Stefanie Nelson
Bountiful High School
Bountiful, Utah
Coordinator: Julia Nelson

Third party intervention in civil wars must be re-conceptualized as the collision of two competing philosophies: sovereignty and humanitarianism. On one hand, principles of sovereignty dictate that the people of a state should decide their own course; on the other hand, the bloodshed of innocent human life invokes humanitarianism concerns that motivate action by the international community. Instead of responding to pictures on CNN, intervention in civil wars needs to be accomplished on a case-by-case basis, carefully balancing these two concerns. Case studies of Sudan and Somalia demonstrate that intervention can be successful if the proper third parties recognize the tension between these two philosophies and act in a way to minimize the inherent problems.

Sovereignty, a tenet enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the basis of all functioning governments, concludes that the most important end is not the actual government of a nation but rather the process by which a community arrives at that arrangement. Artificial governments imposed by a third party fail, John Stuart Mill explained, because they "cannot shift the domestic balance of power in any decisive way toward the forces of freedom." Words, however, mean little when large numbers of people are suffering. Humanitarian concerns involve the protection of fundamental human rights and guarantying each individual the right to food, shelter, and dignity. Humanitarian intervention is justified as an exception to the principle of sovereignty when it responds to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind." Sovereignty must be trumped by the values of individual life and liberty because sovereignty itself is merely a means to protect these values.

In this media-prevalent age the default position is self-determination; humanitarian intervention must be seen as an expedited exception to this principle. Civil wars with humanitarian concerns pose the dilemma of resolving these conflicting standards. By paying careful consideration to the nature and actions of intervening parties, both sovereignty and humanitarian concerns can be reconciled as demonstrated by intervention in Somalia and Sudan.

The roots of recent conflict in Somalia stem from the long, disastrous dictatorship of Siad Barre and the clan system of Somalian society. An underdeveloped economy and Barre's vicious attacks on opponents caused clans to unite against Barre in January 1991. A Somalian described the clan dynamic, "Siad Barre dominates the psychology of this country. All clans want what his clan had." Barre's overthrow, unfortunately, only brought further crisis because the rebels never developed plans for a new government, resulting in an internal fight for control. In 1991, constant civil war between the clans and a severe drought combined to produce a catastrophic famine which killed an estimated 300,000 Somalians.

In 1991, the United Nations intervened with the goal of using arms to provide humanitarian assistance. Most resistance declined, except between rebel leaders General Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The UN effort failed eventually due to internal dissension between officials in Somalia and those in New York, who did not understand the complicated nature of the conflict. Aideed came to believe the United Nations favored his rival and attacked UN forces November 12, 1991, ordering armed gangs to pillage warehouses containing supplies and obstruct convoys. The United Nations, without consulting their Mogadishu delegation, the governments of neighboring countries, or local leaders, sent additional troops. At this point, the United States intervened under its own auspices with the goal of ensuring food for the dying Somalian public and disarming the citizens of Mogadishu, something Colin Powell deemed "short-termed." The mission then changed and the United States unilaterally became part of the conflict, hunting down Aideed. Predictably, the United States faced many problems similar to the United Nations. On October 3, 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed. Aideed boasted, "I had studied Beirut and Lebanon. I knew all I had to do to get Americans to leave was kill one American soldier." Aideed's comments proved astute, as the American public demanded the return of its soldiers and withdrew support. Two years after the U.S. withdrawal, the United Nations also left the African nation. While many Somalians were saved from hunger, political chaos continued to reign.

The failure of intervention stemmed from the mismatch between the desire for a "quick-fix" and the long-term support necessary for reconstituting a divided Somalia, the inability to understand the nuances of Somalian culture, and the failure of the third party to remain neutral. Don McKinnon, the New Zealand foreign minister, estimated helping Somalia to become self-governing would take between five and ten years. Because the "UN was staffed at all levels by expatriates with little knowledge of Somalia and with no briefing program to enable them to understand the local culture or Somalia's clan-based politics," a number of blunders occurred, including the persistent failure to recognize the critical importance of radio broadcasting in shaping Somali public opinion. UN humanitarian officers worked not from Somali towns, but rather from comfortable lodgings in Nairobi, Djibouti, and Mogadishu. As Richard Cheney assessed, "Problems developed when the mission changed to one of taking sides, instead of staying neutral."

