KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Last Friday, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) met in Washington to sign an agreement to end 30 years of conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes region. The peace deal was accompanied by commitments to build a “regional economic integration framework” and promises of U.S. investment in eastern DRC’s abundant critical mineral reserves, among other commercial agreements.
In an Oval Office event with the two foreign ministers, President Trump called the moment “a glorious triumph for the cause of peace” and extended invitations for Rwandan President Paul Kagame and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi to sign further agreements — which, together with the peace deal, have been dubbed the “Washington Accord” by U.S. Senior Advisor for Africa Massad Boulos — in Washington this July.
USIP’s Cecily Brewer and Kent Brokenshire explore what brought DRC and Rwanda to the negotiating table, the long-term outlook for peace in the region, and how control over critical minerals factors into the situation.
Brewer: While the ceremony in the Oval Office on Friday signifies U.S. attention at the highest level, it is important to remember that it is only one signpost, albeit a significant one, along a long and winding path of negotiations — and broken agreements — between DRC and Rwanda over the decades.
Over the past year and a half, high-level mediators from the United States, Angola, Kenya, Qatar, Togo and the African Union, among others, have brought the parties back to the negotiating table time and again, finally culminating in Friday’s peace deal. This “multimediation” is part of a growing global trend of more countries leaning into mediation as a part of their foreign policy toolkit.
The current chapter in the conflict began in late 2023, as tensions between DRC and Rwanda surged around the time of DRC’s presidential elections. In response, the United States re-energized its efforts to broker peace, with the then-director of national intelligence shuttling between the two capitals. The parties committed to de-escalation measures and the U.S. played an innovative role in monitoring implementation of these commitments. In mid-2024, Angola, a long-time mediator of the conflict via the Luanda Process, announced that the parties had committed to a long-term cease-fire.
However, the cease-fire collapsed in December 2024 and the Rwandan-backed armed group M23 embarked on a devastating rampage through eastern DRC. While the cease-fire agreement had not included “built in” consequences for violation of the agreement, the United States did impose sanctions on Rwandan and M23 officials in response to these actions. And in March, Qatar’s emir resuscitated negotiations, meeting with Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi in Doha. With Massad Boulos’ appointment as U.S. senior advisor for Africa in April, the United States resumed a high-level mediation role, now working closely with Qatar.
As to the contents of the peace deal itself: At its heart is a mutual commitment to respect territorial integrity and end hostilities, including implementation of a previously-agreed-upon concept of operations in which Rwanda withdraws from Congolese territory within 90 days and both parties bring an “irreversible and verifiable end” to support for militias.
The agreement also calls for the disengagement, disarmament and conditional integration of non-state armed groups, the expansion of humanitarian access, the return of the displaced, and a re-affirmation of the U.N. mission in DRC’s mandate.
Further, the parties established a joint security coordination mechanism to manage implementation, with the United States and Qatar as observers. The parties also committed to launch a regional economic integration framework, which would be signed at the White House in July.
Brewer: One essential element for peace is the parties’ follow-through on their commitments. The deal is only as strong as the parties’ will to implement it. While in the recent past, the United States and Angola have worked with the parties on innovative, real-time mechanisms to monitor implementation of their commitments, long-term changes in behavior can only be secured if monitoring is tied to tangible consequences. Mediators can help to shape the parties’ calculations by creating inducements linked to implementation and punishments linked to violations.
At the White House, both DRC and Rwandan foreign ministers noted the history of broken agreements and urged the United States to stay committed through the implementation process. President Trump acknowledged this request, but left his government’s commitment open-ended, saying, “We’ll make sure you follow through” while floating the possibility of “severe penalties, financial and otherwise” if the deal should break down. Continued coordination — and pressure — from the U.S., Qatar, the African Union and others will be essential to the implementation of the agreement and the long-sought peace and prosperity that it promises.
