcome virtually certain. The cardinal, root error committed by the CPA was to define and build Iraqi politics along purely sectarian and ethnic lines. This was a gross oversimplification of Iraqi society arising from ignorance and intellectual laziness, and it ignored the complex texture and weave of the Iraqi social fabric. Unfortunately, this reductionist model was encouraged by some Iraqi political groups that had a vested interest in promoting a sectarian or ethnic agenda. This structure has in turn increased religious, sectarian and ethnic fanaticism in the country. It has entrenched the groups in their positions and deepened the divides instead of bridging the gaps.

In this regard, I would like to quote from a report I wrote in September 26, 2003:

[When] the CPA appointed the GC, it promoted a blueprint for sectarian and ethnic proportional representation, rather than political representation.

The sectarian and ethnic basis of the political process in Iraq and the prevalence of a clientage system are contrary to the establishment of democracy in Iraq based on a common and equal Iraqi citizenship. This puts Iraq well on the road to Lebanonization, a prospect (allegedly condemned by Iraqi politicians) that carries with it the seeds for grave future dangers in Iraq. As in Lebanon, it paves the way for future friction and the interference of external influences, two dangers that a still vulnerable Iraq is ill-equipped to face. The constitutional process that is taking shape is likely to entrench the flawed nature of this political process. Unless this tendency is countered by the emergence of national, recognizable political parties, particularly from the democratic center, the prospects for a true democracy are limited.

What should our goals in Iraq be? In the short term, we should aim for:

1. Reduction of violence in Baghdad and the 5 central governorates

2. A political settlement that can give confidence to all groups in Iraq

3. Strengthening of national institutions

For these short-term goals to be sustainable, we need to set medium term goals:

4. An end to zero-sum politics

5. The development of national political platforms in lieu of sectarian and ethnic platforms

6. A rational system of devolution of power to provinces or federated regions

I would like to underline that the vast majority of Iraqis want co-existence, want a national political agenda, and are opposed to sectarian violence. However, as in most countries, the majority is disempowered. May I also address the misperception common today in Washington, that the Sunnis and the Shi’a in Iraq have been “fighting it out for centuries”. That is not accurate. The incidence of sectarian violence in Iraq’s history is rare: certainly nothing like the religious wars that raged in Europe intermittently for many centuries. The fighting we see today is the worst it has ever been in Iraq’s history.

Breaking the Cycle of Violence

While it is true that the solution to Iraq’s problems is political, the violence impedes the quest for a political settlement. The violence in Baghdad and surrounding areas exacerbates the political tensions and deepens the sectarian divide. Whether perpetrated by insurgents or death squads, every killing calls forth an act of revenge in an endless bloody cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. Every bombing in a Shi’a market inflames the Shi’a community against the Sunnis. In the mayhem, a Shi’a backlash against innocent Sunnis is inevitable.

This level of violence blinds the politicians and the public and saps the national will for reconciliation and compromise. It is imperative to reduce the level of violence in order to ease sectarian tensions and launch a credible reconciliation process. We need to break the vicious cycle that currently dominates Iraq and turn it into a virtuous cycle, in which lower levels of violence encourage reconciliation efforts, and more compromises reduce the violence.

Instead of thinking in terms of “ending the violence”, it may be more useful to think of “breaking the cycle of violence”, especially in Baghdad, in order to provide an opportunity for Iraqis to address and implement political objectives. The model of “clear, hold and rebuild” has never been fully implemented because of lack of assets, and needs to be implemented now. Whenever possible, Iraqi troops should be in the forefront of the “rebuild” phase, to gain the trust of the people and build up their own confidence.

Simultaneously, the GOI needs to substantially increase the size of the Iraqi army and, with multinational assistance, improve training, equipment, and command and control structures. But operational improvements alone cannot do the job: the Iraqi army has to be infused with a sense of national mission, determination and pride. Such intangible build up is best provided by Iraqi commanders.

Elements of National Reconciliation

National dialogue in Iraq is overdue. Iraqi political actors need to enter into a meaningful national dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and a political compact. So far, there have only been large conferences full of fanfare and feel-good speeches in full view of the media. The dialogue must be sustained, serious, and far-reaching in confronting differences and resolving disagreements.

There are pre-requisites for a successful dialogue:

• Iraqi political leaders have to abandon the “winner takes all” and “loser loses all” mentality
• For the time being, politicians must abandon “majoritarian” and “minoritarian” thinking
• The Shi’a must accept that, however large their majority, they must share the territory, the resources, and the state of Iraq with others.
• Shi’a leaders must change their rhetoric, which currently swings between victimhood and triumphalism
• The Sunnis must learn to relinquish the power they have been accustomed to and accept the new political order.
• Sunnis leaders have to declare against the insurgency and condemn violence. They need to be squarely within the political framework, and cannot continue to straddle both sides of the fence.

Constitutional Revision

More specifically, revision of the constitution is a central component of national reconciliation. The present constitution is not conducive to a viable state and it enshrines many of the problems that plague Iraqi politics now. It has to be redrafted in terms of individual articles and in terms of the structure of the state it projects. Additionally, the constitution was written by the Shi’a and the Kurdish parties; the Sunnis were invited into the process late and did not have a significant input. The Sunnis have deep fears about aspects of the constitution, and their concerns must be addressed.