The conflict in Sudan had deep-rooted causes. Distinct ethnic identities reinforced by regional separation and uneven economic development created a chasm between northern and southern parts of the country. Racially, the North was predominately Arabic while the South was African. Reinforcing this distrust, the government was located in and dominated by the North. As independence from Britain developed, divisions became more prevalent. For southern Sudanese, the struggle was "against internal colonialism" and more specifically against the "northern-dominated government's policies towards the South," something described as a "form of oppression." Complicating matters further, the southern Sudanese never forgot the slave trading policies imposed by their northern countrymen.

The convergence of region, ethnicity, class, and religion created a protracted conflict between the northern-led Sudanese state and the southern-based guerrillas, lasting from the mid-1950s to the 1970s. During this time, brutal fighting occurred, killing many civilians, and an estimated 500,000 refugees left their homes. After many years of bloody warfare, the northern government survived a military coup and executed opposition elements among the leaders. At the same time, southern forces united under the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM). The military situation stalemated, because of resource scarcity and weak social relations. The result was leaders from both sides willing to negotiate.

The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the All African Conference of Churches (AACC) took advantage of both this situation and their relationships with various Sudanese political leaders to act "as mediators." Both organizations had deep community roots and were predominately African. The mediators understood the complicated political issues, the rise of new actors, the people, and the countryside. One WCC official remarked, "Reconciliation efforts had to be based on a long period of preparation between both sides. . . . A relationship of trust was important, and it took time to establish our reliability and impartiality before people would enter into confidentiality." The WCC and AACC approached both parties and arranged for a neutral negotiation site, emphasizing the similarities and stalemate. During this process, they did not coerce the parties and understood the nuances of the culture.

The South accepted the negotiators because they were African; the North accepted the negotiators because they lacked official status and thus did not legitimize the southern rebels. Successful negotiations between the Nimeiry state and the SSLM at Addis Ababa brought an end to the first Sudanese civil war, creating a "self-governing region within a united, socialist Sudan.

Refugees returned home and rules of interaction between the North and South were established. A decade later, hostilities once again broke out, but experts agree "the agreement amounted to far more than a mere interlude in war."

Boutros Boutros-Ghali observed, "Respect for fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any international process. . . . It is the task to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an interdependent world." Third parties intervening in civil wars need to act in a way to minimize harm to principles of sovereignty while protecting humanitarian concerns. Intervention in Somalia was morally justified but was conducted in a way that failed to recognize sovereignty. The United Nations and the United States did not remain neutral nor did they understand the intricacies of the nation they attempted to assist. In contrast, a key to the success in Sudan was the complete impartiality the third parties maintained, which inspired confidence in the warring factions. Trust also came from the longstanding interest in the problems and a commitment to stay as long as possible, something absent in Somalia. While the WCC and AACC did not bring guns, they were still able to bring a true, albeit short-lived, peace. Intervention must be accomplished by parties who remain neutral and have a vested outcome and deep understanding of the cultural problems of the warring country. A comparison of Sudan and Somalia proves that for successful humanitarian intervention, third parties must recognize the purpose and realize the commitment and problems that accompany violating another state's sovereignty.