Continued coordination — and pressure — from the U.S., Qatar, the African Union and others will be essential to the implementation of the agreement and the long-sought peace and prosperity that it promises.
Another essential element for peace that was left open-ended is the proxy nature of the conflict. While Rwanda has promised to stop providing military support to (and fighting alongside) M23 in eastern DRC, the militia group itself has not yet signed on to any peace agreement. And even with an end to Rwandan patronage, the group is still adept at funding itself via illicit means. Qatar continues to work to bring about a cease-fire between M23 and the DRC government, which will be essential to peace given M23’s role in provoking the current crisis. A peace that does not include M23 is no peace at all.
Furthermore, former DRC President Joseph Kabila reentered the country through the M23-held city of Goma in late May after spending the previous year in self-imposed exile. Kabila’s return and alleged links to M23 could be a harbinger of the reemergence of fraught internal political and regional rivalries that have shaped DRC governance for decades and could perpetuate conflict in the eastern DRC even without Rwanda’s involvement.
Brokenshire: Failure of the peace deal would create further instability in the Great Lakes region and exacerbate the already-dire humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC. It will also deter U.S. investment in cobalt and copper mining operations in southern DRC, leading to continued Chinese dominance in Africa’s critical minerals sector.
Additionally, failure would constitute a setback for the United States’ reputation in Africa, as the Trump administration’s peace efforts mark the first time a sitting U.S. president has directly mediated a peace agreement in the DRC. Conversely, the president’s personal engagement has raised hopes in the region that the long struggle for peace may begin to bear tangible results.
The fiercest challenges will likely come from the illicit economy that has sprung up amid the conflict … These activities have created powerful actors with vested interests in continuing the conflict.
Still, the obstacles are daunting. The fiercest challenges will likely come from the illicit economy that has sprung up amid the conflict, including illegal mining, illegal logging, cross-border smuggling, extortion rackets and other criminal activity. These activities have created powerful actors with vested interests in continuing the conflict.
DRC President Tshisekedi, however, appears confident that peace will bring richer dividends for all. The DRC government is actively seeking investments from U.S. and Western mining companies to counteract growing Congolese dissatisfaction with Chinese firms. And though the DRC’s rich cobalt and copper belt lies hundreds of miles from the conflict in the east, peace, stability and security would inspire the investor confidence needed for U.S. firms to begin operations. From there, the DRC government will be positioned to improve transportation infrastructure and enhance the business climate.
Brewer: Similar to its approach of tying peace mediation efforts to a critical mineral deal with Ukraine, the Trump administration has framed its high-level focus on the conflict between DRC and Rwanda as important for U.S. interests in securing a supply chain of critical minerals independent from China, thereby linking peace in DRC to greater American security and prosperity.
Yet, the peace agreement signed on Friday only mentions critical minerals once. Instead, U.S. officials at Friday’s White House ceremony, including President Trump himself, largely framed this agreement as part of the president’s wider interest in the pursuit of peace by referencing his other peace efforts related to Iran and Israel, Pakistan and India, and Russia and Ukraine. Critical minerals will instead feature strongly in the separate “regional economic integration framework,” which will be part of the “Washington Accord” to be signed by heads of state at the White House in July.
The Trump administration’s framing of the peace talks as a means to greater mutual economic benefit — for the United States, for the leaders and people of DRC and Rwanda, and for the wider region — can help move parties beyond the zero-sum mindsets and self-perpetuating incentives that have become entrenched over three decades of war. But that’s only if that framing can indeed be translated into concrete and beneficial change. Such a “peace dividend” can be slow to manifest, and old systems of corruption often die hard. Further, the U.S. private sector largely pulled out of mining interests in DRC over the past 10 years. To re-create an environment enticing enough for them to return will take a lot of hard work in the days and years following the White House signing ceremony.
The real measure of peace will not be agreements signed in Washington, but concrete measures that improve the lives of those living in eastern DRC. The peace deal raises the possibility of that outcome, but it by no means guarantees it.