Summary

• Throughout the 1990s, Turkey was the anchor in the containment of Saddam Hussein's Iraq by the United States. The unpredictable set of events unleashed by Operation Iraqi Freedom has unnerved both Turkish decision makers and the public alike.
• The U.S.-led coalition's operation in Iraq has also upended Turkey's fundamental interests in Iraq, which are fourfold:
  1. Prevent the division of Iraq along sectarian or ethnic lines that would give rise to an independent or confederal Kurdish state (with the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as its capital), thus supporting aspirations for a similar entity from Turkey's own extensive Kurdish population.
  2. Protect the Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority, which resides primarily in northern Iraq.
  3. Eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the Turkish Kurdish insurgent movement, which has sought refuge in the northeast of Iraq following its defeat in 1999.
  4. Prevent the emergence of a potentially hostile nondemocratic fundamentalist Iraqi state.
• Turkish concerns reflect the deep anxiety it harbors regarding the demonstration effect Kurdish independence or robust autonomy in Iraq would have on its own domestic Kurdish population. Having turned down a U.S. request to open up a second front against Iraq, Turkey has found itself with limited influence in Iraq and is at a loss as to how to shape the future course of events. Turks perceive that Iraqi Kurds have achieved a position of privilege as a result of their unconditional support for the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the occupation of the country by coalition forces.
• Turkish attitudes and foreign policy toward Iraq are complicated by the uneasy relationship between Ankara's ruling Justice and Development Party government and the traditional secularist elites, military and civilian. The latter's suspicions of the ruling party are driven mainly by the "concessions" made to obtain an invitation this past December from the European Union to open accession negotiations. One of the "concessions" was to adopt a tempered policy toward Iraq; hence, success in Iraq has become a litmus test of sorts for the government.
• With uncertainty in Iraq and Turkish anxieties mounting, U.S.-Turkish relations have suffered, despite their mutual desire for a unified, prosperous, and democratic Iraqi state that can become a counterweight to Iran in the future. What divides the United States and Turkey most of all is the lack of accord over future contingencies in Iraq, especially in the event of a U.S. failure in that country. Thus, it is crucial for the United States and Turkey to engage in extensive—preferably back-channel— negotiations and, later, to include the Iraqi government and representatives from Iraqi Kurdish factions in the negotiations in order to rebuild confidence in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.

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