Notes

• Article 2(4) states, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." United Nations Charter, 1945.
• Richard Haass, Intervention (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989), 88.
• John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non–Intervention," in Dissertations and Discussions (New York: Harper Collins, 1873), 39.
• Although this is an accepted doctrine, no precise definition exists in international law. The United Nations Charter mandates that "the purposes of the United Nations" include achieving "international cooperation in solving international problems of a . . . humanitarian character." United Nations Charter, 1945, Article 1(3). Geneva Conventions assume rather than explain "principles of humanity" while the International Court of Justice refers vaguely to the "purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross."
• Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Also see Carol J. Greenhouse, "Fighting for Peace," in Peace and War: Cross Cultural Perspectives, ed. Mary LeCron Foster (New Brunswick: Rubinstein Transaction Books, 1986).
• Anatol Rapport, The Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict (New York: Paragon, 1993), 510. For more general information, see Paul Ramsel, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Lanham, 1983).
• For more regarding specifically Barre's reign, see Richard Greenfield, "An Embattled Barre," Africa Report (May/June 1987), 65–69, and United Nations, Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary–General, S/23829/ Add.1, 21 April 1992. For a general overview of the intervention, see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995).
• Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (Cambridge, England: Polity, 1996), 193.
• General Barre's rule from 1969 to 1991 roughly paralleled the Cold War. First, the Soviets and then the Americans provided economic and military aid. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 56–80.
• Robert G. Patman, "The UN Operation in Somalia," in A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, ed. Ramesh Takur and Carlye A. Thayer (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 45.
• Terrence Lyons and Ahmeed I. Samatar, Somalia: State Collapse, Multitilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995), 25.
• Hirsch and Oakley, 56.
• See United Nations Resolution 755, August 28, 1991, where the Security Council authorized a further deployment of 3500 troops across four operation zones in Somalia.
• The United States planned to stay approximately six months to a year. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Crisis in Somalia: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, 2nd sess., 17 December 1992.
• Much has been written about the Battle of Mogadishu. For a graphic description of this battle, see Rick Atkinson, "The Raid That Went Wrong," Washington Post, 30 January 1994, A1. See also Michael R. Gordon and Thomas L. Friedman, "Disastrous U.S. Raid in Somalia Nearly Succeeded, Review Finds," New York Times, 25 October 1993, A1. A good examination of the root causes of this problem is found in Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Participation in Somalia Peacekeeping: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 19 and 20 October 1993, and William J. Clinton, Report to the Congress on Somalia (Washington: United States Printing Office, 13 October 1993). For criticism of U.S. involvement, see Sidney Blumenthal, "Why Are We in Somalia?" New Yorker, 25 October 1993, 48–60.
• Alexander L. George, The Role of Force in Diplomacy: Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy. www.pbs.org/wbgh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/article.html, 29 November 2000.
• Don McKinnon, "New Zealand and the UN Security Council, " address to Ottago University, 26 October 1993.
• Ioan Lewis, "White–Washing the UN's Failures in Somalia," SNU 3 (27 August 1994): 180.
• Lyons and Samatar, 79.
• Makinda, 192.
• Richard Cheney, interview by Frontline, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/interviews/cheney.html, 29 November 2000.
• For a good overview of the complicated root causes, see Colin Legum, "The Sudan: War of Catastrophe," in Third World Reports (2 November 1988): 1–4.
• Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Peace Process in the Sudan, 1971–1972," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, ed. Roy Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 71–72. Also see Cecil Epirle, "Sudan: The Long War," Conflict Studies 21 (March 1972),7, and Richard Lobban, "National Integration and Disintegration: The Southern Sudan, " in Three Studies on National Integration in the Arab World, ed. Caesar Farah (Dartmouth, Mass: AAUG, 1974), 15–45.
• International Labor Office, Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1976), 199. Also see Edgar O'Balance, The Secret War in the Sudan, 1955–1972 (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1977), and Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1970).
• Sayed Able Alier, Peace and Development in the Southern Region (Khartoum: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1979), 25.
• South Sudan Resistance Movement, The Anya–Ny Struggle: Background and Objectives (London: Southern Sudan Association,1971), 14.
• SSLM leader Joseph Lagu's power came from the leverage gained from controlling military supplies funneled into the Sudan from abroad (allegedly by the Israelis). See Rothchild and Hartzell, 71–72.
• Hizkias Assefa, Mediation of Civil War: Approaches and StrategiesÜ#151;The Sudan Conflict (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 68.
• Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspectives (Tel Aviv: Shiloh Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1975), 179.
• Dunstan M. Wai, The African–Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York: Africana, 1981), 58–89.
• William H. Dorsey, "A Story's View of the Sudanese Settlement," New Middle East, October 1972, 17.
• Collins, 40–41.
• Epirle, 8.
• Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1970), 28.
• Boutros Boutros–Ghali, Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1995), 82.

Works Cited

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