Legislative Agenda

Specific laws have to be revised or enacted that bolster confidence among the different social groups. Among these are the de-Ba’thification law and an amnesty law, both of which should be tightly linked to a credible judicial process. There cannot be national reconciliation while Sunnis continue to be eyed with suspicion and stereotyped as covert Saddam loyalists. At the same time, laws against hate speech and incitement to violence must be enacted to reassure the Shi’a and ease their fears. The constitution provides for a bi-cameral parliament. An Upper House can serve as a forum for national dialogue and provide a much needed counterweight to the sectarian and ethnic dynamics governing Iraqi politics today. The Iraqi parliament should begin looking at models and drafting legislation for a second chamber that is not based on demographic proportionality or electoral majorities and minorities.

Disarming the militias

Most political groups in Iraq have militias. The political groups need the militias not only for protection: they are a means to political power, territorial control, and economic control. In addition, there are local gangs that have acquired the status of militias. The GOI should not pick and choose: If it disbands one, it must eventually disband all. This is the principle that only the state has the legitimate use of force.

Operationally, the Iraqi government does not have adequate army forces, the troops are not sufficiently equipped and trained, and their resolve in such politically sensitive operations may waver. Shi’a army troops may be reluctant to seize and disarm Shi’a militias. Sunni troops may have the same problem. Far more important, the GOI needs the broad support, consensus and cooperation of the political parties in order to disarm the militias. Although everyone pays lip service to the need to eliminate militias, currently there is no visible political support for disarming or disbanding them.

At present, it is perhaps a more realistic strategy to pursue and eliminate the renegade groups that are guilty of crimes rather than attempt a wholesale policy towards militias. This in fact is happening in Baghdad, Basra, and other cities. In the meantime, the more orderly militias should be contained. Eventually, the demobilization and disarming of militias will require a political compact, easing sectarian tensions, economic recovery, job-creation, and a number of other transformations in political and economic life that are not available now.

Broadening Outreach to Sunnis

The GOI has made efforts to reach out to groups of Sunnis who have so far stayed out of the political process and who may be part of, or supportive of, the homegrown elements of the insurgency. This in itself is an important undertaking, but it has yielded limited outcomes. The depth of the problem is demonstrated by the nomenclature: the Sunnis call these groups “the honorable national resistance”, while the Shi’a call them “terrorists”.

In Anbar province, and to some extent in Diyala, local tribes have indeed been battling Al-Qaeda, but this may be because of local conflicts of interest and tribal divisions rather than an outcome of national outreach. The insurgency has not abated as a result of dialogue with Sunni militant groups. The demands of militant groups are frequently unrealistic and cause deep concern to the Shi’a. We should certainly not make national dialogue contingent on the participation of militant Sunni groups, although they should be welcomed if they choose to join.

Impediments to National Reconciliation

Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Maliki presented an ambitions national agenda with included a 24-point reconciliation plan, a proposal for a national amnesty law, a decision to disband the militias, and a commitment to reform the Ministry of Interior. To date, the national reconciliation project has been confined to the level of rhetoric; the revised de-Bathification law has not been presented to parliament; the militias are still going strong; and the Ministry of Interior still has a long way to go.

Because of the PM’s statements, we must assume that the Government of Iraq has the desire to achieve these objectives. The reality is that it is under severe constraints, some of which are operational but the more important ones are of political.

The phrase “Iraqi leadership” rightly refers to a collective that lies beyond the institutions of the state, and includes the leaders of the major political groups in Iraq, who may or may not be members of state institutions. The Government’s ability to execute policy is contingent upon the willingness of others to support and help implement policies. Without the support of this broader leadership, the government of Iraq is seriously hampered.

Thus a national compact is not dependent solely on the will of the government. Political actors have to reach agreements, but at present even the parameters of a national dialogue are in dispute.

After decades of disenfranchisement, the Shi’a are now enjoying the spoils of victory, and are reluctant to give up any of their new-found supremacy. Intellectually, the Shi’a concede that not every Sunni is a Ba’thi and Saddam supporter, but viscerally their suspicions linger. They are mortally afraid of the return of the Ba’this to power, even under other names and other guises, and therefore the de-Ba’thfication law and the amnesty law present difficulties.

Sunnis approach the political process with distrust and misgivings. They cannot reconcile themselves to their loss of status, and they have watched their position erode in the institutions of the state under a system of sectarian and ethnic proportional representation. They fear that they will be the new underdog and will be subject to persecution and revenge measures by the Shi’a. As a consequence, they tacitly or openly support the insurgency as their insurance policy.

From these central reciprocal fears stem a host of subsidiary problems that impede national reconciliation. The Shi’a and the Sunnis do not agree on who should be included in the national dialogue. Currently the Ba’th party is banned in Iraq. Can a reformed Ba’th party be part of the political process? Should any of the armed Sunni groups be included and on what conditions?

Another major problem is the nature of the Iraqi state. The Sunnis wish to see a stronger national government, whereas some Shi’a religious parties want a weak one. These Shi’a groups see an enormous advantage to a grand federated state in the south, with huge oil resources, agricultural opportunities, and access to ports. They also want to organize their social and civic affairs along religious lines, and want minimal interference by the national government. Should Iraq have loose federations in the north and south, with little national authority to earn income and distribute revenue, they will be bereft of resources.

Despite these difficulties, national reconciliation must proceed at full speed. The alternatives: continued bloodshed, ethnic cleansing, civil war, are horrific and the spill-over into the region is inevitable.

Medium Term Strategies

Iraq is too important to US strategic interests to be allowed to descend into chaos. In order for a national compact to take root and for the state to function effectively, the nature of politics of Iraq must be changed from a sectarian/ethnic base to a base of cross-sectarian, multi-ethnic national parties. It will be essential to develop national institutions that have both capacity and credibility. The responsibility for carrying this out obviously lies first and foremost with this and successive Iraqi governments, but the United States, Iraq’s neighbors, and the international community must recognize that they have a role to play if only for their own self-interest.

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.